Forging a punishing state: The punitive turn in U.S. criminal and social policy, 1968-1980 by Kohler-Hausmann, Julilly
  
 
 
 
 
FORGING A PUNISHING STATE: 
THE PUNITIVE TURN IN U.S. CRIMINAL AND SOCIAL POLICY, 1968-1980 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
JULILLY KOHLER-HAUSMANN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
  Doctoral Committee 
 
Associate Professor Mark Leff, Chair 
Professor Jim Barrett 
Associate Professor Clarence Lang 
Professor Elizabeth Pleck 
Professor David Roediger 
 
  ii 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation examines two intertwined recent phenomena: welfare state retrenchment 
and burgeoning carceral institutions. Through research on seminal struggles over welfare, drug, 
and criminal sentencing policy, it chronicles a profound shift during the 1970s where programs 
that championed punishment, expulsion, and retribution supplanted policies that stressed 
rehabilitation and social reintegration. Specifically, it examines New York’s adoption of the 
nation’s harshest drug penalties in the Rockefeller Drug Laws; campaigns in Illinois and 
California designed to control “welfare abuses” through criminalization and community 
surveillance; and California’s passage of the first major determinate sentencing law, which 
abandoned rehabilitation as an aim of incarceration. The project explores legislators’ motivations 
for these policies, their fervent public support, and the constrained agency of prisoners, welfare 
recipients, and drug offenders. These legislative battles served a productive cultural role in 
rationalizing new economic conditions, demarcating membership in the polity, and redefining 
state legitimacy and responsibility. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the 1970s, the United States began an expansion of its penal institutions that decisively 
restructured politics and society. In high-profile political battles across the nation, politicians 
renounced traditional governmental approaches to social problems and championed new, 
“tough” punitive strategies to control crime, drug use, and mounting welfare costs. These early 
experiments did little to make citizens safer or ameliorate the problems plaguing urban centers. 
They were expensive and inefficient, and they repudiated specialists’ accumulated expertise 
about social problems. Nonetheless, legislatures across the country championed and replicated 
them. This dissertation seeks to understand why so many politicians and citizens zealously 
embraced this punitive movement.  
My research is informed and influenced by the sophisticated body of scholarship that 
debates the various economic, social, and cultural factors that inspired the U.S. penal system’s 
explosive growth. Yet I do not weigh in on these debates over what triggered mass incarceration, 
but instead concentrate on how the process of building the carceral state restructured U.S. 
society. Therefore, rather than investigating what caused the incarceration boom, this dissertation 
examines the effects of the struggles to enact punitive legislation during the 1970s. The project 
treats dramatic prison growth and welfare-state retrenchment as one intertwined phenomenon 
that was animated by and rationalized by a growing punitive consensus. It focuses on the wider 
implications of the punitive reorientation in policy that legally and symbolically expelled highly 
stigmatized, racialized groups from the polity. In short, I investigate what was accomplished 
during the 1970s through the embrace of a punitive logic in U.S. criminal and welfare policy.    
I argue that the political process of enacting punishing legislation had two profound 
effects beyond the obvious implications of increasing incarceration and constricting state aid. 
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First, it structured conceptions of citizenship and redefined who was part of the national 
community to which the state was accountable. At a time when notions of full belonging in the 
polity were being dramatically renegotiated through civil rights and other movements, these 
policies constructed racialized outgroups against which full citizenship was defined. Punitive 
policy both created and was predicated upon this divide between normative, “taxpaying” citizens 
and vilified, racialized “anti-citizens.” The manufacture of internal enemies—such as criminals, 
drug pushers, or welfare queens—who have little legitimate claim on the state served multiple 
political functions. It rationalized and sustained shifting economic and social conditions, and 
defined normative citizenship and productive lifestyles by graphically representing their 
opposite. 
Second, the political spectacle of punitive law also forwarded a new vision of state 
authority. Legislation enacted in the 1970s abandoned programs that stressed reform, 
rehabilitation, and reintegration, and championed ideologies that individualized responsibility for 
social problems and privileged the punishment, surveillance, and segregation of deviance. With 
faith in government at an all-time low, these policies attempted to salvage and remake political 
authority by asserting a different, macho vision of state legitimacy.  
 The ascendancy of these punishing strategies was not inevitable. For a brief period 
between the 1960s and 1980s, competing visions clashed and individuals within marginalized 
populations—such as welfare recipients and prisoners—struggled to assert their own visions for 
state programs. Critics from both the left and right exposed the limitations and tensions of the 
liberal welfare state, discrediting many of its reigning assumptions and opening space for 
alternative visions of state intervention in society.1 My story, therefore, ends where many 
                                                
1
 Some key works in the huge literature on the development of the welfare state and its relationship to racial, gender 
and class hierarchies in American society are: Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New 
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narratives about welfare-state declension begin: in 1980, with the election of President Ronald 
Reagan. I argue, however, that Reagan’s election is best understood not as a sudden revolution, 
but as the culmination of a long struggle at the heart of American political culture over society’s 
dominant interpretations of social problems, especially regarding racial, gender, and economic 
inequality, and the fate of the welfare state.  It marked the ascension of a wide punitive 
consensus among elites in both parties and large swaths of the population. The relatively rapid 
rise of this logic was facilitated by the limitations and tensions inherent in the American welfare 
state and liberal reformers’ ideology, which always offered constricted and contingent benefits to 
women and people of color and attributed poverty, crime, and inequality primarily to behavioral 
or cultural causes.2 Therefore, as opposed to being opposites, there was a consonance between 
punitive and welfarist strategies that eased the transition between them. 
 
Three Studies in Building a Punishing Consensus 
Although punishment has become the most obvious and politically safe response to social 
marginality, this was not always the case. This dissertation examines three of the key historical 
sites where punitive, “get tough” strategies became common sense and investigates how these 
notions were first cobbled together. It examines the political processes and arguments that 
                                                                                                                                                       
Deal Order (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Linda Faye Williams, The Constraint of Race: 
Legacies of White Skin Privilege in America (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003); 
Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare’s End (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Michael Brown, Race, Money, and 
the Welfare State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Racism 
Undermined the War on Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black 
Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998); Kenneth Neubeck and 
Noel Cazenave, Welfare Racism (New York: Routledge, 2001); Linda Gordon, Pitied but Not Entitled: Single 
Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-1935 (New York: Free Press, 1994); Alice Kessler-Harris, In Pursuit of 
Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); and Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: the Political Origins of Social Policy 
in the United States (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992). 
2 See, for example, Thomas Jackson, “The State, the Movement, and the Urban Poor” in The “Underclass” Debate: 
Views from History, ed. Michael Katz (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Linda Gordon, Pitied but 
Not Entitled; and Linda Faye Williams, The Constraint of Race: Legacies of White Skin Privilege in America.  
 4 
propelled this punishing logic to ascendancy and discredited alternative visions. I focus on 
historical pivot points, where old rehabilitative rationales for state intervention were crumbling 
but had not yet been replaced. At these critical junctures, we can examine how dueling notions of 
state responsibility, conflicting understandings of social problems, and competing structural 
imperatives were hashed out through the political process, resulting eventually—but not 
inevitably—in a new punishing consensus.  
Through close examination of pivotal state-level political struggles, this dissertation 
chronicles how new punitive policies empowered specific groups, silenced others, and forwarded 
a distinct, macho vision of state authority. In order to explore these themes, the project is 
organized around three case studies, each representing key policy shifts at the state level in drug, 
welfare, and criminal sentencing policy. I focus on the state as opposed to the national level, in 
order to blend policy history and social history and to capture the interactions among cultural 
assumptions, material conditions, legislation, and local people’s perspectives. Linked together, 
these distinct institutional trajectories illustrate how punitive, exclusionary trends spanned 
diverse state bureaucracies and geographic areas and percolated at the state level before 
manifesting on the national scene. Specifically, the dissertation examines New York’s adoption 
of the nation’s harshest drug penalties in the Rockefeller Drug Laws; campaigns in Illinois and 
California designed to control “welfare abuses” through criminalization and community 
surveillance; and California’s passage of the first major determinate sentencing law, which 
abandoned rehabilitation as an aim of incarceration. 
Since it is organized around statutory change, my research reveals the disproportionate 
power of politicians in designing these policies. It also highlights the influence of “law-and-
order” voters, popular culture, social movements, and public opinion. In addition, it incorporates 
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the constrained agency of those groups targeted by these laws: prisoners, welfare recipients, and 
drug users. In order to capture the dynamic interactions within society that shaped these 
phenomena, this study puts in conversation social groups that are often studied separately. 
Locating political leaders, supporters of “get tough” politics, and target populations on the same 
analytical plane illustrates the complex interactions that fueled punitive trends. It reveals that a 
dialogic process, shaped even by the groups it stigmatized, gave rise to the cultural assumptions 
about the desirability and inevitability of punitive approaches to social marginality.  
My careful attention to the contributions and attitudes of common people does not suggest 
they controlled political outcomes. Nor do I excavate their voices simply to include silenced but 
largely ineffectual voices. Within asymmetrical power relations, various groups of common 
citizens pressured elites and sculpted public debates. Within even more highly constrained 
parameters, drug offenders, welfare recipients, and inmates advocated for themselves. Their 
actions guided events, although not always in the ways they would have hoped. Political 
adversaries, for example, used activism by welfare recipients and prisoners to illustrate the need 
for crackdowns and redeployed the activists’ claims for new rights to advance a reactionary 
politics.   
The policy paradigms forged in New York, Illinois, and California set the stage for 
subsequent national debates, producing legislative and programmatic models eventually taken up 
by other states and the federal government. These policy battles unfolded in the states with the 
major economic, cultural, and urban areas in the Midwest, West, and East. These states 
encountered most dramatically many of the hallmarks of the era: movement organizing, urban 
unrest, rising crime, and burgeoning welfare rolls, and became testing grounds for new 
ideologies and programs. Other states and federal authorities watched experiments in Illinois, 
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New York, and California carefully, making these states’ politics and policies disproportionately 
influential. Because these states hosted much of the period’s historical drama, their stories 
mistakenly stood in for the entire nation. They were, however, actually the dramatic, high-profile 
exceptions. New York City’s experience with extreme levels of heroin use and budget-breaking 
welfare costs made sensationalized news across the country because they were far outside the 
national norm. Yet, due to their high profile, the debates in these sites played critical roles in 
sculpting national discourse about poverty, crime, and drug addiction. 
 These state-level contests intersected with national politics. California’s Governor Ronald 
Reagan and New York’s Governor Nelson Rockefeller jockeyed for leadership of the Republican 
Party, and therefore often acted with a national audience in mind. Indeed, it would be difficult to 
assemble a persuasive national historical narrative about punitive trends without taking into 
account state-level developments. Reagan’s welfare reforms in California, for example, were 
instrumental in derailing President Richard Nixon’s guaranteed minimum-income proposal, the 
Family Assistance Plan. It was Reagan who designed and advanced the alternative, more 
punitive approach that Republicans (and President Bill Clinton) ultimately embraced.   
These case studies represent historically influential chapters in the ongoing negotiations 
over culpability for pressing social problems and appropriate state responses. While they were 
early forays into “get tough” policy, I do not claim that the statutes or their direct descendants 
were the most significant policy triggers of today’s hyper-incarceration. The Rockefeller Drug 
Laws and mandatory drug sentencing were responsible for a large percentage of prison 
population growth. However, the influence of determinate sentencing was, especially in the early 
stages, more ambiguous. Welfare fraud convictions clearly were not a significant statistical 
factor in ballooning prison populations. Instead, I have chosen case studies that highlight specific 
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dimensions of the rising punishing consensus and evolving understandings of civil belonging and 
state responsibility. These policies did not simply index majority opinion; they were key sites 
where opinion was forged and new visions of political authority and civic belonging developed. 
The three studies are linked together by their embrace of shared assumptions, but they do 
not follow the same narrative arc. On the contrary, their juxtaposition illustrates the diversity 
within the punitive trend and the divergent, specific factors that influenced it. While the studies 
are presented separately in this dissertation for narrative purposes, the politics of drugs, crime, 
and welfare were intertwined ideologically and overlapped chronologically. The exclusionary 
logic they shared developed strength, consistency, and legitimacy as it spread, although it did not 
operate the same way in every setting. 
The first study examines New York’s passage of the renowned Rockefeller Drug Laws and 
establishes the foundation of my argument about punitive policy. In 1973, moderate Republican 
Governor Nelson Rockefeller abandoned aggressive drug addiction treatment programs in favor 
of draconian new penalties. Heralded as the “nation’s toughest drug laws,” the law mandated 
indeterminate life sentences for anyone convicted of selling narcotics. The case study opens by 
surveying the therapeutic programs Rockefeller first championed to combat the perception of an 
epidemic of crime and heroin use. It examines the political and programmatic stumbling blocks 
faced by New York’s therapeutic communities, methadone maintenance, and civil commitment 
programs. These complications joined with the governor’s national political ambitions to inspire 
his dramatic punitive conversion. Rockefeller’s embrace of draconian, “tough” drug penalties 
discredited and supplanted therapeutic approaches while also casting drug pushers as menacing, 
racialized enemies against which full citizenship was defined.  Vilifying pushers and portraying 
drug abuse as a problem indigenous to central cities helped alleviate the consternation 
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surrounding the drug use and cultural upheaval among white, middle-class communities. 
Through this discourse about crime and drugs, various groups struggled to assign culpability for 
social problems and reallocate civil rights and responsibilities within the nation, especially 
regarding race. The Rockefeller Drug Laws, therefore, not only had devastating effects on those 
drug offenders caught in the state’s dragnet, but were also instrumental in the profound 
renegotiation of the state’s role, responsibilities, and character.  
The second case study focuses on welfare reform during the 1970s and straddles California, 
Illinois, and federal politics to illustrate the ways punitive strategies migrated. Instead of 
centering the federal government, this study foregrounds state-level experiments and pushes 
national debates to the background. It focuses on efforts by politicians in California and Illinois 
to shrink welfare rolls and coerce recipients into wage labor through a relentless focus on welfare 
abuses and welfare chiselers.  
This study begins by chronicling President Nixon’s and Governor Reagan’s divergent 
approaches to the fiscal and political “welfare crisis.”  In 1969, Nixon introduced the Family 
Assistance Plan [FAP] to address welfare’s rising costs and public disdain, and to build his 
constituency among lower-income whites. The FAP proposed to institute a guaranteed minimum 
income to all low-income families, including subsidizing the wages of the working poor. It 
would have dramatically expanded the pool of people receiving public aid and diminished the 
saliency and stigma of the social category of welfare recipient. Reagan’s welfare reforms, while 
sharing some of Nixon’s assumptions and aims, were largely understood to be the FAP’s foil. 
California constricted access to welfare, and restricted peoples’ ability to work and receive 
welfare simultaneously. These eligibility changes—coupled with the increased surveillance and 
criminalization based on fevered anti-fraud campaigns—made the distinction between welfare 
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recipients and low-wage workers all the more stark. As a consequence, welfare recipients 
became more economically destitute and socially stigmatized.  
The second half of the welfare study explores how Illinois legislators appropriated the 
themes of Reagan’s welfare reform and translated them into a high profile anti-fraud campaign. 
Where the California section investigates the ways Reagan’s rhetoric and policy reframed 
welfare and countered welfare rights activists’ claims, the Illinois section explores the 
perspectives and influence of non-elite actors. It investigates the enthusiastic public participation 
in identifying fraud and welfare recipients’ responses to the crackdown. These campaigns and 
the surrounding cultural politics solidified the image of a criminalized “welfare queen” and her 
co-conspirator, the inept welfare system. 
This welfare case study builds on the drug law study to illustrate how punitive trends 
manifested in the welfare bureaucracy, a state entity not technically charged with law 
enforcement. Nonetheless, punishing politics played a similar role of discrediting the 
therapeutically oriented welfare program and positioning recipients as the antithesis of full 
citizens. Through heightened surveillance, restricted eligibility, and criminalization, the welfare 
reforms of Illinois and California negated recipients’ claims to material support and cultural 
respect. By positioning welfare recipients as the opposite of productive workers, these politics 
enshrined the primacy of wage labor and depressed the value of unpaid domestic labor. The 
relentless focus on welfare fraud further marginalized the work of child rearing while 
simultaneously discrediting welfare-state programs.    
The final case study of the dissertation explores the punitive shifts in criminal sentencing 
through California’s passage of the first major determinate sentencing law in the country.3  
                                                
3
 Maine passed a determinate sentencing law before California, although the specifics made it less precedent-setting 
than California’s. 
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California’s 1977 law proclaimed punishment as incarceration’s primary purpose and formally 
abandoned the penal system’s rehabilitative mission. The old therapeutic rationale had been 
enshrined in indeterminate sentencing, where parole boards had near total control over sentence 
length and only released inmates once they were deemed sufficiently reformed.4 Prisoners 
themselves, resentful of this arbitrary power of parole boards over their lives, campaigned for a 
determinate sentencing law. While the new law eliminated much of the uncertainty resulting 
from open-ended prison terms, it transferred sentencing authority from the parole boards to the 
legislature, which steadily increased sentences and constricted inmates’ rights and privileges. 
This section chronicles the contingent historical process where a macho, punitive vision for state 
programs supplanted the reigning therapeutic rationale for incarceration. It explores the ways 
“get tough” politics interacted with organizing by prisoners and their allies against penal 
liberalism and the “rehabilitative ideal.” “Law-and-order” elites leveraged the openings created 
by repudiating the therapeutic rationale for incarcerations and advanced a new vision that relied 
upon ostracizing inmates from the civil society. Through this process, law enforcement 
professionals positioned themselves and their increasingly militaristic, punishing strategies as the 
inevitable, obvious guarantors of public order and safety.   
 These three high-profile political struggles were instrumental in forging a new consensus 
about government’s responsibility and capacity to manage social problems.  Taken together, they 
illuminate how the spectacle of “getting tough” played a critical role in redefining who had 
legitimate claims on the state and to full belonging in U.S. society.  
 
                                                
4
 Although this was the reigning philosophy, punishment and vengeance have always been part of incarceration, and 
rehabilitation has always been unevenly embraced. For example, rehabilitation was not significantly integrated into 
the South’s convict leasing system, which predominantly affected African Americans. See Angela Davis, "Race, 
Gender and Prison History: From the Convict Lease System to the Supermax Prison," in Prison Masculinities, ed. 
Dan Sabo, Terry A. Kupers, and Willie London (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 35-45. 
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Integrating Punitive Trends into Recent United States History  
The themes of this dissertation intersect with a rich and diverse array of scholarship. However, 
the specific focus—punitive trends in U.S. criminal and social policy during the 1970s—has 
been underscrutinized in historical literature and not fully historicized in the scholarship of other 
disciplines. Due no doubt to disciplinary imperatives, research in fields such as sociology and 
political science make general, broad historic claims, usually based on the national level, that are 
rarely rooted in deep archival research. Within the historical discipline, there is relatively little 
scholarship on the explosion of carceral institutions, and it is rarely even mentioned in textbooks 
and synopses of the period.5 My work contributes to our understanding of these core social 
policies by uncovering the politics, rhetoric, and dynamics at the ground level in these early 
formative struggles. It incorporates the participation and perspectives of non-elite actors: those 
people clamoring for “get tough” approaches and those targeted by them.   
 Historians have traditionally seen “law-and-order” crusades as a “backlash” against urban 
riots, rising crime rates, and protest movements, especially by African Americans, of the 1960s.6 
                                                
5
 For textbooks, see, for example, William Rorabaugh, Donald Critchlow, and Paula Baker, America’s Promise 
(Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004); Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty: An American History (New 
York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2006); and Jacqueline Jones, et al., Created Equal (New York: Longman, 2003).  For 
syntheses of historical work and surveys of the period, see Stephen Whitfield, A Companion to 20th-Century 
America (Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004); Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig, A 
Companion to Post-1945 America (Malden, MA : Blackwell, 2002); Peter Carroll, It Seemed Like Nothing 
Happened (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990); and Bruce Schulman, The Seventies: the Great Shift in 
American Culture, Society and Politics (New York: Free Press, 2001). One exception to this trend could be Philip 
Jenkins, Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties and the Making of Eighties America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). He explores the cultural panics regarding crime between 1975 and 1985, especially murder 
and child abuse, and the increasingly harsh, simplistic legislative efforts to respond. 
6
 See, for example, Thomas Byrne Edsall & Mary Edsall, Chain Reaction: the Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on 
American Politics (New York: Norton, 1991); and Michael Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and 
the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). Debates rage over the actual 
extent of the crime wave that began in the 1950s. It was probably statistically inflated by new reporting procedures 
and the inevitable result of demographic factors. Since baby boomers, the large cohort of babies born after WWII, 
began reaching early adulthood— the age bracket most prone to commit crime—in the late 1950s, scholars suggest 
increases in crime were assured. Others, such as David Garland, argue that higher levels of crime are the result of 
the disaggregated communities of late modernity. Regardless of the cause or the precise extent of the crime increase, 
there seems little doubt that there was a significant rise when compared to the previous decade.  David Garland, The 
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According to this argument, politicians were responding to the public’s demand for order and 
retribution in the face of growing unrest and threats to their safety. I contribute to these debates 
by historicizing the assumption that rising crime rates and social disorder inevitably gave rise to 
calls for “get tough” programs. Failing to scrutinize this logic risks merely reinforcing the 
historical actors’ rationale for advancing punishing policy. Higher crime has not always resulted 
in punitive legislation or the public hostility directed toward courts, liberal politicians, and 
rehabilitative programs that characterized these experiences.7 As political scientist Vesla Weaver 
explains,  
Without elite goals and shift in power, crime and violence were merely objective 
conditions. Deep investigation into how the issue was framed and negotiated in 
the political process provides crucial insights into when and under what 
conditions crime came to be an urgent social problem... The simplistic assumption 
that increases in crime are behind changes that led to increasing prison 
populations ignores the politicization of the issue, how target groups were socially 
constructed, and elite incentives and agency.8  
 
Following this logic, a central objective of this research is to interrogate the punitive reflex 
among politicians and the public and to denaturalize their construction of these social problems 
and marginalized groups. I argue that the ascendancy of “law-and-order” politics was neither 
inevitable nor reflexive. Instead, politicians proactively and creatively used the spectacle of 
punishing policy (among other things) to mobilize support and reshape the political terrain.   
 Other recent historical work has countered “backlash” interpretations by studying right-
wing movements on their own terms instead of as derivative of more high-profile left-wing 
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mobilizations.9 Although this important scholarship has rightly emphasized organizing against 
taxes, government intervention, and the erosion of “traditional morality,” it has not scrutinized 
the central role and implications of punitive policy. As opposed to shrinking government, 
punishing programs were actually state-building enterprises. They played a key role in 
galvanizing the right’s resurgence and ideologically rationalizing key conservative projects, 
especially welfare-state retrenchment.    
 Threaded through this literature is a debate over whether the rise of the right and “law-
and-order” politics were bottom-up or top-down phenomena. Scholars disagree over whether the 
change was animated by a white working-class “backlash” against civil rights victories, right-
wing grassroots organizing, or elites strategically deploying controversial, racially coded issues 
to inspire the rejection of liberal programs and politicians. By putting political elites, enraged 
“backlash voters,” and targeted groups on the same analytical plane, this research illustrates that 
the popular assumption that the “urban crisis” demanded retributive policy was not simply the 
product of top-down manipulation by elites, nor the irrepressible political dictate of grassroots 
pressure. Instead, punitive policy was driven by a complex, dialectical interaction between 
political elites and groups of common citizens who felt a loss of stature and privileges as 
economic opportunities narrowed and traditionally marginalized groups gained new rights. Thus, 
although punishing policy reflected frustrations of the electorate and their fears about social and 
economic transformation, the policies were also performative and creative; they were 
instrumental in producing the common sense and worldviews they purported to reflect. This 
close scrutiny of high-profile examples of “get tough” politics also reveals the limitations of 
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focusing exclusively on far-right conservatives and reveals the extent to which moderate 
Republicans and Democrats were implicated in forwarding punitive policies. 
 As the past decades’ still-amorphous historical narrative comes into focus, punitive trends 
should not be relegated to a sidebar. Instead they belong at the center of recent U.S. history.  
These transformations did not affect only those people and communities targeted by punishing 
laws; they also had profound implications for conceptions of national identity, civic virtue, and 
state responsibility and character. Folding these themes into wider historical narratives recasts 
our understanding of the entire period. When viewed from the perspective of those populations 
targeted by these laws, this story becomes, on balance, declensionist and therefore unsettles 
popular visions of the era’s triumphant struggles for racial, economic, and gender equality. 
Scholars from outside the historical discipline—such as sociologists, geographers and 
political scientists—have important insight into the macro-level economic, political, and social 
changes that fueled the growing emphasis on punishment that began in the 1970s.  I start from 
the premise, which has been well-established by other research, that mass incarceration must be 
understood primarily as a political phenomenon. Scholars’ close scrutiny of the chronology 
debunks those theories that attribute prison expansion primarily to the era’s rising crime rates, 
increased drug use, or the economic interests of private prison industries.10 Although they may 
disagree about what motivated shifts in criminal policy, most scholars agree that changes in 
criminal sentencing and the practices of law enforcement account for a disproportionate share of 
the unprecedented increases in the number of people in prison and the amount of time they spent 
there.  
Sociologists of punishment stress that wider social transformations inspired exclusionary, 
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punishing policies during this particular historical moment.11 In some of the most fully 
developed work in this vein, David Garland argues that late modern capitalism, which was 
marked by economic insecurity and social atomization, undermined the efficacy and public 
legitimacy of “penal-welfarism,” with its focus on rehabilitation and therapeutic rationales for 
state intervention.12  
Geographer Ruth Wilson Gilmore also approaches prison expansion as a response to 
wider social transformations, but places greater emphasis on race and political economy. 
Gilmore sees mass incarceration as a strategy to manage the crises generated by late global 
capitalism. She argues that as the state abandoned military Keynesianism and full employment in 
the 1970s, it moved toward a “post-Keynesian militarism,” where the prison boom sustained 
rural economies and absorbed the surplus labor, land, and capital that globalization and 
deindustrialization had generated.13 Focusing on structural transformations, she highlights the 
role of spacialized racial subjugation in sculpting the geography and demographics of mass 
incarceration. In addition, spotlighting the massive scale of African American and Latina/o 
incarceration, other writers investigate the penal system’s role in maintaining racial hierarchies.14  
 I build upon this research to illuminate how the punishing politics that built the new 
                                                
11
 David Garland, Crime and the Culture of Control; Loic Wacquant, “The Great Penal Leap Backwards,” in John 
Pratt et al., ed., The New Punitiveness: Trends, Theories, Perspectives (Portland: Willan Publishing, 2005), 3-26; 
Loic Wacquant, “The Penalization of Poverty and the Rise of Neoliberalism,” European Journal of Criminal Policy 
and Research 9 (2001): 401-412; and David Garland, ed., Mass Imprisonment: Social Causes and Consequences 
(London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2001). 
12 David Garland, Crime and the Culture of Control. 
13
 Gilmore, Golden Gulag. 
14
 The work of Angela Davis highlights the important historical connections between the legacy of slavery, racial 
oppression, and today’s hyper incarceration. See, for example, Angela Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? (New York: 
Seven Stories Press, 2003); and Angela Davis, "Race, Gender and Prison History: From the Convict Lease System 
to the Supermax Prison." Other scholarship highlights the role of racism in the popularity of “get tough” politics—
illustrating that racial animus, more than other factors, predicted support for punitive policy. See, for example, 
James Unnever and Francis Cullen, “The Social Sources of Americans’ Punitiveness: A Test of Three Competing 
Models,” Criminology 48, no.1 (2010): 99-129. For a powerful study of the sociological effects of mass 
incarceration, see Bruce Western, Punishment and Inequality in America (New York: Russell Sage, 2006).  
 16 
carceral state reconstituted notions of citizenship and political authority. I focus on the 
productive cultural role that legislative battles served in articulating new social logics, defining 
membership in the polity, and remaking state legitimacy and responsibility. The three studies 
illustrate how these politics played out at the local level, and how the larger social and economic 
transformations underway in society were negotiated through the process of enacting punitive 
policy.    
This focus on the rhetorical level does not minimize the importance of the economic or 
social transformations other scholars have examined, but instead explores how these factors were 
articulated and interpreted. Structural changes operated in the background of my case studies in 
important ways, such as enlarging the number of people needing public assistance or enhancing 
the economic importance of illegal economies, such as drug markets. However, rising crime 
rates, economic downturns, capital flight, and burgeoning welfare rolls did not carry inherent 
meaning. It is imperative to attend to the significance people attached to them. The purpose here 
is to explore how new political arrangements—especially welfare-state dismemberment and 
retrenchment—became politically palatable and acquired tacit or explicit acceptance from 
various groups in society. While changes in the political economy gave rise to mass 
incarceration, punitive policy also enabled structural transformations by offering social logics 
that rationalized historical conditions.  
   
Citizenship and Political Authority 
Recent historical work examines how welfare programs played central roles in negotiating social 
boundaries and defining which groups can claim the full range of rights and protections from the 
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state.15 Expanding upon this line of inquiry, I examine how recent criminal and social policy has 
intertwined in complex ways to relegate entire segments of the nation—predominantly low-
income people of color—outside of full citizenship. The public policy examined in each of these 
case studies targeted groups of people popularly assumed to be predominantly Black or Latina/o. 
Therefore, the politics of drugs, crime, and welfare were often a vehicle to navigate through a 
highly charged and volatile racial landscape. As freedom movements exposed and threatened to 
disrupt unjust racial hierarchies, punitive legislation accommodated the new norms—forbidding 
explicitly race-based policy while simultaneously (re)constructing the poorest, most 
marginalized populations in communities of color as outside the polity. Race, therefore, cannot 
take a peripheral position in any interpretive schema concerning these themes. The two central 
themes tracked in this analysis—civic belonging and state legitimacy— were mediated through 
and sculpted by the racial landscape. While a crude reflection of public beliefs, state policy 
helped marshal public hostility, particularly racial animus, and direct it toward certain themes 
and targets. It not only reflected racism and other public prejudices, but also heightened 
stigmatization of people subject to particular state bureaucracies. In other words, public policy 
was productive: it mobilized and organized public sentiments. It was a condensation point where 
new cultural understandings were constituted.16 
Framing these issues in terms of citizenship or belonging in the polity is not without 
liabilities, and warrants careful qualification. First, I employ here an expansive definition of 
citizenship that includes but stretches beyond the formal category of legal citizenship. Although I 
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have examined the issue in other work, this analysis does not take up the important ways 
immigration, foreigners, or military enemies constituted notions of civic belonging.17 Most of the 
people at issue in these debates were legal citizens. They were immanent outsiders, groups of 
highly stigmatized citizens that despite their technical belonging were positioned outside the 
polity and, through that process, helped define and reaffirm normative citizenship.   
 During this period, welfare recipients, prisoners, and drug users struggled to secure the 
most basic protections and rights within the nation. They strove for the abstract and symbolic 
benefits of full economic or social citizenship, but also for the more rudimentary protections of 
basic legal citizenship. Inmates fought bitterly for the vote, and for the right to free 
communication, expression, and legal representation within prisons. Welfare recipients fought 
for basic protections of their privacy and property. This does not imply that they yearned for 
assimilation or absorption into some idealized national civic body.  In fact, activism by criminal 
offenders and welfare recipients was motivated less by an abstract, patriotic longing for full 
citizenship than by a desire for self-determination, economic security, and freedom from the 
harassment or intrusion of state agents. Unlike more privileged groups, these populations had no 
choice but to engage the rhetoric of the state and politicians. Their lives were so deeply entangled 
with government institutions that any expansion of their agency required direct engagement with 
the state. These groups did not have the option of ignoring or completely disregarding dominant 
ideologies, public policy, or political change. 
  I do not understand the historical struggles over citizenship as inherently democratizing, as 
a process by which more and more groups ultimately gain equal rights, representation, and 
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inclusion. After all, hierarchy and differentiation within the polity have been constant features of 
U.S. society, perpetually remade in different alignments throughout the nation’s history. 
Therefore, otherness, or stigmatized out-groups, should not be considered incidental or vestigial 
to civic culture; conceptions of citizenship are usually constructed through and with the creation 
of outgroups.18 Chronicling punitive policy’s role in sculpting and solidifying various social 
outgroups exposes a haphazard, contingent process, and the relevance of specific historical 
conditions.  
 Notions of citizenship and civic belonging are not static; they are continually 
reconstituted through ongoing public debate and political struggles. Because of the social, 
economic, and political upheavals of the 1970s, these conceptions were particularly volatile and 
unsettled during this period. At a time of little apparent social cohesion or unifying moral or 
social standards, normative citizenship was defined through and against the images of these anti-
citizens. However, anti-citizens were not a neat, unified, monolithic category that stood in 
opposition to citizens. The racialized and gendered class positions of welfare recipients, drug 
sellers, and criminal offenders profoundly inflected their representations in political discourse. 
For example, these debates defined work and productivity though the contrast with multiple 
negative examples, such as the welfare queen and the drug pusher. Therefore, the contours of 
normative citizenship were defined and its character given specificity through a dialogic process 
underway in multiple sites. 
By closely scrutinizing these three pivotal political struggles, this dissertation chronicles 
how punitive policy facilitated the dramatic reconstitution of popular notions of civic belonging 
and state responsibility. By almost every measure, the consequences of these policies have been 
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devastating, especially for low-income communities of color. They have helped build a society 
more fearful and alienated, but not more secure or economically stable. However, only so much 
can be revealed about this phenomenon by focusing solely on punitive policy’s brutality, waste, 
inefficiency, and myriad other programmatic failings. These policies were always more 
expressive than practical. It is critical to explore how “get tough” politics rewarded their 
proponents, and rationalized profound economic and social transformations. Incorporating this 
phenomenon into our narratives of U.S. history will reorient our understanding of recent decades 
and help denaturalize a destructive logic that much of society has come to embrace as common 
sense.       
 21 
 
STUDY ONE: “THE ATTILA THE HUN LAW”: NEW YORK’S 
ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS AND THE MAKING OF ANTI-
CITIZENS 
 
During his annual address to the legislature in 1973, Governor Nelson Rockefeller shocked the 
political establishment by declaring that New York State’s drug treatment programs—programs 
he had championed for over a decade—were abject failures. He explained that it was time to 
come clean with the legislature and the people of New York:  
It is a time for brutal honesty regarding narcotics addiction...In this state, we have 
allotted over $1 billion to every form of education against drugs and treatment of the 
addict through commitment, therapy, and rehabilitation. But let’s be frank—let’s tell 
it like it is: We have achieved very little permanent rehabilitation—and have found no 
cure.19  
 
What the situation demanded, the governor explained, was a stern new policy of deterrence that 
repudiated the state’s earlier emphasis on rehabilitation and reintegrating drug users into society. 
Rockefeller insisted this drastic move was imperative because “[t]he hard drug pusher destroys 
lives just as surely as and far more cruelly than a cold-blooded killer. He threatens our society as 
a whole.”20 To stave off this disaster, he called on New York State to punish drug dealing more 
harshly than rape, kidnapping, and even murder:  
I, therefore, will ask for legislation making the penalty for all illegal trafficking in 
hard drugs a life sentence in prison. To close all avenues for escaping the full force of 
this sentence, the law would forbid acceptance of a plea to a lesser charge, forbid 
probation, forbid parole and forbid suspension of sentence.21 
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A few months later, the New York legislature answered Rockefeller’s call and passed a mildly 
diluted version of his proposal, enacting the harshest narcotics laws in the nation.  
  This case study investigates what led to Rockefeller’s dramatic embrace of these 
punitive policies and their implications. It explores the ideological and political work 
accomplished by these high-profile policies—for policymakers, for members of the general 
public who clamored for “get tough” strategies, and for drug users. To capture the implications 
for political culture, I focus on the social and cultural history of New York’s drug programs, and 
only tangentially follow the intricacies of the drug-policy debates or the institutional history of 
drug treatment in New York. It is therefore most attentive to the meanings different groups—
such as legislators, drug users, or the bill’s supporters—attached to drugs and the state’s response 
to drugs.  
Because of their relevance at the time and their continuing salience today, the central 
concern of this first study is the embrace of penal sanctions in the 1973 Rockefeller Drug Laws. 
However, in order to understand the matrix of factors that gave rise to these laws, I first 
investigate the state’s three therapeutic strategies for managing addiction and addict crime prior 
to 1973. I investigate what made rising crime and drug use potent political issues in the early 
1970s by analyzing how people framed these problems in their public comments and 
correspondence. This history demonstrates why Rockefeller reversed course and rejected the 
era’s reigning assumptions regarding drug abuse, and also illuminates the larger political and 
social ramifications of the anti-drug campaigns. Each proposal reflected politicians’ assessments 
of the shifting historical terrain and evolving understandings of the relationship between drugs, 
the state, and society, and particularly who was best empowered to manage addicts. 
The second half of the study details Nelson Rockefeller’s break with his therapeutic 
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programs and his advocacy for and passage of the “toughest drug laws in the nation.” It 
excavates the public’s response and participation, changing conceptions of addiction and drug 
use, and the implications of the laws’ eventual passage. The study also investigates how drug 
offenders interpreted the new laws and represented themselves in the face of a program 
committed to ostracizing and silencing them. It concludes with a discussion of how this 
examination of the Rockefeller Drug Laws contributes to our broader understanding of punitive 
policy’s political utility and the specific ways such legislation empowered conservative 
politicians and rationalized neoliberal political projects.   
The growing public alarm about rising drug use and crime caused “junkies,” “pushers,” 
and “addicts” to loom large in public consciousness during the late 1960s and 1970s. The 
growing heroin use seemed to threaten the nation at every turn. Newspapers warned that hunger 
for drugs drove people to steal, mug, and even kill to sustain their habits. Commentators 
attributed the era’s crime rates to surging heroin addiction and claimed that addicts transformed 
once welcoming neighborhoods into dangerous, forbidding spaces. Simultaneously, many were 
alarmed that heroin use no longer seemed confined to poor communities of color. White, middle-
class youth were increasingly addicted and parents worried that drugs—like so many problems at 
the time—had breached the carefully guarded borders of suburban America.22 To make matters 
worse, vast numbers of soldiers were using the high-quality, affordable heroin in Southeast Asia 
to manage the boredom and terror of the Vietnam War.23 These specific crises were all the more 
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ominous because of the general upheaval throughout society: the mass movements; the sexual, 
cultural, and political rebellion of youth; and the inability of the U.S. military to suppress the 
enemy in Vietnam. According to popular rhetoric, the fate of the nation hung in the balance and 
drugs were tipping the scale toward catastrophe. Nelson Rockefeller echoed a chorus of voices 
when he explained in 1970 that, “The fiber of the American character has traditionally been 
strong. That is why the nation grew great. Drugs threaten to destroy that very fiber and to destroy 
the American future along with it.”24 President Richard Nixon injected the issue into national 
politics and used drugs as a way to mobilize frustration with the counterculture, youth rebellion, 
and social movements. In 1971, he branded drug abuse “public enemy #1” and declared an 
official “War on Drugs.”25  
 Nowhere was the issue more salient than New York. New York City, the main entry 
point for heroin into the country, was supposedly home to half of the nation’s heroin addicts.26 
The perception of a drug epidemic was both crisis and opportunity for lawmakers in New York 
State and no one more persistently or adroitly leveraged the issue than Rockefeller, who served 
as governor from 1958 to 1973. In the last decade of this tenure, Rockefeller devoted 
unprecedented physical, institutional, and monetary resources to a series of rehabilitative 
programs that approached drug addiction as a disease that warranted therapeutic intervention. 
Rockefeller’s first program, created by the Metcalf-Volker Law in 1962, positioned the addict as 
a victim of disease and allowed criminal offenders to opt for lengthy treatment programs instead 
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of incarceration. The second initiative, administered by the Narcotic Addiction Control 
Commission (NACC), mandated the civil commitment of addicts on the grounds that they must 
be prevented from spreading their disease to others. Since segregating addicts in compulsory 
treatment programs proved to be expensive and programmatically ineffective, Rockefeller 
embraced methadone maintenance in 1970, hoping it would reduce crime without the huge costs 
of residential treatment. Again facing limited results and new conflicts over establishing 
methadone clinics, the governor searched for a new politically viable strategy to control drugs. In 
January of 1973, he proposed that the state make the penalty for sale of hard drugs, regardless of 
quantity, a lifetime in prison without any option of plea-bargaining, probation, or parole.  
 New York’s history with drugs—and heroin specifically—was unique and explosive and 
not representative of general experience across the nation. In fact, New York is a critical case 
study because it was so extreme, and yet its experiments and experiences were nationally 
influential. The state was unparalleled in its efforts to combat drug use and it had a 
disproportionate impact on policy and drug politics throughout the nation. The federal 
government and other states watched the outcomes of New York’s various experiments 
carefully, eventually steering a course that mimicked some features while avoiding others that 
seemed to backfire politically or programmatically. The Rockefeller Drug Laws served as 
inspiration for the “War on Drugs” policies enacted nationwide that have fueled the 
unprecedented recent explosion in incarceration. As an early experiment in articulating new 
visions for government, the passage of the Rockefeller Drug Laws was not only a formative 
historical event in its own right, but it also sheds light onto the wider phenomena of “get tough” 
criminal policies and rhetoric that escalated in the 1970s. Even more generally, the laws were 
instrumental in the profound renegotiation of the state’s role, responsibilities, and character that 
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was occurring in society at that time. First, debates about drugs were inevitably connected with 
the struggles—most visibly by the Black Freedom Movement—over who had full rights and 
autonomy in U.S. society and how to secure those rights in the face of gross social, economic, 
and racial inequality. Second, the laws were enmeshed in the ongoing debates about the state’s 
capacity to address social problems, especially through liberalism’s therapeutic government 
interventions. Focusing on this single policy allows us to see how high-profile, punishing 
legislation worked to salvage and remake state legitimacy, as well as to rationalize racial and 
other inequities spotlighted by the social activism of the period.   
Regardless of party, few politicians in New York acted primarily in the interests of drug 
users. Politicians designed the various programs to control public anxiety, minimize the 
symptoms of rising drug use, and buttress their political position. As Jerome Jaffe, the chief 
architect of President Nixon’s national drug treatment efforts, stated simply: “The outpouring of 
concern for treatment did not stem from profound public empathy for the heroin addict, but 
rather from the belief that heroin addicts committed crimes and created other addicts.”27 In 
Rockefeller’s early programs, however, this motivation was veiled by talk of helping drug users, 
a medicalized understanding of addiction, and emphasis on rehabilitation and reintegration. 
Therefore, even though therapeutic programs often seemed coercive and punishing to their 
patients, Rockefeller’s move in 1973 from a policy rhetorically committed to reintegrating drug 
addicts to a policy of social expulsion was highly significant.  
Of course, the displacement of therapeutic for punitive rationales did not occur evenly 
across society. In fact, these strategies coexisted almost symbiotically: The growing 
medicalization of addiction and mental illness for the middle and upper classes has been 
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conjoined with persistent criminalization of the same problems for the working classes, and 
especially poor people of color.28 While often working at cross-purposes ideologically and 
programmatically, the strategies shared assumptions about the individual locus of deviance and 
the role of the state in managing social marginality.  
Nonetheless, rehabilitative intent in policy was theoretically democratizing, committed to 
reabsorbing marginalized citizens into the polity (on elites’ terms).29 By abandoning these 
rehabilitative and therapeutic rationales for marginalized populations, policymakers changed the 
definition of success for state intervention. What program administrators and politicians had 
presented as efforts to cure addicts of their disease, they now framed as efforts to protect “the 
public” from the “addict” and “pusher.” This dramatically revised the subject position of addicts, 
for not only was their welfare no longer at issue in these policies but they were also being 
constructed as emphatically outside of the public. Since the addict/pusher targeted by these laws 
was almost universally understood to be a Black or Puerto Rican man, these characterizations 
had wide political implications at a time when society wrestled over civil rights activists’ 
demands for full, equal citizenship. The laws positioned addicts as “anti-citizens,” the opposite 
of rights-bearing citizens.30 In terms of the dominant medical metaphor of addiction, 
pusher/addicts moved from being considered diseased to being cast as the disease. 
 Politicians constructed addict/pushers as outside of citizenship, holding them responsible 
not only for their own condition, but also for many of the problems plaguing society, such as 
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crime, deteriorating urban infrastructure, and mass racial and economic inequality. Locating the 
cause of these problems outside of the nation exonerated U.S. society from culpability and the 
American state from the responsibility of ameliorating these conditions—precisely the opposite 
arguments advanced by social movement participants who demanded the state redress past and 
present injustices.  
 Rockefeller’s drug laws were also a declaration of the failure of liberal treatment 
programs and specialists’ expertise, and provided a forum to remake the much-maligned welfare 
state into a tough, macho vehicle for establishing order in society. Thus, punitive policy allowed 
politicians to offer a new vision of state legitimacy at a time of profound social antipathy toward 
government. The laws were built upon the premise that therapeutic programs failed to effectively 
regulate social marginality, and they were also instrumental in reifying this assumption in public 
discourse. In other words, punitive policy helped naturalize highly political assumptions as social 
fact, in this case the alleged inability of rehabilitative state interventions to handle societal crises 
and secure public safety.  
In addition to wider cultural implications, this shift in political rhetoric and policy rationale 
also had tangible consequences for addicts and for state institutions. The earlier emphasis on 
treatment and rehabilitation, however compromised, provided addicts and their families with 
some discursive leverage in negotiations with the state over their fates. Treating drug users as 
patients, instead of criminals, logically prescribed different services and attitudes. A treatment 
emphasis also supported a different economy from mass incarceration. Programs ostensibly 
devoted to rehabilitation hired more social workers than guards, and significantly more women, 
people of color, and ex-drug users than penal institutions. As the stigma associated with drug 
selling reached a crescendo and punitive strategies discredited and replaced therapeutic 
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rationales for intervention, offenders found they could claim entitlement to few rights and fewer 
services to facilitate recovery and employment.  
It is important to distinguish between the way I employ terms such as “addicts” and 
“pushers” and how they operated in their historical context. Contemporary rhetoric presented 
“addicts” and “pushers” as stable, essential identities. With the exception of the occasional 
sensationalized news story about heroin-addicted mothers and babies, after World War II, the 
public almost universally imagined addicts or “junkies” to be Black or Latino men. Although this 
demographic was statistically overrepresented, heroin use was obviously never isolated to these 
populations.31 The popular emphasis on males contributed to the construction of a particular and 
ominous caricature of an addict—that of a hyper-threatening, criminal, poor man of color. Since 
it is a contingent and contested label, I primarily refer to addicts when analyzing the historical 
dialogue about narcotics or drug users’ self-identification. My usage of the term does not suggest 
that people’s drug use was homogeneous or that they suffered from a uniform affliction; nor, 
however, is it intended to deny the reality of substance addiction. It is also important to note that 
the relationship of drug users themselves to the concept of addiction has changed depending on 
context, policy regime, and time period. The same person might desperately struggle to be 
certified by the state as an addict in one setting while, in another, shun the label and its stigma. 
The term “pusher” referred to those who sell drugs at the street level and also had a 
prominent position in these debates. It was even more imprecise than addict, since most poor, 
habitual heroin users sold and traded drugs to sustain their habit. Rockefeller’s early drug 
programs targeted for coerced treatment all users certified by state officials as addicts, while still 
holding open the possibility of reintegration. Criminal penalties distinguished low-level street 
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pushers, most of whom were habitual users, from the large-scale dealers. Bigger sellers were 
universally reviled and subject to lengthy sentences. By 1973, growing anxiety about drug use 
among middle-class youth, coupled with acceptance of the disease concept of addiction, inspired 
politicians to target “pushers,” as opposed to users, as they advanced their more punitive policy 
recommendations. Having to allow for limited empathy for victims of disease, elites laid 
responsibility for the entire drug problem at the feet of drug sellers. The term “pushers” suggests 
that drug sellers were involved in aggressively “pushing drugs,” recruiting new customers, and 
creating more addicts, as opposed to responding to an overwhelming demand.32 Although the 
term was often used interchangeably with addict, the focus on pushers was a subtle departure 
from the general criminalization of all users. When Governor Rockefeller proposed life 
sentences for all pushers, big and small, he and others familiar with the landscape knew that 
small time “street pushers,” the poor habitual users who were often African Americans and 
Puerto Rican, would be disproportionately affected.33 Elevating any drug selling to the most 
severe sanction accommodated medicalized rhetoric about addiction, and preserved a path for 
reintegration of middle-class users who were not directly implicated in the drug trade. It 
maintained the heaviest stigma on the most marginalized users who did not have alternative 
sources of money and had to sell drugs (or engage in other illegal “hustles”) to subsidize their 
habit. Targeting pushers therefore, further criminalized addiction for the poor.  
 
The Disease Concept of Addiction and New York’s Drug Free Treatment Experiments, 
1960-1968  
  
The surge in drug use and the accompanying social panic that began in the 1960s was not 
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unprecedented. The nation’s history is marked by cycles of intense public consternation about 
intoxicating substances, usually influenced as much by who was publicly associated with the 
drug as the dangers posed by the substance itself. Therefore, efforts to control the use of drugs 
and alcohol have always been connected to the larger projects of managing suspect populations 
and negotiating and enforcing societal norms.34 
 A cursory history of the state’s handling and interpretation of drug abuse contextualizes 
the events of the early 1970s. It illustrates that Rockefeller’s actions were not only responses to 
his particular social and political moment but also a part of a long, evolving debate over the 
boundaries of societal, governmental, and personal responsibility for substance abuse. Providing 
this context highlights the continuities and ruptures with the past that would be elided by just 
focusing on the period in question. Most dramatically, it locates these debates as an important 
pivot point in struggles about whether users were best treated as addicts through medicalized, 
therapeutic modalities or punished as deviant criminals.  
Around the turn of the twentieth century, the United States faced growing opiate and 
cocaine use, which resulted in the increased regulation and eventual outlaw of the substances. 
Panic about cocaine use among African Americans peaked in the decades after Reconstruction. 
As Southern whites struggled to reassert white supremacy, they curtailed access to cocaine on 
the grounds that it stimulated lust, violence, and rebellion in Black users.35 While most addiction 
resulted from doctors’ morphine prescriptions to white, middle-class women, social tolerance 
decreased dramatically by the 1890s when the drug use was increasingly associated with 
marginalized racial groups. Opium was integral to the construction of Chinese immigrants as 
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dangerous and exotic during a period when labor competition in the West heightened anti-
Chinese sentiments.  
 Since drug regulation was largely the responsibility of individual states, the federal 
government had minimal jurisdiction beyond issues of overseas importation and tariffs. In 1914, 
the federal government passed the Harrison Act, an attempt to curb drug use through the 
Treasury Department and increased regulation and taxation. Subsequent law enforcement and 
court interpretations of the law limited legal access to narcotics and suppressed physicians’ 
practice of treating addiction through drug maintenance—the ongoing (or tapering) proscription 
of opiates. As the drug trade moved into the black market, penal sanctions steadily escalated.  
 Although World War II almost completely interrupted heroin supply routes, the drug 
trade reopened after 1945. Heroin reappeared, primarily in the newly formed “second ghettos,” 
the densely populated Black and Latino communities created by mass internal migration and 
discriminatory housing practices in northern industrial cities.36 This trend coupled with emerging 
Cold War anxieties to stimulate another panic about drugs and inspire the passage of the 1951 
Boggs Act. The Act dramatically increased penalties and introduced two-year mandatory 
minimum sentences for first offenders. Five years later, Congress increased the penalties eight-
fold, and for the first time in U.S. history allowed juries to sentence those convicted of 
distributing drugs to death or life in prison.37  
 These harsh penalties failed to curtail drug use. Their extreme nature  motivated those 
who considered addiction a medical disease, including the American Medical Association and 
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the American Bar Association, to advocate for reevaluation of punitive law enforcement 
strategies.38 The dramatic spread of heroin in the late 1950s and early 1960s strengthened the 
case for treating addiction as a disease. Despite the growing medicalization of addiction, little 
treatment was available. For example, until the 1960s, most New York hospitals were unwilling 
to make space in their wards for detoxification.39  
 In the 1960s, courts helped transfer responsibility for managing habitual drug users from 
the penal system to health and social work specialists. This shift had wide implications for the 
social position of addicts, since the ill—no matter how stigmatized—were accorded greater 
social tolerance than criminals. Reflecting the growing disenchantment with purely carceral 
measures, the Supreme Court codified the disease concept of addiction in its landmark 1962 
decision Robinson v. California. It declared unconstitutional a California law that sentenced 
people to prison for 90 days for the crime of being an addict. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Stewart explained, “It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt to make 
it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal 
disease…We cannot but consider the statute before us as of the same category.” The court 
declared imprisonment for being an addict cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. It explained: “To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is 
not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be 
considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for 
the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”40  
 The decision did allow, however, for the coerced institutionalization of addicts, as long as 
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it was to treat and not penalize: “A State might determine that the general health and welfare 
require that the victims of these and other human afflictions be dealt with by compulsory 
treatment, involving quarantine, confinement, or sequestration.”41 Even from within this 
liberalized understanding of addiction, the court permitted restrictions on the liberty and rights of 
drug users to protect the “general welfare.” This ruling was ambiguous and controversial since it 
opened the possibility that illness relieved addicts of legal responsibility. It left it to lower courts 
to determine the implications of construing compulsive drug use as a medical condition that, like 
insanity, limited criminal culpability.  
 It was a decade until courts settled the legal questions opened in Robinson by narrowly 
interpreting the decision to simply prohibit criminalizing the status of addiction if accompanied 
by no other illegal act. In the interim, however, defendants and their lawyers threw the law into 
disarray by challenging the criminal sanctions for drug possession and purchase, as well as other 
crimes against property they claimed were the inevitable consequence of their disease. For 
example, in 1965, New Yorker Nelson Borrero pled not guilty to burglary and grand larceny on 
the grounds that he stole only to appease his insatiable desire for narcotics.42 Although the judges 
were ultimately not persuaded that Borrero’s status as an addict absolved him of criminal 
responsibility, the legal system was struggling to accommodate the disease concept of addiction. 
In their rulings, judges wrestled with the inherent contradictions of decriminalizing the status of 
addiction while maintaining criminal sanction for the very acts that constituted the disease: 
buying, possessing, and ingesting drugs.43 Lawmakers followed the liberal judicial rulings. By 
1970, the U.S. Congress had abandoned the harsh mandatory minimum drug sentences enacted 
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during the 1950s and many state legislatures revised the harsh criminal penalties that were 
legacies of the past drug scares.  
 The passage of the Metcalf-Volker Law in 1962 suggests Governor Rockefeller also 
accepted the disease concept of addiction. The law allowed drug offenders to choose between a 
prison term and rehabilitative treatment in a state hospital. Recognizing that addiction invariably 
constituted or led to criminal behavior, the law hoped to divert addicts from prison to psychiatric 
hospitals to allow their eventual full reintegration into society. In advancing this legislation, 
Rockefeller positioned the state as savior and the addict as a victim of circumstances beyond his 
or her control:  
This is a humane, practical approach to make it possible for many unfortunate victims 
of addiction, in trouble with the law because of their helpless dependence on drugs, to 
be rehabilitated and saved as self-respecting, self-reliant members of society before it 
is too late for them.44 
 
In practice, the program was ineffectual and did little to curb the rising tide of drug use. Drug 
offenders frequently opted for prison because it was usually considerably shorter than treatment 
stays.45 The programs were underfunded and the Department of Mental Hygiene lacked expertise 
and enthusiasm for handling addicts. Studies reported that a huge percentage of the patients ran 
away from the facility, while 80 percent of those who did receive treatment were rearrested.46  
 New York soon faced an unprecedented explosion of drug use that existing institutions 
were ill-equipped to handle. There is considerable debate over the cause of these increases, 
particularly the “heroin epidemic” that surged between 1966 and 1976. Since the issue was so 
clouded by fear, racism, and clashing political motivations, it was difficult even to accurately 
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estimate the number of heroin addicts, let alone definitively identify the problem’s impetus. 
Heroin use and marketplaces concentrated and proliferated in poor, urban communities most 
ravaged by deindustrialization and institutional racism. Some increase in drug use resulted from 
the large cohort of baby boomers entering “heroin susceptible years.”47 Additionally, between 
1960 and 1970, the gross national product doubled, increasing consumer demand for all types of 
commodities, legal and illegal.48 Many observers emphasized that drug use exploded when it 
became connected with popular cultural phenomena, such as the link between heroin and the jazz 
scene in Harlem or the connection between drugs, particularly marijuana, and the counterculture. 
Some analysts focused on the supply side and faulted corrupt police and ill-conceived Cold War 
foreign policy that enabled a new flow of heroin from Southeast Asia into U.S. cities.49 
Influenced in part by all these factors, the estimated number of heroin users increased tenfold 
during the 1960s, from 50,000 nationally in 1960 to approximately a half million in 1970.50 The 
estimated population of addicts in New York—25,000 in 1966 versus 200,000 in 1973—also 
grew precipitously.51   
 Two issues associated with this mounting drug use were particularly troubling for 
legislators: rising street crime and growing drug use among the white middle class. In the period 
after World War II, the “addicts” and “dope pushers” were popularly understood to be Black or 
Puerto Rican men from poor, urban areas who committed crimes to buy drugs. Politicians 
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claimed that half of all inmates in New York City jails were there for drug related crimes.52 
While it is impossible to accurately quantify the number of addicts or amount of crime 
committed by drug users, there is little question that the cost of maintaining a heroin habit 
required more money than most low-income people had readily available. Estimates vary widely 
but it seems users needed $50 to $100 a day to sustain a habit.53 There is also no question that the 
political rhetoric of the period grossly inflated the extent of addict crime. In assessing the amount 
of crime heroin addicts committed, the Rockefeller administration would simply multiply the 
estimated number of addicts by the amount of money it cost to maintain a daily heroin habit, 
resulting in the calculation that addicts stole $1,095,000,000 of goods in 1970. Since there was 
never more than $100 million of property reported stolen in New York during this period, the 
billion-dollar figure was probably inaccurate.54   
 Despite their dubious nature, these figures had very real consequences for policy and 
public perception; they proved to an anxious public that drug addicts were the cause of the crime 
and disorder many felt was eroding the nation. However, crime rates alone cannot account for 
the intense politicization of the issue of law and order during the 1960s. The social unrest and 
movements of the time exacerbated anxieties about loss of “law and order.” This upheaval was 
not a news story from far away; New Yorkers directly participated in or witnessed the mass, 
high-profile resistance. In 1963, Jesse Gray organized widespread rent strikes of 4,500 tenants in 
Harlem to redress devastating living conditions. The next year, the shooting of a 15-year-old 
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African American boy by a white police officer triggered the Harlem Riots and thrust the 
conditions in inner cities into the center of public attention. Many groups of citizens were 
agitated and resistant to the fundamental renegotiation of rights and privileges that movements 
demanded. In political rhetoric and media portrayals about riots, the habit of fusing political 
revolt and street crime intensified.55 Although drug policy was motivated by the specific, local 
imperatives surrounding narcotics, it was also a “racially sanitized” way to discuss conditions in 
central cities and direct responsibility to criminals and drug users and away from those blamed 
by movement participants: moneyed elites, systematic racism, and gross economic disparity.56  
 Narcotics did not become a dominant political issue until drugs became visible in 
suburban communities and a pressing concern for white, middle-class families in the mid- 
1960s.57 For years, people living in predominantly African American and Latino communities 
were frustrated by what they felt was the state’s failure to respond to the drug problem in their 
neighborhoods. In 1965, only a year after the Harlem riots, the drug problem had grown so acute 
that middle-class African American community leaders called on police to crack down on 
dealers.58 Others, acknowledging police neglect, took matters in their own hands and formed 
vigilante groups to push dealers out of their neighborhoods.59  
  Many observers alleged that the state’s motivation to dedicate its resources to fighting 
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drugs only began once crime, addiction, and addicts became fears for white communities, 
especially white, middle-class communities.60 Some linked the growing reliance on therapeutic 
expertise to the seeming inappropriateness of punishment for this new population of drug users. 
A leftist health newsletter explained:  
Heroin, they say, is no longer an affliction of the “amoral or ignorant” lower classes 
and black and brown ghetto dwellers alone; its use is spreading like wildfire among 
the children of the respectable, white, middle class. As the daily rep fans the flames, 
and as frightened (and voting) middle class parents begin to demand action which 
will deal with “the problem,” treatment “experts” and politicians are moving to the 
fore with the “solutions.”61  
 
Therefore, growing white involvement served to heighten panic about drugs as well as interest in 
therapeutic or medical remedies.  
  Narcotic use and its link to crime became an issue in the 1965 campaign for mayor of 
New York City. John V. Lindsay—an even more liberal Republican than Rockefeller—called for 
amending the Metcalf-Volker Law to make treatment mandatory for arrested addicts and to 
toughen sentences for pushers.62 Despite his calls for harsher enforcement, Lindsay’s political 
rhetoric depicted rampant drug use as a product of larger social forces. He stressed how systemic 
factors contributed to addiction and he portrayed punitive strategies as discredited relics of a 
less-enlightened past:   
I should make it clear at this point that while drug misuse contributes greatly to 
criminal activity, it cannot be permanently cured by treating addicts as 
criminals…Arrest and punishment have not solved addiction; there is nothing in 
our experience to indicate that they will succeed in the future. The punitive 
emphasis is largely misplaced, for most addicts should be viewed as sick in need 
of a physician rather than criminals in need of judgment…For so long as people 
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live in poverty, so long as they are denied even a basic chance for the exercise of 
their ambitions they will turn to the painless, euphoric world of drugs in which to 
lose themselves.63 
 
This language fortified the rhetorical link between crime and drug use while arguing that both 
emerged from the matrix of poverty and inequality of American inner cities.  
 Lindsay’s position was not far from his Democratic rival, Abraham Beame, although his 
challenger also favored drug maintenance. But it was William F. Buckley, Jr., running on the 
Conservative ticket, whose rhetoric best anticipated future trends. He advocated federally 
administered quarantine centers, where addicts would be segregated from society and be unable 
to spread their disease to others.64 This particular twist on the disease concept of addiction, 
portraying addicts as “infectious,” was popularized during the 1950s.65 Even though casting 
addiction as an illness opened the possibility of extracting users from the criminal system, there 
were also perils of medicalization for drug users. The same logic used to discredit penal 
strategies was also used to portray the addict as “contagious” and, as we shall see, legitimize 
calls for their quarantine.   
 
The Narcotic Addiction Control Commission (NACC) 
With continued reports of rising crime and spreading drug use, Rockefeller and Lindsay felt 
immense political pressure to take new action by 1966. Rockefeller warned of the problem’s 
scope in his annual speech to the legislature, “Narcotic addicts are said to be responsible for one-
half the crimes committed in New York City alone—and their evil contagion is spreading to the 
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suburbs.”66 In February, the governor introduced a plan of compulsory treatment of addicts for a 
maximum of three years, or five years for felons. The civil commitment of addicts was a strategy 
employed without significant success in California, though it had just weathered challenges to its 
constitutionality. It authorized the removal of any person certified as an addict to state-
administered treatment facilities. Those not arrested for a crime were often committed to the 
program by friends, family members, or acquaintances who swore before authorities that the 
individual was an addict unwilling to undergo treatment. The program, administered by the 
newly created Narcotic Addiction Control Commission (NACC), had a double—and, many 
would argue, conflicted—mission: first, to reduce crime by “sweeping addicts from the streets” 
and second, to rehabilitate addicts. It would prove incapable of accomplishing either goal or 
satisfying any of the multiple constituencies it endeavored to accommodate.   
 Regardless, the new, mandatory treatment law paid immediate political dividends in 
Rockefeller’s third gubernatorial campaign. He championed the new policy, which was about to 
go into effect, throughout the 1966 race, running newspaper ads that stoked the racialized fear of 
addict crime. In one, an image of a dark arm with a hypodermic needle ran next to the words: 
“The stealing. The mugging. The Killing. All for this.” It concluded, “Get the addicts off the 
streets, put the pushers behind bars, and this crime will stop.”67 By suggesting that crime would 
end by removing addicts from the public, Rockefeller presented a simple and fast solution to 
what he had helped make a central concern of New York voters. Rockefeller’s Democratic 
challenger, Frank O’Connor, campaigned against the law as a violation of addicts’ civil rights, 
and advocated its repeal.68 It turned out that quarantining addicts was the more politically 
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rewarding position, and Rockefeller was able to exploit his opponent’s opposition to compulsory 
treatment. The governor warned that “O’Connor’s election would mean that addicts were free to 
continue to roam the streets: to mug, to purse-snatch, to steal, and even to murder.”69 When 
Rockefeller won the race, both camps believed that his opponent’s stand against compulsory 
treatment cost him the election.70 
   While politically pragmatic, in practice the new program’s twin commitment to 
rehabilitative and custodial functions caused tension immediately. In early meetings of the 
Narcotic Addiction Control Commission (NACC), members, who hailed from distinct 
institutional backgrounds, clashed over the most basic attributes of the program: Should 
employees carry batons and badges and be able to give half rations as punishment as they do in 
prison? Do patients who run away from the program “escape,” as they do from prison, or 
“abscond,” as they would from a mental hospital?71 Such seemingly mundane choices reflected 
the struggles to actualize an internally conflicted policy that permeated all levels of the 
program’s implementation. In 1974, a state audit would find that this tension hamstrung its entire 
performance.72  
 In the initial five months of the program, one third of the first 1,200 who entered the 
program were civilly committed, meaning they had not been arrested for a crime. Half presented 
themselves voluntarily for treatment and the other half were confined against their will, usually 
after being turned in by a spouse or other family member. The remaining 800 were committed 
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criminally, after arrest for a crime, and faced up to five years in compulsory treatment.73 
  The conditions residents faced at NACC facilities solidified their stigmatized position. 
Commonly located in old prisons, treatment centers were far more effective at their custodial 
functions than treatment and reintegration. Residents were called “patients,” but their visitors 
were controlled and their mail surveilled; there were three head counts a day.74 An in-depth study 
by the New York Times two years into the program found almost nothing positive to report about 
the institutions’ therapeutic capacities. Even people who voluntarily submitted themselves for 
treatment were led away in handcuffs. One man explained, “I am being treated like an animal in 
a locked cage.”75 With no coherent therapeutic philosophy and insufficient staff training, the 
caliber of treatment was almost universally condemned. The Times reported that the Edgecomb 
center’s staff severely beat residents and Woodbourne program guards, who were mostly trained 
at reformatories and prisons, carried clubs although, according to the director, they “did lots of 
informal counseling.”76  
 These programs, colloquially called the “Rockefeller Program,” quickly encountered 
motley resistance. Unsurprisingly, public support for removing addicts from the streets did not 
easily translate into welcoming treatment facilities into the neighborhoods.77 Local communities 
fought fervently to prevent placement of new treatment centers in their neighborhoods, 
considerably slowing the acquisition of facilities and resulting in many centers locating within 
commercial and industrial areas. As word of the conditions spread, many of those arrested or 
committed fought desperately against being certified as an addict through procedural challenges 
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or hearings, especially if the “treatment” length exceeded the criminal sentence for their crimes.  
When legal avenues were exhausted, residents of the Rockefeller Programs often took drastic 
measures to escape. According to government reports, more than 7,000 of the 24,000 committed 
to NACC programs absconded, either from residential programs or aftercare.78 Of the departing 
residents placed in aftercare between March 1969 and March 1970, only 19 percent were still 
enrolled nine months later; the remaining 81 percent relapsed, absconded, or were rearrested.79 
These statistics, which reflected the Rockefeller Programs’ highly permeably boundaries, 
alarmed residents and discredited the state’s pledge to isolate drug users from the community.  
 The political enthusiasm for the NACC programs barely outlasted the initial huge outlays 
to secure staff and facilities.80 The Rockefeller Program did not fully satisfy a single 
constituency, nor did it fulfill either of its conflicting missions. It never accomplished the 
therapeutic objectives, and also failed in its custodial ambitions, interning only 4,244 of the 
64,240 “known addicts” as of December 1968. Lackluster progress reports and the inability to 
house even a small percentage of New York’s heroin users conspired to undermine political 
support for the program, and the legislature was increasingly unwilling to fund the program. 
State Senator Samuel Greenberg (D-Brooklyn) captured the general mood when he offered his 
verdict on the program: “The program is a failure. It is failing to get the addicts off the street. It 
is failing to rehabilitate those few addicts under its care. It is failing to halt crime.”81 
 
Negotiating Culpability: Addicts, their Families, and NACC Programs 
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Despite the programs’ failures and highly coercive features, many arrested for drug crimes and 
their families embraced the state’s commitment to rehabilitation. Drug offenders often wrote the 
governor, pleading for him to intervene in their case, and asserting their status as addicts to gain 
entry into treatment programs or evade prison. With few archival sources capturing the 
perspectives of drug users, these letters offer welcome insight into prisoners’ relationship to 
various policies and the state. They are, however, like any source, a product of the context in 
which they are produced and reflect gross power differentials. Therefore, although they may not 
reflect the writers’ most intimate or even honest sentiments, the letters reveal the way drug 
offenders rhetorically negotiated the hostile political terrain to advance their own interests.  
 Medicalized understandings of drug use opened new space for people to maneuver within 
the criminal justice system to affect their fates. The disease concept of addiction also allowed 
judges and prosecutors to advance lenient or therapeutic rationalizations for criminal deviance in 
those cases where they saw fit. As illustrated by a letter from a woman whose son was randomly 
diverted to prison after being certified an addict, this by no means negated the arbitrary power of 
the courts. After fighting with various officials to have her son committed to the NACC facility, 
the mother was finally able to reach someone in the governor’s office who intervened on her 
behalf. Although her son was transferred from prison to a rehab facility that was itself housed in 
an old prison, she wrote the governor about her relief at the change of venue and her gratitude to 
the man who helped her:  
He was concerned that I might be frightened at first seeing…Woodburne 
[Treatment Center] because it was a former prison facility. It seemed incredible 
that this kind, concerned human being should care whether or not Woodburne was 
the proper place for my son. I was so happy at the prospect of the boy’s release 
from the Tombs, that if Mr. Warner had said he was sending him to “hell”–I 
would have felt it was better than the Tombs.  
 
After expressing relief at having her son out of prison, the woman went on to challenge the 
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state’s individualized response to drug use and highlight the implications of criminalizing huge 
numbers of citizens.   
Governor Rockefeller, do you think the time will ever come when legislators, 
society, and government will accept part of the blame, and realize that drug 
addiction is a great social disease, not a crime?…Surely, the hundreds of 
thousands of our young people involved in today’s “drug culture” cannot possibly 
all be criminals…A lifetime where meaningful, decent employment will be 
forever denied them. By expressing my views, Governor Rockefeller, I do not 
wish to imply that my son is an innocent in the woods. I am not, unfortunately, 
naïve enough to believe that anyone, other than himself injected that heroine filled 
needle into his arm—or that anyone forced him to [do] things he may have done 
to obtain drugs. I am inclined to believe that he can be saved; and that rather than 
a criminal, he is merely a victim of his times.82  
 
This mother resisted treating her son as a criminal or even as the victim of an individual illness. 
Instead, she argued that her son, although responsible for his own actions, suffered from a “social 
disease,” which was rooted in and attributable to contemporary conditions. Her letter, and many 
others like it, rhetorically embedded the addict back into society, asserted the possibility of 
redemption and, most importantly, rejected the brand of criminality.  
 NACC policy also inspired people who were not narcotic users to seek therapeutic, rather 
than penal, custody. Highlighting the haphazard and political nature of program development, 
one man wrote the governor to protest the failure of the state to commit any resources or legal 
allowances for alcoholics. The author started by associating himself with the more socially 
marginalized category of drug addict to assert his right to treatment.  
I, sir, am an “addict” of a sort, also a criminal, substantiated by numerous 
convictions and most of my adult life spent in prison, but also and most important 
sir, I am a alcoholic, for over 20 of my 36 years. I have never committed a crime 
while sober, I have never hurt, injured or assaulted anyone in anyway in my entire 
life…I need professional help, rather than punishment and prison, the psychiatrist 
of this institution is in agreement—but there is no place for the judge to send me, 
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no alcohol program for the criminal alcoholic, no hospitals…I sir humbly pray for 
some help, some understanding, some understanding and intervention, from 
someone who cares, for someone to step forward and prevent a bigger crime from 
being committed against me than I ever committed against society.83  
 
By putting his crimes in perspective to the state’s crimes against him, the author flips the 
conventional narrative about societal victimization. Instead of the alcoholic offending society, 
society and the state failed the alcoholic by neglecting to provide alcohol treatment.  
 Even though many drug offenders preferred treatment programs to prison, many 
complained directly about the hypocrisy and classism of the state’s treatment objectives.  
[Since they] took it upon themselves to start the NACC to combat the rise of drug 
abuse in our great state, to do just more than lock the accused addicts [sic] up and 
keep him away from the so-called society whom in the first place “let” the drug 
problem get to where it is today without bothering to do any thing so longed [sic] 
as it stayed within the low class people, but once it stepped out of that class they 
rose up in arms to do battle with the great [beast] after seeing it was going to 
desegregate itself, but with all that in the past I will say thank you for giving my 
the chance to be able and sit down and write this letter to you… 
 What I mean is don’t you have a place that can train me to help others to 
leave the land of the walking dead and become real people again?…Please help me 
by sending my any information that may help me in regaining my manhood.84 
 
Fully aware that Rockefeller’s policies were motivated by fears of drug use in middle- and 
upper-class communities, the man still used the policy as an opening to make claims on the state 
for job training. 
 The authors of such letters used the state’s emphasis on rehabilitation to request a drug 
treatment and job training while stressing the inability of punishment to redress the serious 
problems posed by addiction. Contrary to the state’s rhetorical emphasis on therapy, it was clear 
that addicts viewed job training and education as integral to their vision of rehabilitation. A 
veteran who became addicted to heroin after his nervous breakdown in battle explained, “A state 
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prison term would be of no help to me. I want to help myself.” Reflecting the growing consensus 
that prisons served little rehabilitative function, he asserted his right, as a certified addict, to 
treatment: “There are stipulations [that allow treatment instead of prison]. A program where I 
will be able to finish school and learn a trade. A program where I can receive the therapy that I 
need so bad.”85 Although letter writers were fully cognizant of the new laws and programs that 
committed the state to offer drug rehabilitation, most wrote in a suppliant tone, and people rarely 
demanded treatment as a right. For many drug offenders, the treatment regimes, while inherently 
coercive, allowed more mobility and agency than penal structures and, perhaps, hope for an 
alternative future. So, within highly constricted options, people maneuvered to affect the state’s 
role in their lives and called upon the government to act as a catalyst for a positive personal 
transformation. The possibility of this role for government in the lives of drug users, however 
compromised and problematic, would not last for long.  
 
Therapeutic Communities 
People who sincerely sought to end dependence on drugs rarely found the Rockefeller Programs 
helpful. Instead, many turned to therapeutic communities, a new and innovative trend in drug 
treatment, where ex-users designed and directed recovery. Therapeutic communities were drug-
free residential treatment programs that aimed to fundamentally rebuild the addict’s personality 
and lifestyle before facilitating reintegration into society. Understanding drug abuse to be a 
symptom of a deeper character dysfunction, therapeutic communities facilitated emotional 
development through cultivating self-awareness and self-discipline. To achieve these ends, 
centers employed highly confrontational group therapy, which encouraged high levels of 
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personal and collective responsibility, and an elaborate system of demotions and rewards that 
moved patients within a strict hierarchy of residents. As residents progressed through their multi-
year stay, they took on increasing leadership and control in the community. Therefore, while 
strictly autocratic, therapeutic communities were largely controlled and staffed by ex-addicts, 
many of whom had completed the same programs.86 By positioning the ex-addict as the expert on 
recovery, therapeutic communities saw ex-drug users as role models and agents of positive 
change in society, as opposed to corrosive and permanent outsiders. The popularity and 
prominence of therapeutic communities in the late 1960s suggests that New York’s eventual 
punitive approach to drug abuse was not the inevitable response to rising addiction, and that 
policy was contingent, conflicted, and largely shaped by political imperatives. 
 Synanon, the first therapeutic community, was founded in 1958 by a recovering 
alcoholic, Charles Dederich, in Ocean Park, California. Originally a fervent Alcoholics 
Anonymous adherent, Dederich developed an enthusiastic following for his unique program of 
communal living and group confrontation sessions. Raucous and free-wheeling, these group 
encounters, or “games” as they were called, were based on the rejection of the traditional, 
restrained treatment environments. An inversion of modern notions of therapeutic expertise, here 
patients were the catalysts of their own cures.  
 In 1963, leaders of the Probation Department of New York’s Kings County Supreme 
Court turned to Synanon as a model when they wanted to start an experimental program for the 
male drug felons under their department’s supervision. They founded Daytop, which became a 
formalized, functioning therapeutic community when they recruited David Deitch, a former 
Synanon resident, to oversee the program in 1964. Like Synanon, Daytop emphasized the 
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addict’s role and responsibility in ending dependence on drugs. It was a regimented, intense 
environment, designed to create stressful conditions that residents learned to manage with new, 
healthy strategies. There was constant, mutual support but also mutual surveillance of every 
aspect of daily life. For seemingly minor transgressions, colleagues and staff publicly and 
belligerently berated residents. For example, a resident might be forced to wear a sign and a 
diaper to admit that he acted “like a baby” or carry a light bulb all day after forgetting to turn out 
the lights. Though appearing harsh to some, proponents explained that techniques of traditionally 
trained social workers and counselors, such as gentle questioning and observations, could not 
meaningfully pierce an addict’s elaborate shield of defenses, withdrawal, and self-delusion. 
Since they had themselves employed similar subterfuge, ex-addict counselors claimed to easily 
see through the manipulation and delusion that often would deceive other counselors. Advocates 
of therapeutic communities charged that traditional practices risked “killing with kindness,” 
since “people like us” needed persistent, forceful interventions and surveillance to arrest their 
destructive behavior.87 
 Desperate for a meaningful intervention into the drug problem, politicians were willing to 
experiment with a treatment program that empowered and employed addicts. In 1966, Mayor 
Lindsay backed Rockefeller’s tough civil-commitment legislation while also investing in these 
alternative programs. That year, he hired Efren Ramirez, a proponent of therapeutic communities 
who had directed successful programs in Puerto Rico, to lead New York City’s treatment efforts. 
With the help of Daytop staff, Ramirez established the Phoenix House and New York City 
became a major sponsor of these experiments in drug rehabilitation. For a number of years, 
                                                
87
 Barry Sugarman, Daytop Village: A Therapeutic Community, 95. The book is an anthropological study that 
explores the functions, philosophy, and organization of Daytop Village. 
 51 
therapeutic communities were the centerpiece of the city’s drug treatment efforts. 88 As opposed 
to the medical establishment or therapists, Dr. Ramirez felt that the addict, once “reformed,” was 
the best authority on recovery. He explained, “The rehabilitated addict, in our opinion, is an 
expert in drug addiction.”89 Although funding for these communities was motivated by the 
political desire to control drug use and the related crime, participants felt their mission to be 
fundamentally divergent. A co-founder of Daytop explained the difference:  
There’s no doubt about it. Because of their numbers, addicts are a public menace, 
accounting for over 50% of the crimes against persons and property in New York 
City. But we must be careful not to confuse steps taken to protect society from the 
addict (jails, the “Rockefeller program,” the federal facilities in Fort Worth, 
Texas, and Lexington, Kentucky, and in my opinion, methadone maintenance) 
with those now being taken to rehabilitate the addict himself.90  
 
Casting addicts themselves as agents of their own rehabilitation inverted the dominant 
characterizations of the period, which either characterized addicts as unredeemable criminals or 
as needing specialists’ expertise. These programs positioned addicts as eminently redeemable, 
and—once sober—integral to the treatment of other drug users and therefore, to the general 
social welfare.  
 As a state strategy to control drugs and crimes, therapeutic communities posed political 
problems. They were residential programs with average stays of two years and were, therefore, 
expensive to establish and operate. Although they proliferated rapidly, the houses were 
necessarily small and intimate and the city did not have enough funds, time, or trained ex-addict 
staff to treat even a small percentage of the addict population in New York. Additionally, 
membership in a therapeutic community was considered a privilege and the strictly regimented 
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environment caused many residents to be expelled or “split” before completing the program. 
Statistically, the program was very successful for those who finished, but had an almost 50 
percent drop-out rate.91 Moreover, local communities engaged in extensive grassroots organizing 
to oppose the placement of treatment houses in their neighborhoods. In one of many examples, 
hundreds of community members picketed the Daytop House on Staten Island to oppose its 
placement and successfully delayed funding for many months.92 These confrontations forced 
politicians to choose between supporting addicts, an unpopular if not completely disenfranchised 
constituency, or the politically powerful and resourceful neighborhood councils, churches, and 
business owners.  
 Still, therapeutic communities captured the imagination of New Yorkers in the late 1960s, 
and became a part of the cultural landscape. On top of widespread social concern about heroin, 
people were probably drawn to the example of human struggle and renewal that ex-addicts 
represented. Their cause drew famous musicians, such as Pete Seeger, Duke Ellington, and the 
Grateful Dead, to play in Daytop’s four-day musical festival and fundraiser.93 There were 
television documentaries about Daytop and the members staged a long-running, critically 
acclaimed Off-Broadway show about their experiences in recovery. 94  
 Many, however, condemned the therapeutic communities. Critics, especially some 
African Americans and Puerto Ricans, charged that white program leaders preyed on 
communities of color, just like drug peddlers, and built institutions that were not accountable to 
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or controlled by local communities. People also challenged the basic philosophical 
underpinnings of the therapeutic community, which located the locus of addiction in an 
individual personality defect. One commentator explained, “[T]he therapeutic community tends 
to reduce drug addiction to the level of an individual problem. This position derives from the 
concept of the addict as a sociopathic personality. If on the other hand, addiction is attributed at 
least partially to a sick society, then its cure is to involve the ex-addict in changing society.”95 
Therefore, these critics questioned the emphasis on reintegrating addicts into society, since 
society itself was seen as compromised and producing the very problems that generated drug 
addiction in the first place.  
 Inspired perhaps by these critiques, David Deitch, the director of Daytop, began 
articulating a new vision for therapeutic communities. Instead of reforming citizens to reenter a 
fundamentally righteous society, Deitch presented Daytop as a social movement exemplifying 
higher principles. The emphasis on living with absolute honesty, integrity, openness, 
accountability, and mutual concern was a positive example for mainstream society, not 
preparation for it. So he explained that recovered addicts must be trained to go back to the 
community to be agents of social change: “Our real job ain’t got nothing to do with just 
overcoming drugs. Our real job…is confronting a racist community and challenging them to live 
the life we show by example.”96 In this formulation, addicts were cast not as pariahs who 
threatened society, but as guides who could, by virtue of their experience and struggle in 
recovery, catalyze revolutionary change in society. The board of directors disapproved of 
Deitch’s new political objectives and struggled to assert more direct control over operations. A 
power struggle escalated and Deitch and the residents staged a sit-in at Daytop, refusing to leave 
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until the board eventually evicted them.97  
The prominence of Daytop and other therapeutic communities illustrates the extent to 
which societal response to drug addiction was up in the air in the late 1960s. While many people 
only approved of programs that approached drug users as criminal pariahs, New York funded 
drug-free residential communities where addicts directed their own recovery.98 The costs and 
limitations of these programs, however, led Governor Rockefeller to begin disinvesting in 
residential drug-free treatment. He searched again for a strategy to control widespread drug use 
that could also enhance his political position. This time, abetted in part by the Nixon 
administration, New York abandoned a commitment to drug free therapy, and funded a 
controversial experiment in methadone maintenance.  
 
“We are the prisoners”99: Citizens Demands for Their Rights Back 
Between 1968 and 1970, the political importance of heroin in New York only grew. In fact, the 
tangle of treatment programs did little to appease the mass anxiety about drugs and crime. The 
panic about growing heroin use in white communities compounded fears about rising crime 
rates. These distinct but interconnected concerns put politicians in a precarious position. The 
stigmatizing, exclusionary drug-management tactics that targeted predominantly low-income, 
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communities of color seemed less appropriate for drug users from middle- and upper-class white 
communities. An emphasis on treatment and reintegration, grounded in the disease concept of 
addiction, appeared better suited to handle the drug abuse in affluent communities, whose 
families had more sway with many legislators. Yet, panic about rising crime rates, largely 
attributed to heroin use in poor communities, pulled policy in the other direction, as many 
demanded increasingly punitive state intervention to “restore order.” Federal politics and the war 
in Vietnam also conspired to keep New York’s approach to heroin in flux between 1968 and 
1973.  
 Before exploring how the state’s large scale experiments with methadone maintenance 
reflected and helped resolve these tensions, it is important to investigate more closely the twin 
forces that drove public concern about heroin addiction: widening use and rising crime. It is 
impossible to comprehend the frenzy of public attention to heroin addiction without 
acknowledging its intimate connection to consternation about rising crime rates that began in the 
1950s.100 The specific ways that these problems were framed in public discourse helps make 
sense of legislators’ subsequent political choices.  
 Rockefeller, therefore, did not embrace highly punitive policy on a random personal 
whim. He was embedded in the popular zeitgeist—which he, in turn, helped sculpt through his 
rhetoric and legislative agenda—that held particular beliefs about the causes of crime and the 
appropriate responses. Letters to Rockefeller offer valuable insight into the public attitudes he 
confronted, and they help reveal the particular ways Rockefeller’s constituents framed their 
concern about drugs and crime. Over his years in office, Rockefeller received hundreds of letters 
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on the need for “law and order.”101 Certain themes manifested clearly, especially the rhetorical 
habit of attributing rising crime to liberalism’s failures and the barely secured victories of civil 
rights organizing.  
 Rockefeller’s constituent mail persistently blamed rising crime rates on the 
permissiveness of the courts and social programs, asserting a causal connection between newly 
won legal and social rights for marginalized populations and “worsening” conditions in society. 
Some victims of horrible crime understood their experience through this lens. One woman, 
whose brother was killed, expressed this perspective to the governor:  
There is too much emphasis on rights and the various minority groups and not 
enough on responsibilities and the majority…The convict or guy with a record has 
more rights than anyone. Money that is presently being handed out for welfare, 
Medicaid, youth services, senior citizens and the various minorities or gravy 
trains might better be used to create a responsible society. There is too much 
appealing, protests, etc. for more funds and not enough common sense to 
administer sensible programs that are for the majority and create a more 
responsible society. 102 
 
These sentiments must be understood, at least in part, as connected to the high-profile struggles 
by people of color for new rights and protections.  
In addition to legislative civil rights victories, the Supreme Court had dramatically 
revised criminal procedures during the 1960s. It granted defendants a whole series of new 
protections: people charged with crimes won the right to a public defender if unable to pay for 
counsel, the right to have a lawyer present during interrogations, and the right to be informed of 
their rights upon arrest.103 Critics of these changes often attributed conditions on the street to 
these new legal protections and other liberal state policy. In correspondence, constituents 
declared that their status and protection had been eroded as criminal defendants gained rights. In 
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a letter advocating the reinstatement of the death penalty, one person wrote:  
Over the past several years I have been increasingly deprived of certain rights and 
guarantees, granted to me under the Bill of Rights. I refer to the right to walk the 
streets in peace and security and to feel safe within my home. We have, in fact, 
arrived at a reversal of the normal: the criminal walks the streets and the law-
abiding, tax-paying citizen is locked up-voluntarily at his home, with several 
locks at the door and a lock at each window.104  
 
These arguments directly challenged a dominant tenet of the era—advanced by both mainstream 
liberals and radical social movements—that stressed the role of social inequality and racial 
injustice in producing criminal behavior. For example, President Lyndon Johnson argued that 
crime was rooted in social conditions and could be mitigated by expanding opportunities, which 
he proposed accomplishing through his Great Society programs; he declared that, “The War on 
Poverty is…a war against crime and a war against disorder.”105 Contesting this narrative, letter 
writers insisted that liberal programs and civil rights laws encouraged crime instead of lessening 
it, and—in a zero-sum formulation of rights where one group’s gain is another’s loss— 
subordinated the rights of “taxpayers” or “the majority.” Another woman wrote to express these 
frustrations after her home was robbed:  
This letter is written to you by a law abiding citizen who feels she is discriminated 
against in favor of dope addicts and welfare cheats. I am a widow who lives 
alone, works every day, pays taxes and lives by the rules. I get very little from my 
taxes when I can no longer walk on the streets and when I am afraid in my own 
home…Sorry this letter is not typed. My typewriter was stolen.106  
 
This woman employed the language of activists challenging discrimination to articulate her 
belief that the state had betrayed the reciprocal arrangement between itself and the citizenry. The 
government failed in its responsibility to maintain her safety, even as she upheld her 
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responsibilities of working, following the law, and paying taxes. She linked her growing 
insecurity directly to the state’s growing accountability to marginalized groups, specifically the 
“dope addicts” and “welfare cheats.”  
Such feelings were heightened by class frustrations, especially the belief that the liberals 
who advocated for attention to “root causes” lived in segregated, suburban communities apart 
from the problems. A woman expressed this view in her correspondence with Rockefeller about 
her father’s murder: 
On January 20, 1973, two black men attempted a robbery at my father’s place of 
business in New York City. My father died because of gun shot wounds to the 
heart, lungs, and face…The impunity with which murder can be committed and 
excused for by guilt ridden liberals who, because of the privilege of their 
affluence in the socio-economic spectrum make concessions to the criminal 
element…The social experiments they espouse for the majority rarely, if ever, 
effect their own family prerogatives of freedom of choice guaranteed by their 
socio-economic sanctuary. Conversely, once murder has been committed, they 
bend backwards to find root causes thereby condoning the very act of violence 
itself. The cycle of excuse and permissiveness feeds on itself until there is no safe 
society for anyone and the vast majority walk with fear… 
 It must be reaffirmed that we value the life of the victim of violent crime 
more dearly that the imagined rights of the murderer, that the full extent of 
punishment that fits the crime is not cruel and inhuman but merciful to the 
memory of the victims and his family and is a proper deterrent to the commission 
of violence… 
 The legal structure unjustly sets aside the rights of that life and stupidly 
seeks redemption and social value in the salvation of the murderer, instead of 
bringing all power to bear to the prevention of such crimes.107  
 
This letter conveyed the prevalent sentiment that working-class people had been abandoned to 
deal with problems in the cities that elites fled. Perhaps most important, among a catalogue of 
possible explanations, the author ascribed rising crime to efforts to understand its root causes—
“the cycle of excuse and permissiveness”—and posited a dichotomy where granting rights to a 
murderer inevitably and invariably restricts and devalues the victim.  
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The rhetoric in these letters often belittled and discredited welfare-state and therapeutic 
programs by gendering them female. In this and many other letters, citizens imply that paying 
attention to structural inequalities (“root causes”) and policies of rehabilitation were 
“permissive” and “over-indulgent,” and, therefore, had the pernicious effect of excusing and 
ultimately encouraging anti-social behavior. It is also strikingly reminiscent of long-held beliefs 
that the overindulgent, smothering mother was responsible for producing an array of social 
pathologies in her children.108 Again and again, citizens called for tough, hyper-masculine 
responses to these problems, such as the death penalty or a military presence in the streets. One 
man wrote Rockefeller, “We need the national guard in NYC. This educated moron [Mayor 
John] Lindsay is all but destroying us. I would rather see martial law or civil war than present 
conditions.”109  
 Constituents repeatedly insisted that they lived in a world turned upside down, 
where the “wrong people” had rights and the “right people” were punished. One police 
officer wrote, “It seems like the law abiding citizen have no rights whatsoever, except the 
responsibility and obligation ‘to work in order to support and care for the parasites of 
society, the common and habitual criminal.’”110 Another police officer articulated a 
similar point when he wrote Rockefeller that, “It’s ironic that prisoners have a union and 
policemen don’t. It seems that as a policeman you lose some of your privileges and as a 
prisoner you gain…Let’s treat a prisoner like a prisoner and not like a poor unfortunate 
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who because of his social environment acted in a criminal manner.”111 According to this 
logic, being treated “like a prisoner” was diametrically opposed to awarding rights or 
procedural protections, and most importantly, interrogating the “root causes” of criminal 
behavior. People who expressed their fear of crime often attributed the conditions on the 
street to these new legal protections and other liberal state policy. They stressed their 
belief that as criminals gained rights, their status and protection had been eroded. 
Intertwined with these calls for a tough new state role was a determined resistance to 
extending universal rights to all citizens. 
Among the myriad factors to hold accountable for rising crime, these letters most often 
faulted government permissiveness, systemic explanations of deviance, and the expansion of 
rights for marginalized populations, especially racial minorities. As opposed to repudiating 
government intervention in society, this logic called for a new kind of state action, characterized 
by tough, masculinist, retributive strategies that constricted targeted groups’ rights. A state 
legislator captured this logic in a letter to Rockefeller explaining his support for a new death 
penalty law: “In the name of decent people who obey the laws of our country and contribute to 
our society, let’s stop playing nurse-maid to these cut-throats and murderers and give them what 
they deserve.”112 In other words, to sanctify and honor normative citizenship, criminal deviance 
must be dramatically avenged.  
 
“They call it an epidemic now. That means white people are doing it”113: Panic Over 
Middle-Class Heroin Use 
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With persistent attention to rising drug use and crime rates, it is not surprising that the tangle of 
treatment programs in New York did little to appease the mass anxiety. In fact, it seemed that the 
more visible the attention to the problem, the more the demands for action and results escalated. 
According to political rhetoric of the time, it is difficult to exaggerate the danger drugs posed. 
Rockefeller constantly informed constituents that drugs abraded the very fiber of society and the 
fate of the nation hung in the balance.114  
 Without acknowledging the profound social instability that plagued the nation in the early 
1970s, this rhetoric could seem hyperbolic and bizarre. The intensity and fervor over drugs 
cannot be teased apart from the mass social movements of the time. A vocal counterculture 
rejected the mainstream values of their parents, embracing drugs and new notions of sexuality. 
Movements of people traditionally marginalized because of their race, ethnicity, sexuality and 
gender demanded the rise of a society dramatically reformed and reborn. Politicians’ claims that 
drugs unraveled the country’s social fabric were politically resonant in part because they were a 
way to give meaning to the turmoil throughout society. In Nixon’s campaigns and presidential 
addresses, he endeavored to discredit his political adversaries by persistently linking the 
counterculture and protest movements to an illegal, deviant drug culture. Drugs, therefore, 
provided an explanation for social upheaval that did not question American exceptionalism or 
the virtue of mainstream culture. Just as officials tried to blame urban riots on outside 
Communist agitators, this logic attributed discord and deviance to an enemy from outside the 
body politic, not from social or structural problems in the country. The need for a scapegoat to 
explain the dramatic social unrest and cultural revolt only became more desperate as it reached 
deeper and deeper into affluent, middle-class communities.  
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As early as 1968, federally sponsored anti-drug advertisements designed by the Ad 
Council featured large font simply and ominously stating: “Heroin is moving to the suburbs.”115 
At a Senate hearing, Mayor Lindsay warned of the new dynamic: 
For too long, people thought of the problem of narcotics in the same way they 
thought of slums, unemployment, and welfare checks—all problems confined to 
the poor and to minorities, and to central cities. But the explosion of the drug 
culture has proven that wrong. Today, no family in America is immune from the 
possible discovery that their son or daughter suffers from drug abuse. All have 
becomes painfully aware that addiction knows no neighborhood lines, no county 
boundaries, and no racial or ethnic distinctions.116  
 
As the new decade began, reports of heroin use in the high schools of affluent areas of Brooklyn, 
Long Island, and Westchester heightened concern that drugs were “spreading” from inner cites. 
An article from the Washington Post read: “One thing is certain—the drug culture is spreading 
rapidly. It is spreading from the ghettos, where it has long been deeply embedded, to the white 
suburbs.”117 In articles such as these, drugs were presented as indigenous to inner cities; if they 
did appear in other communities, they were imagined as a weed or disease that had escaped from 
its traditional ecosystem to infect new territory. This language naturalized the high rates of drug 
addiction in poor areas, which itself was a relatively new historical phenomenon; normalized the 
devastating abuse of other substances—such as alcohol and prescription pills—in affluent 
communities; and erased the history of morphine addiction by upper-class women earlier in the 
century. Most important, it located the genesis of social problems in inner cities and deflected 
attention from other social, economic, and cultural factors that could inspire young, white people 
to use drugs.  
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 The changing demographics of heroin use intensified the political urgency of the 
problem, as some officials would occasionally publicly admit. An unnamed official in the 
Lindsay administration told a reporter, “As long as drugs were primarily a problem of the lower 
classes, there was a minimum amount of pressure to do any more than research the problem.”118 
In 1970, an official from the White House Office of Management and Budget generated outrage 
when he acknowledged before a House committee on drug abuse that as long as heroin was a 
problem isolated to the “ghetto,” “it was a problem we could live with.”119 
 The urgency inspired by the new concerns about white, middle-class drug use did not 
escape the notice of Black commentators. A columnist for the African-American newspaper, 
New York Amsterdam News, wrote in 1971:  
Drug addiction is nothing new. Black kids have been destroyed for years by the 
heroin plague. Ghetto youth were easy prey for pushers whose little bags of dope 
brought the promise of escape from the dismal trap of poverty and racism. But now 
there is general alarm about the inroads dope is making. The reason isn’t hard to 
find. More and more victims are coming from white middle-class families. When 
black kids were hooked, society was silent. But now everyone is up in arms about 
it.120  
This also created frustration for those working in the state’s treatment programs, many of whom 
were already indignant about bureaucratic and philosophical impediments to their mission. A 
disillusioned senior training official explained her resignation from her job in a telegram to 
Governor Rockefeller,  
We have the answers but there are those who do not wish to see the problem 
solved. This is especially unfortunate because it has now gone full circle and it is 
not the black race which has the problems but the white race. Talk to any teenager 
in the ghetto or outside the ghetto and they can tell you where it’s really at. You 
have allowed the house to burn down but it is your family, the so-called silent 
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middle class majority, which is now inside.121  
 
Although concern about middle-class drug use probably inspired some more lenient, treatment- 
based, responses to drug users, it had the inverse effect on attitudes toward drug sellers, who 
were held responsible for spreading the habit. One critic wrote:  
And now, the move afoot to reduce drug penalties for the mere possession of a 
drug (heroin and marijuana) and to increase the penalties for pushers, once again 
is in response of the needs of a frightened middle class segment of our society. In 
effect, the “liberalized” laws only represent a liberalization for the drug user who 
can afford to purchase his drugs. The poor, ghetto addict (who must sell to 
support his habit) will continue to be prosecuted to the full extent of an even 
harsher law.122  
 
Since most street dealers were low-income users themselves, the trend of increasingly harsh 
punishment for “pushing” essentially created a race- and class-based penalty structure for drug 
crime. Those with resources had a greater chance of diversion to treatment programs while the 
working class and poor, especially people of color, were usually channeled into the penal system, 
fueling visions of a criminalized, racialized “underclass” solidifying in American central cities.  
 
The Rise of Methadone Treatment 
With ceaseless reports of rising crime rates and expanding drug use, few politicians and 
members of the public felt that the Rockefeller Programs and therapeutic communities were 
managing the situation sufficiently. In fact, it seemed the problem was reaching crisis 
proportions. New York City officials reported 50 percent of the inmates in jail were addicts. 
Drug-related arrests had more than doubled from 22,000 in 1968 to 52,000 in 1970.123 As 
politicians searched desperately for a way to stem the tide, a new controversial approach to 
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heroin addiction was attracting national attention.  
 In the mid 1960s, a small research study conducted at New York City’s Rockefeller 
Hospital began dispensing methadone, a heroin substitute, to addicts.124 Methadone, a long-
acting, synthetic opiate that sated the addicts’ craving for heroin, was particularly appealing 
because it supposedly mitigated the need to commit crimes to support the habit. Patients required 
only one dose daily, and, its advocates claimed, experienced little if any euphoria. Once treated, 
they were able to function normally and perform all social, work, and family obligations. 
Proponents saw the drug as treating the chemical imbalance that caused compulsive heroin 
cravings and acknowledged that some people would need to continue treatment indefinitely, 
often comparing methadone maintenance to diabetics’ long-term reliance on insulin. Although 
methadone users technically remained addicted to opiates, treatment experts emphasized their 
transformation into law-abiding “productive citizens” who could work and raise families. The 
treatment, therefore, promised to slash crime statistics while reintegrating heroin users into 
normative society. Arthur Dole, one of the study’s principal researchers, described the profound 
transformation methadone would catalyze in drug users’ status: “Our objective, after all, is to 
make citizens out of addicts.”125 
 National interest in the new treatment was further piqued when, in 1969, the psychiatrist 
Robert Dupont conducted a highly publicized study that, for many, conclusively proved that 
crime rates were directly tied to burgeoning heroin use. DuPont’s researchers interviewed or 
tested the urine of around 200 people booked into Washington, D.C. jails during August and 
September and discovered 45 percent tested positive or admitted heroin use.126 In the next 
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months, Washington, D.C. instituted a methadone program in the Department of Corrections that 
was credited in a dramatic reduction in crime indices. Nixon staffers, desperate for ways to make 
good on anti-drug and anti-crime campaign pledges, funneled federal money toward the program 
and started crafting a national program. By the 1972 presidential election, crime rates in 
Washington defied national trends and fell by half from their high in 1969.127 The White House 
declared the federally supported citywide experiment a success.  
 For Republican politicians, methadone might seem dangerously permissive and verging 
on government drug handouts. However, the chance to quickly and dramatically reduce crime 
rates at relatively low cost was impossible to ignore for politicians— such as Nixon and 
Rockefeller— who had made high-profile pledges to reduce crime during their election 
campaigns.128 Methadone was particularly attractive to Rockefeller in 1970 as he approached his 
fourth reelection campaign for governor. The NACC’s compulsory treatment program faced all 
manner of public criticism: for its punitive emphasis, its inability to “sweep addicts from the 
streets,” the alleged slow pace of getting programs on line, its high cost, and the failure to 
dramatically reduce crime. Rockefeller’s Democratic opponent, Arthur Goldberg, made the 
governor’s failure to stem drug use one of his two main issues in the campaign. Rockefeller’s 
own polling confirmed the centrality of the issue, showing drug abuse to be the primary concern 
of voters.129 Acknowledging the limitations in his compulsory treatment programs, Rockefeller 
turned to methadone in the hope that it would provide dramatic reductions in crime at a far lower 
cost.  
 Rockefeller’s campaign rhetoric ratcheted up the tough talk about drug pushers. One 
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advertisement featured the image of an aging drug dealer sitting in a prison cell while a stern, 
booming narrator cautioned his colleagues: “A warning to dope pushers in New York State, 
Rockefeller has increased the maximum punishment for selling hard drugs to life imprisonment. 
And now, pusher, when you’re caught it can be for keeps…Rockefeller. He’s done a lot. He’ll do 
more.” 130 Speaking directly to pushers—with the intended audience, of course, being everyone 
else— provided the public spectacle of an empowered Rockefeller disciplining and punishing the 
recalcitrant drug pushers. Ironically, this rhetoric did not quite match the penal practices of the 
time and Rockefeller’s opponent was quick to point out that there were few drug sellers serving 
life sentences in New York.   
 New York’s methadone efforts were bolstered by new national scrutiny of heroin use. 
What had been a high-profile problem exploded into a full-blown political crisis when two 
Congressmen returned from a trip to Vietnam to report staggering levels of heroin use among 
U.S. armed forces. They reported that 10 to 15 percent of troops, between 26,000 and 39,000 
people, used the drug on a regular basis.131  Republican Robert H. Steele warned that, “The 
soldier going to South Viet Nam today runs a far greater risk of becoming a heroin addict than a 
combat casualty."132   
 The federal response to soldiers’ drug use illustrates again how different populations of 
drug users inspired radically different reactions from state officials. The image of American 
soldiers sat uncomfortably next to popular representations of heroin addicts and presented 
problems for the Nixon administration, which was intent on preventing the chaos and public 
relations nightmare of a wave of displaced, heroin-addicted veterans returning to the United 
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States. In contrast to the rhetoric about domestic drug users, government officials acknowledged 
the situational factors that motivated drug use, such as stress and easy drug availability. As 
opposed to the segregation and alienation of poor addicts in the United States, federal policies 
emphasized soldiers’ inherent belonging within the American polity.  
 Years later, Dr. Beny Primm, a treatment specialist from New York, explained that the 
situation demanded a different strategy than had been previously employed. 
What we did in Vietnam, we said these were soldiers, these were good American 
boys over there fighting a war, red-blooded Americans, who happened to be in a 
stressful situation and used drugs.We began to find other ways to describe 
addiction rather than to say, ‘They’re second-class citizens. They’re the worst in 
the world. They’re the dregs of the earth.’ That’s how addiction was thought 
about for many, many years.133 
 
While in Vietnam, U.S. forces were rarely characterized as junkies. This had much to do with the 
low-cost, high-quality heroin readily available in Southeast Asia. With such pure narcotics, 
troops had little need to inject heroin and, instead, were able use less direct, less-stigmatized 
delivery mechanisms such as smoking or snorting. Most important, a heroin habit in Vietnam 
cost between two and seven dollars daily, well within the budget of an average GI, as compared 
to the $50 to $100 daily cost of much weaker heroin in the United States.134   
 Unlike the emphasis on personal weakness or illness of heroin addicts stateside, soldiers’ 
less marginalized positions allowed them space to emphasize the circumstantial motivations for 
drug use. They often claimed a therapeutic function for marijuana and heroin, emphasizing their 
utility in managing the terror of combat. One explained the function this way:  
All our guys used it [pot] in my outfit. I was point man [marched ahead of the 
squad to look for booby traps, mines, and enemy ambush] for our squad...and I 
smoked and shot up a little scag [heroin] you know, just to save my own ass! 
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When you get high, in a way it calms you down so you don’t shit your pants.135  
 
Press coverage of this drug use reached a frenzied pitch in the summer of 1971. Politicians 
warned of the dangers posed by weapon- trained veterans joining the domestic drug culture. 
Iowa Senator Harold Hughes predicted that, “Within a matter of months in our large cities, the 
Capone era of the ’20s may look like a Sunday school picnic by comparison.”136  
With heroin use growing among the white middle class, registering as a top priority in 
public opinion polls, and now threatening entire military operations, it is not surprising that 
President Nixon took the stage at a press conference in June of 1971 to declare that “America’s 
Public Enemy Number One is drug abuse.”137 Like his declaration of a “war on drugs,” Nixon’s 
rhetoric positioned drug use as the menacing and alien “enemy” of American society, as opposed 
to acknowledging its long and indigenous history. At the same press conference, the president 
announced the formation of the most extensive federal drug-treatment initiative in U.S. history. 
Headed by Jerome Jaffe, a leading methadone researcher and treatment developer from Illinois, 
the new federal effort diverged from past practices by investing a majority of funds into 
treatment and education, as opposed to law enforcement. With a Republican administration 
sponsoring an unprecedented and massive treatment apparatus favoring methadone maintenance, 
the disease concept of addiction appeared ascendant. National drug policy was firmly under the 
direction of specialized treatment experts. Architects of Nixon’s program spoke hopefully of a 
growing consensus that the state was responsible for reintegrating drug users into society: “As 
the notion of the right to rehabilitation evolves into the consciousness of America, it will get us 
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away from the archaic thinking that the drug addict is an evil character."138  
 Drug use in the military was the administration’s priority and Jerome Jaffe was on a 
plane to Vietnam the day after Nixon announced his new initiative. There he implemented a new 
drug-screening program where two huge newly minted machines tested the urine of every 
returning service member. Those testing positive spent an extra week in detoxification—
interestingly without the assistance of methadone—before returning to the United States for three 
more weeks of treatment. To enable this plan, Nixon reversed the long-standing policy of 
dishonorably discharging or court marshaling those caught using drugs in the military. In a single 
memo, he ordered the Secretary of Defense to stop considering drug use a crime in the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice.139 This sudden decriminalization reflected the profound pragmatism of 
the Nixon Administration, the desperation for getting a handle on the problem, as well as an 
awareness of the political dangers of punitive policy that criminalized honored citizens, 
particularly U.S. soldiers.  
 When the screening results began to trickle back, White House officials were relieved to 
find far fewer heroin users than they feared. In the first seven weeks, only 5.4 percent tested 
positive for drugs.140 While initial estimates were potentially inflated, Jaffe had anticipated that 
many soldiers would probably stop using once word got out about testing and that positive 
results could delay soldiers’ much-anticipated discharge. While many users probably brought 
their heroin addiction home with them, most left their habit in Vietnam along with the stressful 
war that had helped inspire it.141 
 Back in New York, the Nixon Administration’s pragmatic embrace of methadone 
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treatment buttressed the state’s burgeoning clinic infrastructure with federal funding and political 
legitimacy. The NACC, with financial help from the federal government, expanded methadone 
treatment dramatically by establishing clinics throughout New York. Funding for the Rockefeller 
Programs slowly decreased and methadone became the state’s dominant treatment modality. 
While some centers offered basic services, such as health or employment counseling, the new 
clinics simply dispensed methadone to patients once a day and were far less expensive than 
custodial care.142  
 In its execution, methadone was a particularly complicated program with diverse and 
seemingly contradictory implications. On one hand, it mitigated the stigma associated with drug 
abuse by medicalizing addiction and embracing the objective of restoring drug users to 
“productive citizens.” On the other hand, by treating addiction as an individual pathology 
managed by a simple daily prescription medication, methadone tended to absolve larger social 
forces from responsibility for drug epidemics and divert attention from the profound economic 
crises that fueled the drug trade in central cities. Methadone was born from a desire to protect 
“the public” from the addict, and in that sense, it further strengthened the perceived distinction 
between the two. Many who promoted methadone, in theory, did so out of willingness to accept 
any strategy to control crime, regardless of its impact on drug users. One Lower East Side 
resident explained he had lost all interest in protecting the rights or well-being of addicts. “I 
wouldn’t care if someone came along with a machine gun and killed all of them…I’ve been 
robbed, my wife has been robbed—I’m sorry, but I don’t care any more.”143 A social worker’s 
comment to the New York Times reflected the popular belief that methadone was needed to 
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protect the city, even if it did not address the root causes of addiction. “If your goal is to get 
people off the streets, you can give them methadone,” she explained. “If you are considering why 
they became addicted and you want to help them make their lives more productive, then you 
have to do something else. But you look around and you wonder if you shouldn’t get people off 
the streets before the city is destroyed.”144  
 Ironically, in practice, methadone actually failed at “getting people off the streets.” 
Although methadone showed promise in reducing crime, it lost much community support, and 
therefore political support, because drug users remained enmeshed in public space. Residents of 
neighborhoods with methadone programs often recoiled at the groups of addicts congregating for 
their daily doses of the drug. Although methadone succeeded at reducing crime rates, a visible, 
salient presence of addicts in neighborhoods all over New York exacerbated hostility toward 
heroin users and government treatment efforts. All over the country, methadone clinics faced 
active and organized opposition from neighborhood groups opposed to the placement of clinics 
in their community. Locals fiercely resisted the clinics though lobbying, pickets, letter-writing 
campaigns, and even vigilante attacks and sabotage.145 These struggles, which had also surfaced 
in response to drug-free programs, continued throughout the decade. Methadone centers attracted 
special attention because they served higher numbers of people who had to pass through 
neighborhoods to visit the clinic daily. Residents claimed that the clients lingered, accosted 
locals, and generally disrupted communities. Race factored in many of these conflicts, as 
illustrated by a report to Mayor Lindsay concerning a public nuisance lawsuit again a private 
methadone clinic treatment facility. It explained simply, “In the case of Ithaca, there have been 
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thinly veiled racial overtones. The patients are predominantly Black and Puerto Rican and this is 
basically a white middle class neighborhood.”146 In other situations, communities of color 
resisted what they viewed as an unfair concentration of drug treatment centers in their 
neighborhoods. Such organized resistance from mainstream, reputable organizations inevitably 
made rehabilitation centers less attractive politically, especially for state legislators from the 
districts directly affected. 
In letters opposing drug centers, people often voiced a zero-sum understanding of rights, 
where services or programs understood to help one group directly disadvantaged another. One 
letter to Mayor Lindsay that opposed a rehabilitation center reasoned that “bringing hardcore 
disadvantaged people and taking whites out of our area who represent middle income status is 
racially discriminating.” The author continued by asserting that her aversion to the neighborhood 
becoming a “ghetto” was not racist: “We don’t want to increase the density of population in this 
vicinity and especially the extension of another possible ghetto made of Hispanics and Blacks. 
This does not mean any feeling of discrimination either.”147 In this rhetoric, writers repeatedly 
asserted their positions as homeowners and taxpayers to legitimize their claims on the state and 
to distinguish themselves from a racialized population of addicts. For example, U.S. 
Representative (and future mayor) Ed Koch wrote to Mayor Lindsay about his constituents’ 
complaints regarding methadone centers. He argued that, “We must strike a balance between the 
addict’s needs and the public’s right for protection.”148 This seemingly mundane language 
saturated these debates and reflects the assumption that addicts and the “public” are separate and 
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their interests are inversely related—so that what helps the addict, hurts the public, and vice 
versa.  
Methadone clients recognized this and struggled to counter this image. The newsletter, 
Breakthrough, written by the patients and staff of a clinic at Jamaica Hospital, discussed 
strategies for countering the notion that they were an alien element. “We are part of local 
community,” one author asserted, despite the fact that local residents felt differently.  
Most residents of this area still consider us junkies and a menace to their children, 
their businesses, and their piece of mind…The fact that we are on “methadone” 
does nothing to alleviate their fears for too many of them it is just another form of 
drug abuse…we are no longer addicts but human beings with the same ambitions, 
desires and feeling that they have. We have learned from our mistakes, which is 
one of the reasons we are on methadone, and this alone should show them our 
desire to become a productive part of society again.149  
 
The author seemed to take for granted that addicts were non-productive members of society that 
were barely considered human; here, he does not challenge these assumptions as much as 
struggle against the permanency of the label and for a chance at reintegration.  
While organizing against treatment centers further heightened the gulf between addicts 
and full rights-bearing citizens, drug programs faced other fundamental obstacles and, like 
Governor Rockefeller’s previous programs, methadone would not relieve the political pressure. 
For many critics, especially those in the drug-free treatment community, methadone was akin to 
drug maintenance and denied more substantive healing to an addict. Others worried that 
methadone symbolized tolerance of the “drug culture” and accelerated social decay. Many 
radical Black and Latino activists saw methadone as a strategy to forestall organized political 
resistance by sedating their communities.150    
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In addition to outside resistance, methadone also faced the daunting obstacle of 
delivering on its stated programmatic goal of successfully reintegrating ex-drug addicts into 
society. The concentration of drug use among low-income people of color forced programs that 
worked with that population to directly confront the structural racism in the United States. Beny 
Primm, the director of a methadone treatment program in Brooklyn, described the unique 
challenges of dealing with heroin use in African-American communities. He acknowledged the 
benefits of methadone: “Probably outstanding among these has been the conceptual 
transformation of the ‘junkie’ from criminal to patient.” This fact, however, did little to lessen 
the barriers to full integration into the polity, especially since African Americans still struggled 
to secure the most rudimentary rights and legal protections. Primm explained,  
Even if we are able to overcome the psychic inertia among our patients—the lack 
of self-confidence, the lack of basic skills, and the lack of acceptable patterns for 
dealing with society’s demands—we have not altered the environment in which 
they developed and in which they must survive. Thus we are placed in a position 
of attempting to prepare individuals intellectually and emotionally to enter a 
society which really doesn’t want them…Society, and I’m talking about the white 
establishment, has made the black ghetto resident a deviant to begin with. Thus it 
is of little consequence in the eyes of society and in the individual’s own mind 
that he becomes an addict, a criminal, or dependent on welfare. I know, my staff 
knows, and my patients know that few employers are willing to hire an ex-addict 
or ex-convict…This means that the community must begin to accept treatment 
programs in their midst, that community residents must accept ex-addicts as 
fellow citizens and workers (emphasis added).151 
 
In a society where normative citizenship was often based on consumption and productivity, few 
issues were more significant to rehabilitation and reintegration than access to jobs. However, 
cultural and political rhetoric that positioned heroin users as non-working, dangerous outsiders 
poisoned efforts to secure even the most basic work for recovering drug users. As Dr. Primm 
noted, this stigma was compounded by the more general barriers to economic opportunity that all 
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low-income communities of color faced and made the full integration of poor African-American 
and Latino heroin addicts into the nation’s economic mainstream a hollow and improbable 
proposition.  
Recognizing that no promise of rehabilitation was viable if employers refused to hire 
people in the state’s programs, the state attempted to mitigate discrimination against recovering 
addicts in the job market. A state commission discovered that representations by the media and 
politicians made employers reluctant to hire addicts:  
[Major employers] receive their information about addiction from the media; they 
constantly refer to such information, which they deem highly reliable; and they 
view the addict, as does the media, as a source of all of society’s problems… 
[The] exaggeration of addict-related crime through the media and certain 
otherwise responsible agencies of government is a significant factor in leading the 
major employers to believe that since addiction means crime, and most crime at 
that, rehabilitation is impossible.152 
 
These seemingly theoretical debates caused practical tensions between people charged with 
executing anti-drug campaigns. For example, the chief council of the NACC complained that 
New York City’s anti-drug advertisements directly sabotaged his efforts to convince employers 
to hire rehabilitated addicts. He argued that the campaign, which painted a frightening, sordid 
image of addicts as the “living dead,” was irrelevant to potential users since it failed to 
acknowledge the real reasons people start using drugs. He wrote to city officials: 
To add to all this, the phrase, “living dead” suggests, as do all of the ads, no return 
for the rehabilitated addict. This is scary, all right, but it is scaring all the wrong 
people for all the wrong reasons, such as employers who recoil from hiring 
rehabilitated addicts. Your campaign has reinforced a stereotype in the most 
persistent and unenlightened way.  
 
He went on to critique the hypocrisy of presenting narcotic use as the dark and repulsive habit of 
a distinct, perverse type of person when a vast majority of society relies on chemical substances.  
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Finally, you say that you are telling the truth [in these ads]. You are not. At best, 
you are generalizing with slogans. Drugs make people feel good, not bad. They 
give people pleasures available in no other way. And they provide a near perfect 
escape from reality. The truth is that we are a drug taking society, with nine 
million alcoholics, hundreds of thousands of respectable pill takers who can 
afford prescriptions, thousands who drink to excess on occasion, including before 
driving, untold millions who continue to shorten their lives with tobacco, and five 
hundred seventy thousand heroin addicts. The truth is we are all in the same 
boat.153 
 
Efforts such as these to counter the rhetorical and physical segregation of addicts from 
society were usually ineffectual. Individuals in treatment programs were, of course, the most 
acutely aware of the contradictions between policies aimed at reintegration and segregation. One 
man’s experience illustrated how these policies intersected in individuals’ lives. John Browski 
testified before the Temporary Commission to Evaluate Drug Laws about quitting heroin and 
trying to find work. “I have tried every existing program at that time and failed at all the 
programs. I was at Kentucky [federal drug treatment center] five times; I detoxed at hospitals 
five times…As soon as I would find work, I would spend the money on drugs and if it wasn’t 
enough, I would steal from the company,” he explained. This all changed when he enrolled in a 
methadone program: “From the first day of the program until this day, I have not touched a drop 
of junk which surprises me more than anybody.” Once stabilized on methadone and looking for 
employment, Browski lied in his interview with Western Electric about his past drug use. He 
worked at the company for a year and a half without incident until he was hospitalized after a 
workplace accident and informed his doctor he needed methadone. When the doctor reported this 
to Western Electric, Browski was fired.  
I had a good work record and I thought that I had proven myself after working for 
them for two years. But I was informed that it is company policy not to hire meth 
patients and if I had told them at the time, they would not have hired me. So my 
services were terminated…I have been collecting compensation from the 
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company for 1 1/2 years. They are actually paying me $50 a week not to work for 
them because they fired me.154 
 
His union did not take up his cause because they also viewed methadone as continued drug 
dependence. Browski’s subsequent attempts to get a license to drive a cab were also blocked by a 
policy prohibiting methadone patients. The interaction between state policies, employer 
practices, and cultural stigma effectively stymied recovering addicts’ job opportunities, often 
forcing them to either forgo sustainable employment or risk repercussions by misrepresenting 
their histories. Ironically, the government program dedicated to transform addicts into 
productive, contributing citizens simultaneously marked them as dangerous and risky 
propositions for employers.  
The jobs most naturally available to ex-users were in the burgeoning drug treatment 
infrastructure. Many clinics and therapeutic communities recruited staff mainly from the ranks of 
their successful patients. In addition to providing jobs, this was effective programmatically since 
people intimately familiar with addiction counseled patients and provided role models of long-
term sobriety. However, privileging personal experience over specialized training clashed with 
the professionalization trends within the health and social work fields and provoked hostility 
among some working in drug rehabilitation. A program administrator from California wrote to 
Rockefeller about his disdain for the implications of employing ex-drug users as counselors. He 
explained:  
What has happened, however, it that the addict has become a sacred cow, he is in 
vogue. As a user-criminal he is in vogue because he is the subject of the greatest 
& most extensive (expensive) campaign in history to pamper, coddle, re-educate, 
rehabilitate, etc. Once he is temporarily rehabilitated, he is again in vogue. This 
time, as an “ex-addict counselor,” which means that he can skillfully parley a 
third grade education and some needle marks and 10 years in jail into a job a lot 
of college graduates, nurses, etc. would love to have…No Governor, money and 
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dedication are not the answer, as you know. The drug addict is a criminal, a 
cancer in society, eroding, crippling, draining. Lock him up.155 
 
Hostility toward employing ex-users, even among those working in the drug treatment industry, 
was probably intensified by the general decay in economic opportunities throughout the 1970s. 
These frustrations joined the rhetoric that emphasized the danger of heroin users and sabotaged 
efforts to curtail job discrimination and secure economic opportunities for recovering addicts.  
 
The Crossroads in Drug Policy  
Drug policy could have moved in a number of different directions in 1973. As chronicled in the 
previous sections, there were serious political liabilities, financial consequences, and institutional 
limitations to every treatment strategy advanced by Governor Rockefeller. However, the critical 
problem resulted from the tension inherent in policies ostensibly designed to rehabilitate that 
were marketed as protection for “the public” from a menacing group of outsiders. Still, punitive 
policy was not the inevitable result of these dynamics.  
 As late as 1971, New York City’s mayor, a man with national political ambitions, 
publicly floated the idea of imitating Britain’s network of heroin maintenance clinics, and 
actually dispensing heroin to addicts.156 Although the Republican Party had largely embraced the 
“get tough” logic, some challenged “law-and-order” political rhetoric. In a speech on crime, 
Mayor Lindsay directly questioned the practical value of such talk:  
The rise of crime in the 1960s makes many Americans long for the comparative 
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tranquility of the 1950s…Now that feeling of security—if it really existed—is 
gone…The security all of us have lost will not be restored by hard words. The 
rhetoric of a George Wallace or a Ronald Reagan or a Richard Nixon can exploit 
this nation’s fear but it will not stop the rise of crime on your streets and mine.157  
And regardless of the public fear about addict crime and the popularity of “law-and-order” 
political appeals, a vast majority of the population reported to pollsters that they viewed drug 
abuse as a medical problem. In 1971, Governor Rockefeller released a poll showing that 87.6 
percent of respondents reported that drug addicts should be treated as sick people, not 
criminals.158  
 There were, therefore, no predestined political moves for Rockefeller in the early 1970s. 
His presidential ambitions were still much alive, even as his party pulled away from his liberal 
Republican tradition. After a hostile reception from Goldwater’s supporters (the crowds booed 
him) at the 1964 Republican Convention, Rockefeller became determined to court the steadily 
increasing conservative factions in his efforts to improve his standing in the party. When looking 
for clues to Rockefeller’s developing politics, perhaps the most important events occurred at 
Attica, an upstate New York prison. On September 9, 1971, inmates of the prison rebelled and 
took control of a section of the prison, holding 42 guards hostage. In the standoff that ensued, the 
prisoners released a list of demands, including amnesty for the revolt and remedies for the poor 
conditions, racism, and abuse at the prison. Russell Oswald, a relatively liberal prison warden, 
attempted negotiations with the prisoners through a group of intermediaries chosen by the 
inmates. Rockefeller, in one of the most controversial decisions of his administration, refused to 
visit the scene to take part in the negotiations and, on September 13, ordered state police to 
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retake Attica. In the frenzy of their attack, police killed ten hostages and 29 inmates.159  
 Although much of the country considered the violent repression at Attica a travesty and a 
state massacre, the decision played very well among key sections of Rockefeller’s target 
constituency. It strengthened his appeal among conservative Republicans and was even cited as 
evidence of his growing viability with the right as a 1976 presidential candidate.160 One typical 
constituent letter read,  
Frankly, many times your actions have been too liberal for my taste, but this time 
I was delighted and fully supported your actions, as did almost everyone I know 
in business here in NYC and elsewhere. It seems to most of us middle class 
Republicans that all the rights nowadays belong to the drug addicts, burglars, 
rapists and murderers, with little thought given to the rights of their victims. I 
know that you know this is the true viewpoint of the majority and the majority 
gratefully supported you in your actions on Attica. Hooray!161  
 
For many, Attica represented the rejection of negotiations and accommodations, and the embrace 
of strong, decisive, and—if need be—violent action to maintain order. As another person 
explained in his letter celebrating Rockefeller’s decision, “the liberal over compensation has 
proven that bowing to unreasonable demands does not appease the complainants, but increases 
the clamor for more outlandish demands.”162 This letter writer did not deny the existence of 
injustice or inequality; he merely warned that liberal “over compensation” and “permissiveness” 
would not bring social order. This was a lesson Rockefeller took to heart as he contemplated the 
next phase in his struggle against drugs. The governor’s actions at Attica horrified many and 
tarnished his reputation in certain circles, making enemies of prisoners’ allies, civil liberties 
advocates, and the “liberal establishment.” However, those actions also built Rockefeller’s 
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credibility in a key and coveted demographic of Republican voters. The enemies he targeted and 
decisions he made at Attica hinted at the political tactics he would come to employ in drug 
policy.  
 By 1973, 56,522 people were enrolled in New York state drug treatment, 34,149 in 
methadone programs and 22,373 in drug-free treatment.163 This massive new infrastructure had 
not ended drug use or appeased public anxiety about street crime and the new drug cultures. In 
fairness, a review of the nation’s centuries-long efforts would suggest that it never should have 
been expected to produce dramatic results in such short periods. However, for politicians who 
demanded and promised safer streets and a restoration of law and order, these programs, 
originally intended to bolster their anti-drug credentials, quickly became a liability. While 
treatment undoubtedly intervened dramatically in the lives of individual addicts and did 
statistically mitigate the problem, the programs—often unfairly—were made to stand as evidence 
for the state’s incapacity to handle social problems and the impotence of liberalism’s answers to 
the crises of late modernity.  
 Paradoxically, the political rhetoric that rationalized these policies discursively ostracized 
the very people the programs were ostensibly designed to help. It was increasingly impossible to 
build support for state programs to heal, or mass acceptance for “the right to rehabilitation” for a 
population constructed as the “living dead” and anti-citizens within the polity. In fact, these 
debates crystallized the parameters of normative citizenship, as the nonproductive, deviant, 
parasitic addict cast in high relief the contributing, hard-working citizen. These sentiments were 
captured in a man’s letter to Mayor Lindsay protesting that any portion of his taxes would be 
used to support drug rehabilitation centers. He warned, “Soon there will be more addicts than tax 
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payers. The sooner an addict gives himself or herself an over dose the better off the public, the 
tax payers and their families will be.”164 This language placed the drug addict in diametric 
opposition to the “taxpayer,” the classic proxy language for full citizen. Erased from this rhetoric 
were the collective consequences in an interdependent society of exacerbating inequality by 
economically, socially, and legally ostracizing the most vulnerable populations. When, in 
January of 1973, Governor Rockefeller chose to demand the penal segregation of the hyper-
stigmatized “pusher,” he not only repudiated more than a decade of his own treatment policies 
but also contributed to the fundamental renegotiations of social belonging and state responsibility 
for social problems. 
 
“Drug addiction in NY: Once an Illness, Now a Crime”165: Rockefeller’s Embrace of 
Punishment 
 
It is impossible, of course, to isolate what led Rockefeller to abandon his drug treatment 
emphasis and embrace draconian penalties for drug selling. Regardless of its veracity, the story 
that the governor told of his conversion illuminates how his proposal intersected with many of 
the themes discussed in the previous sections. Rockefeller’s narrative begins at a party in early 
1972 when he was talking with William Fine, the president of Bonwit Teller department stores.  
Fine had become concerned about narcotics after his own son’s struggle with addiction and he 
was now board chairman of the Phoenix House, the therapeutic communities originally opened 
by New York City.166 That night, Rockefeller asked Fine if he’d be willing to go to Japan and 
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find out why they had the lowest addiction rate of any industrialized nation. Fine agreed, 
financed the trip himself, and spent a weekend meeting with health officials in Japan. He 
submitted his findings to the governor in March of 1972.  
 He reported that the Japanese did indeed have negligible drug addiction, affecting less 
than one percent of the population, and only a 0.13 percent relapse rate after treatment. 167 Fine’s 
memo outlined their aggressive treatment strategies: 72 hour detentions in all suspected cases of 
drug use (with an additional ten-to-20-day hold if ordered), detoxification without any medical 
treatment to soften withdrawal symptoms, mandatory hospitalization for up to six months for 
confirmed addicts, community mentors to facilitate the transition from treatment programs, and 
the possibility of a life sentence for drug sellers. Although Fine detailed these various features in 
Japan’s aggressive anti-drug program, Rockefeller fixed on a single component: life sentences 
for drug sellers. He also took to heart Fine’s theoretical lesson from the trip. For Fine, the 
takeaway message from the Japanese was not the details of their program but what he considered 
their strategic disregard for the rights of the addict. He wrote:  
The thing that impressed me most of all is the single minded conviction they have that 
public interest is above human rights when it comes to an evil. In other words, it becomes 
a detriment to the public interest when there is drug abuse; therefore, the human rights of 
those who get involved in narcotics, or push narcotics, are brushed aside-quickly, 
aggressively, and with little or no recourse…It is incredible to me that they have had such 
success, but then, it really all comes down to what people are willing to give up to get, 
and the Japanese, obviously, were willing to give up the soap box movement on human 
rights in order to rid the public of the evil abuses of drugs.168  
 
Fine’s analysis barely touched upon the complex set of cultural, historical, and political factors 
that made drugs profoundly distinct phenomena in Japan versus the United States.169 His letter 
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did, however, echo calls for a new balance between individual rights and the collective social 
welfare that saturated Rockefeller’s mail and conservative rhetoric at the time. And it was these 
themes that the governor would eventually make the ideological underpinning of his new drug 
laws.  
The governor seems to have quickly recognized the potential political utility of this 
“Japanese model.” According to Joe Persico, a key Rockefeller aide, two months after sending 
his report, Fine again found himself at a party with New York’s governor. This time, California’s 
governor, Ronald Reagan, was also in attendance. Reagan was intrigued by Fine’s description of 
his trip to Japan and requested a copy of his report and recommendations. However, when Fine 
walked across the room to ask Rockefeller if he would mind sharing the report with Reagan, the 
governor refused. Explaining Rockefeller’s thinking, Persico wrote: “This thunderbolt was to be 
hurled by him.”170 Rockefeller’s refusal makes even more sense in light of the fact that Reagan 
was widely perceived as his chief opponent for the 1976 Republican presidential nomination.171 
The governor’s aides did not hear about Rockefeller’s new idea until they met at the end 
of 1972 to discuss the next year’s legislative program and begin drafting the “State of the State” 
address. According to Persico, the staff was uneasy as Rockefeller announced his plan to 
sentence all drug sellers to life in prison without parole or any other escape. Their hesitation 
about the plan infuriated the governor and he demanded that they advance it despite their 
reservations. Michael Whitman, Rockefeller’s chief counsel, risked his relationship with the 
governor to express his distaste for the idea. 
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Howard Jones, head of New York’s Narcotic Addiction Control Commission and 
supposedly the governor’s key advisor on narcotics, was never consulted and only spoke with 
Rockefeller after he got wind of the proposal from other sources and requested a meeting. When 
they met, Jones outlined the many problems with the proposal: Juries would hesitate to convict 
addicts for such long sentences, jails could not hold them all, the budget could not afford the 
mandate, judges would lose sentencing discretion and, most critically, the law offered no hope 
for rehabilitation or second chances. Rockefeller listened coldly and silently throughout the 
meeting. After Jones left, he simply said, “He’s just worried about his people,” referring to the 
fact that the NACC head was African American.172 His offhand comment reflected not only the 
governor’s disregard for the logistical and philosophical arguments against the plan but also the 
extent to which Rockefeller knew the law would disproportionately target people of color.  
Rockefeller’s staff advanced the law despite their concerns. In retrospect, Persico 
claimed, “I never understood the psychological milieu in which the chain of errors in Vietnam 
was forged until I became involved in the Rockefeller drug proposal.”173 The fact that 
Rockefeller rejected the counsel of drug-treatment experts was not merely incidental. His 
proposal was deliberately anti-specialist and the flagrant rejection of modern, social scientific 
knowledge was a key part of its appeal. By advancing his own “common-sense” solution and 
brazenly rejecting established expertise, Rockefeller tapped into and helped solidify a deep 
frustration with modern bureaucracy and liberal state policy. He proudly told reporters that a 
central feature of his plan, a $1,000 reward for information leading to the arrest of a pusher, was 
not generated by law-enforcement experts but was the idea of his college- and high-school-aged 
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stepsons.174 He explained to a New York Times reporter that his conversations with Fine inspired 
him to be his own drug expert. He continued, “So out of this I got to feel maybe we’ve got to 
focus on who is being mugged, mobbed, robbed, murdered, raped, and so forth—so how to 
restore civil liberties to our citizens.”175 Here, echoing Fine’s point from his report, Rockefeller 
signaled that he changed the intended object of legislation from curing and re-integrating addicts 
to protecting “society” and the victims of crime. He advanced a zero-sum understanding of 
rights, where the restoration of “civil liberties to our citizens” was predicated upon rhetorically 
and physically expelling addicts from the public. While rehabilitation had always been a 
conflicted and partially hollow mission, the new proposal made clear that the well-being of drug 
addicts would no longer be a barometer of success.  
 Rockefeller first publicly unveiled his plan in the “State of the State” speech on January 
3, 1973. Beginning his discussion of drugs by establishing the depth of public concern about the 
issue, he said, “Virtually every poll of public opinion concerns documents that the number one, 
growing concern of the American people is crime and drugs—coupled with an all-pervasive fear 
for the safety of their person and their property.” He continued by declaring that citizens were 
right to demand firm action from the state to protect their interests: “The law abiding people of 
this State have the right to expect tougher and more effective action from their elected leaders to 
protect them from lawlessness and crime.” He emphasized the failure of all previous state efforts 
to curb addiction and the ongoing dangers drugs posed, declaring:  
But let’s be frank—let’s tell it like it is: We have achieved very little permanent 
rehabilitation-and have found no cure…Addiction has kept growing. A rising 
percentage of our high school and college students, from every background and 
economic level, have become involved, whether as victims or pushers…Whole 
neighborhoods have been effectively destroyed by addicts as by an invading 
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army. We face the risk of undermining our will as a people—and the ultimate 
destruction of our society as a whole.176 
 
In calling addicts an “invading army,” the governor not only positioned them as outsiders, 
without claims to citizenship protections, but also as a military enemy solely responsible for the 
destruction of entire communities. Drugs were all the more insidious because they were now 
spreading to new communities, presumably white and middle class. “This has to stop,” he 
declared, pounding the lectern. “This is going to stop.” He then outlined his intentions to 
sentence dealers to life in prison without the option of probation, parole, or plea-bargaining. 
Additionally, $1,000 bounties for information leading to a dealer’s arrest would ensure that, “For 
the first time ever, there would be a cash incentive to work for society instead of against it.” 177  
 Response to the governor’s proposal ran the gamut from shocked disbelief to fervent 
support. Legislators jokingly called it the “Attila the Hun Law,” apparently referencing the law’s 
invocation of a ruthless, barbaric masculinity. Organizations such as the American Civil 
Liberties Union and Legal Aid immediately opposed the policy. The New York Times 
editorialized against the program from the beginning, calling the governor’s speech “vengeful,” 
and arguing that he was abandoning treatment programs that showed signs of promise although 
they had not been fully implemented or funded.178 Much of the opposition focused on the 
logistical and financial implications of the proposed legislation, as commentators predicted 
catastrophic consequences for the state’s budget and prison and court systems.179  Judges 
expressed reservations about the proposed limitations to their discretion and the elimination of 
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plea bargaining, which they claimed prevented trial backlogs and induced low-level dealers to 
turn against the larger operators in the business.180 The most powerful opponent was probably 
John Lindsay, who had recently switched parties to run for the 1972 Democratic presidential 
nomination and would face most of the logistical fallout of such a law as New York City’s 
mayor. He called it “impractical, unworkable and vindictive,” and questioned the motivation for 
the proposal:181  
We all know the urge to lash out, to take some drastic step, which will yield a 
final answer to this corrosive evil…We all know how empty it is to promise 
victory over crime by an emotional call to lock the criminals up and throw away 
the key. That is not a battle plan. It is merely a deceptive gesture, offering nothing 
beyond momentary satisfaction and inevitable disillusionment.182 
 
Other commentators charged Rockefeller with irresponsible politicking and throwing a 
tantrum.183 Pointing to the governor’s presidential ambitions, many dismissed the entire 
announcement as a ploy to rework his liberal image and appeal to the increasingly powerful right 
wing of the Republican Party that had thwarted his previous efforts at the nomination.184 
Commentators noted that the harsh proposal politically insulated Rockefeller on two fronts. 
Remembering how O’Connor’s opposition to Rockefeller’s harsh drug proposals cost O’Connor 
the 1966 gubernatorial election, politicians realized that resistance to Rockefeller’s plan left them 
open to being branded as “soft on crime” and “soft on addicts,” both politically fatal in the 
contemporary climate. Second, since the logic of the new, punitive proposal rested upon the 
notion that New York’s treatment efforts were total failures, Rockefeller turned his earlier 
programs into evidence to support his new direction, thereby neutralizing them as political 
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liabilities in upcoming campaigns.185 
 Politicians also recognized how the new drug plan could be symbolically deployed to 
further discredit liberalism and fashion a new vision of government responsibility that restored 
confidence in the state. The deputy Republican majority leader in the Senate connected his 
support of Rockefeller’s proposal to the larger project of restoring faith in the justice system:  
Seldom in my lifetime have so many citizens expressed such failing confidence in 
our system of justice that they do today…Ironically, too often, we are thwarted by 
the very instruments created by our own hand. We are captives of both our 
compassion and our idealism.186  
 
By characterizing therapeutic programs as the product of misplaced compassion and idealism, 
politicians discredited specialist expertise and portrayed therapeutic social policies as naive, 
effete responses to the tough problems at hand.  
 Instead of aiming the law at high-level dealers who profited financially from the drug 
trade, Rockefeller explicitly diverged from past practice by targeting the small-time sellers 
commonly understood to be addicts. “It is time to stop listening to the bleeding hearts. It is time 
to start protecting ourselves. There is no question that young people who are sharing and selling 
relatively small amounts of heroin must be removed from society and isolated like carriers of a 
dangerous contagion.”187 Here Rockefeller rationalized his proposal by redeploying medical 
metaphors that traditionally framed addict/pushers as victims of illness and instead cast them as 
infectious agents spreading heroin addiction. Some medical authorities echoed his logic, even 
characterizing this criminalization strategy as being fundamentally grounded in a public health 
approach to drug use. In a letter to the editor, a doctor at S.U.N.Y’s Community Medicine 
Department wrote,  
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Governor Rockefeller’s new proposals for dealing with the drug problem by 
attacking sellers are strongly supported by epidemiological theory...Thus heroin 
addiction is similar in many ways to diseases such as malaria with its identifiable 
vector, the mosquito. Malaria has been controlled in many parts of the world, not 
by treating sick individuals and not by warning people against swamps, but by 
eliminating swamps and mosquitoes. Governor Rockefeller, having previously 
tried treatment (including methadone maintenance) and education programs for 
heroin addiction and seen them fail to control its spread, has opted for a public 
health approach which…has some real chance of success. 188  
 
By equating pushers with mosquitoes, the letter swiftly cast pushers not only as anti-citizens, but 
as non-humans whose fate was utterly irrelevant. This language buttressed assumptions that 
permeated Rockefeller’s rhetoric regarding the opposing position of citizens and pushers. In one 
example, the governor bellowed to a gathering of the Empire State Chamber of Commerce, “We, 
the citizens, are imprisoned by the pushers. I want to put the pushers in prison so we can come 
out, ladies and gentlemen.”189    
  It is not surprising that addicts and drug dealers were almost entirely absent from these debates, 
although some people spoke on their behalf or challenged their expulsion from the American polity. In one 
rare instance, an “ex-junkie” was quoted by the New York Times challenging the governor’s assertion that 
the threat of life in prison would deter addicts: “The trouble with the deterrent theory is that politicians 
think that there was a logical process to my behavior…that I was thinking rationally about sentences, 
prisons, and deterrence while I was pursuing a white powder to inject into my body and which would strip 
me of any decency of purpose.”190 In a few limited forums, family members spoke publicly against 
abandoning the hope of rehabilitation of their loved ones.191 The father of a heroin addict even suggested 
that there were some former addicts who were “probably doing more to help their fellow man than the 
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average citizen.”192  
 Paul Good, a prominent television and print journalist, admitted in an op-ed that his son was a 
recovering heroin addict. He explained that he understood the governor’s desire for retribution against 
pushers since he had often fantasized about murdering his son’s dealer. But he realized the futility of 
holding drug dealers responsible for his son’s actions:  
I put the idea aside because I knew that virtually all of my son’s suppliers were 
addicts like he, hustling money in any way to insure their fix…My son did the 
same thing at times, buying bags cheap in Harlem and the South Bronx, and 
selling them at a profit in our Connecticut suburb, the profits going back into his 
arm…Where was Rockefeller when addiction began gaining a foothold as a 
basically black problem? He was nowhere to be heard.193  
 
Acknowledging his own son’s culpability, Good’s article implied that Rockefeller intended to 
punish and exile young and poor people of color as an answer to growing fears about drug use 
among young whites. 
 Treatment specialists spoke out against the proposal, although sometimes without 
challenging many of the governor’s core assumptions. Dr. Judianne Densen-Gerber, the 
controversial head of the drug-free treatment complex, the Odyssey House, wrote Rockefeller of 
her objections to his plan:  
First of all, I agree with you totally that it is impossible for civilized society to 
continue in the present jungle situation. The streets must be safe for all citizens. 
However, long-term incarceration without the possibility of rehabilitation or the 
ability to change one’s destiny creates an angry, hostile, enraged prison 
population similar to Attica. Nor is long-term incarceration the most economical 
way of dealing with this disease; it is much more expensive than returning the 
individual as quickly as possible to the mainstream of society where he or she 
becomes a self-supporting and tax-paying citizen rather than a parasitic burden.194  
 
Here, Dr. Densen-Gerber reinforced the popular characterization of addicts as the opposite of 
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citizens, even living parasitically off humans, because of their alleged lack of economic 
productivity. While advancing her own proposal of coerced institutionalization and treatment, 
she pushed back against the affront to her own authority latent in Rockefeller’s proposal. “Truly, 
Nelson, there is no substitute for expertise,” she reminded him at one point in her letter. Despite 
her disagreement over which institution was most appropriate to forcibly confine addicts, she 
concluded, “I agree first and foremost addicts must be removed from the streets! On that there is 
no debate.”195 Like much other opposition to Rockefeller’s plan, this protest did not challenge his 
underlying assumption that addicts must be cast out and purged from public space.  
 In its efforts to gauge support among African Americans, the press found mixed 
reactions. Many believed the law explicitly targeted Black people, while others welcomed 
aggressive action on a problem they felt had been too long ignored by law enforcement in central 
cities. Rockefeller’s tough proposal reinforced long-held skepticism toward the state and led 
many African Americans to believe that the policies, while ostensibly racially neutral, were part 
of ongoing sabotage and oppression of their communities. One man in a high administrative state 
post said that Rockefeller “is out of his mind—we see him now for what he is. He’s not dealing 
with social dynamics. When he starts talking about narcotics, he’s talking about the minority 
population.” An African culture educator echoed a prevalent critique when she charged that the 
governor was looking to “round up young black kids, young black boys, and put them in 
concentration camps.”196  
 On the other hand, since many African Americans had long clamored for concerted, 
proactive state action to handle the drug problem, some may have held out hope that a 
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crackdown would alleviate the burden on their communities.197 One Harlem social worker told a 
New York Times reporter that “Such a measure is long overdue and I support it 100 percent.”198  
Leveraging these sentiments, the Rockefeller administration organized a news conference where 
the governor presented five community leaders from Harlem who supported his bill.199 Among 
them was Reverend Dempsey, a pastor who called for organized vigilante resistance to drug 
peddlers in the mid-1960s and would now travel with the governor to promote the bill. An 
African-American state senator dismissed this support, telling reporters, “But they were just 
palace pets, the usual ones who endorse him. The community can’t be fooled by that.”200 
 Although debate raged about the plan, it quickly became clear that, similar to his decision 
to authorize the brutal retaking of Attica during a 1971 prison uprising, the governor had 
mobilized a frustrated segment of society and directed its antagonism toward marginalized 
outgroups. His drug proposal became a national story, garnering valuable publicity for his 
anticipated presidential run. By early February, Gallup public opinion polls showed that 67 
percent of the country supported his plan. Support was lowest among “nonwhites,” but among 
them, 59 percent supported putting dealers away for life.201 The governor’s mail was even more 
enthusiastically behind the plan; according to early reports, it ran 20 to one in his favor.202 By the 
end of 1973, Rockefeller had received 3,042 letters about his proposal; 2,353 of them, or 77 
percent, supported it.203 Support came from all over the country. One woman wrote from Florida 
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to express her enthusiasm for the drug plan: “Bravo! For the first time since 1964, I have the 
feeling that society is on my side in the struggle to raise my children to be decent, honorable, 
responsible citizens.”204 To this woman, the harsh punishment of addicts symbolized the 
recapture of the state and society from other antagonistic interests. A number of letters 
commented on the “courage” and “guts” it took for Rockefeller to “get tough” and stand up to 
the established medical and legal authorities.205 Many people were moved to contact Rockefeller 
after watching him and Reverend Dempsey debate the proposal with a doctor on Barbara 
Walters’s television show. One woman wrote, “I wanted to stand up and applaud after you 
spoke. I am sick to death of hearing these doctors and liberal lawyers be ‘so holier than thou.’”206 
This frustration was evident in another response to the show:  
You were great on “Not For Women Only” on TV. These so called goodie goodie people 
say don’t punish this one and that one...The doctor and his KIND are the cause of a lot of 
troubles in this country. If we don’t bring back the electric chair, too, we should put them 
in a small [pen]. No Privileges.207 
 
Discourse about these policies therefore not only spurred people to identify against the perception of 
deviant, nonproductive junkies but also galvanized hostility toward liberal specialists.  
 Because of this public support, it was politically risky for lawmakers in early 1973 to 
resist calls for increased punishment. Many legislators lined up in support, others condemned the 
plan, and others tried to tweak the details to make a more workable policy. Pushed by legislators 
and criminal justice officials worried about jail overcrowding and court backlogs, the governor 
made compromises as the bill moved toward becoming law. Rockefeller agreed to remove 
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hashish from the drugs included and to allow for limited plea-bargaining and parole. Under the 
new version, drug offenders would receive a sentence range dictated by the type and quantity of 
drug they sold. For example, an A-1 felony constituted the sale of at least one ounce of any 
narcotic or the possession of two or more ounces. This conviction carried a mandatory sentence 
of 15-years to life in prison, meaning that the person could not be eligible for parole until serving 
the minimum sentence of 15 years. After serving their minimum sentence, prisoners still faced 
parole boards that could set release dates at any time between the completion of the minimum 
sentence and the maximum, life in prison. Once released, people convicted of Class-A felonies 
could never be removed from parole; they were to be monitored by state agents until their 
death.208 The only way to avoid the prison time and be placed directly on parole was to become a 
police informant and provide authorities with information they deemed valuable.209 In practice, 
this provision rarely applied to street-level sellers since they seldom had significant intelligence 
on the higher-level drug operations. Since the new law prohibited plea bargaining out of a Class-
A felony, people arrested with small amounts of drugs could not plead down to a lower class to 
evade lifetime parole or the possibility of life in prison. They had to be sentenced with at least 
one year to life. 
 With these amendments and heavy lobbying by the governor, the bill became law five 
months after Rockefeller proposed the idea.210 The Senate passed Rockefeller’s bill on April 27 
with 41 votes in favor and 14 opposed.211 Soon after, the Assembly passed the bill by the smaller 
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margin of 80 to 65, with Democrats casting most of the dissenting votes.212 At the bill signing, 
Rockefeller explained that the state finally had the “tools to protect law abiding citizens from the 
drug pushers” and commended lawmakers for their courage in passing the bill:  
This is the toughest anti-drug program in the nation. It ignited a heated debate and 
generated enormous pressures on our lawmakers. I applaud the courage of the 
majority leaders and members of the state legislature who stood firm against this 
strange alliance of established interests, political opportunists and misguided soft-
liners who joined forces and tried unsuccessfully to stop this program.213 
 
The characterization of Rockefeller and his allies as besieged by the powerful, vested interests of 
the liberal state is, in many ways, misleading. Thanks in part to Rockefeller’s own rhetoric on the 
issue, there were few safer political positions in 1973 than being categorically against drug 
dealers. The fact that the drug law also appeared to have discredited and marginalized 
therapeutic, “permissive” approaches to social problems only added to its appeal. When 
Reverend Dempsey spoke, he explained that the law had provided an opportunity for leaders to 
show their manly courage in facing the drug problem: “Many things I think this particular 
legislation has done. One thing, it provided us an opportunity to see a separation of the men from 
the boys, and I didn’t know we had so many little boys in high positions throughout the City of 
New York and throughout the state.”214 Again, the punitive policy was presented as the strong, 
masculine policy in comparison to childish, naïve, or effeminate programs that emphasized 
treatment and reintegration.  
 To deal with implementation of the law, the governor dedicated new funds to prepare the 
treatment facilities in anticipation of a surge in addicts seeking help. He asked the legislature to 
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create 100 new judgeships to handle the increased volume of drug crime trials.215 The state also 
sponsored a $500,000 public information campaign warning of the harsh new rules and 
established hotlines to access treatment and report drug dealers (and possibly qualify for the 
$1,000 bounty). In the weeks when the hotline was aggressively promoted, 100 callers a day 
reported incidences, usually low-level drug dealers in their areas. 216 New York City’s Addiction 
Services Agency sponsored a “3 Day Drug Treatment Recruitment Marathon,” sending six vans 
around to high drug use areas to round up addicts for rehabilitation before the law went into 
effect.217 
The campaign’s tagline was “Don’t get caught holding the bag.” Many of the 
advertisements targeted not just drug users but all citizens, running under big black letters that 
read, “How the New Drug Laws Affect You.” Under the heading “Why did the State make this 
law in the first place,” officials listed the legislature’s motivations:  
[T]o make it tough for the addicts, the junkies, the pushers to infect others. And to 
give them a chance to end their addiction. To stop the mugging and the crime 
which is a tragic by-product of drug abuse. To make the streets safe for you and 
your family.  
 
These announcements declared that treatment was available for anyone finally convinced that the 
state was serious about cracking down on drugs. But the ads also announced the dedicated funds 
for new judges and prison space, and warned that “the State Means Business.”218 While these 
advertisements may have informed some drug addicts of the increasing risks of their habit, their 
more important function was performative, publicly displaying the state’s tough new stance 
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toward drug users and invigorated commitment to acting as guarantor of public safety.  
 When the law was implemented on September 1, 1973, the effects were not particularly 
dramatic. For fear of flooding the courts, police did not undertake high-profile raids and 
generally kept arrest levels steady. Addicts did not seek treatment in dramatically higher 
numbers, nor did they flee to other states as many had predicted. A few reporters heard that 
dealers stayed inside or stuck to regular customers for a few days. Many reported higher drug 
prices, and over time, dealers relied increasingly on minors, who were not sentenced as harshly 
as adults, as drug runners. Without much interruption, users continued to buy and sell drugs to 
maintain their habit.219 
 Barely three months after the law went into effect, Nelson Rockefeller resigned as 
governor, claiming he wanted to devote more time to his National Commission on the Critical 
Choices for America.220 Most assumed that the real reason he resigned was to get a jumpstart on 
his presidential campaign in 1976 and avoid a potentially bruising gubernatorial election. Despite 
hopes that Rockefeller’s early departure would give his lieutenant, Malcolm Wilson, a leg up in 
the state election of 1974, Democrat Hugh Carey defeated Governor Wilson in a post-Watergate 
election that went badly for Republicans nationwide.  
 In the meantime, New York was left to implement the “nation’s toughest drug law.” 
Although it quickly fulfilled its drafters’ promise to send more people to prison for longer 
periods, the policy presented considerable logistical problems and had little measurable success 
in curtailing drug use. A comprehensive study published in 1978 found that while the laws may 
have temporarily deterred drug sales, they had no significant long-term impact on heroin use or 
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crime rates. The researchers reported that “Serious property crime of the sort often associated 
with heroin users increased sharply between 1973 and 1975. The rise in New York was similar to 
increases in nearby states.”221 They also found that “Heroin use was as widespread in mid-1976 
as it had been when the 1973 revision took effect, and ample supplies of the drug were 
available.”222 The laws were not only ineffectual, but they also created backlogs that paralyzed 
the court system, especially in New York City. Because the law prohibited small-time drug 
sellers from plea-bargaining, a growing percentage of defendants demanded a trial. Before the 
laws’ implementation, only 6 percent of drug indictments went to trial; afterwards, the number of 
people demanding trials rose to 16 percent.223 This forced the state to spend a disproportionate 
amount of time handling A-III felons, the lowest level dealers who were usually habitual users 
themselves. Between 1974 and June of 1976, they represented 41 percent of all Class-A drug 
indictments, and 61 percent of the trial workload.224   
 There were now also gross discrepancies between New York State punishments and other 
jurisdictions. New York was so out of step with sentences in the federal system that some federal 
agents would coerce full cooperation by threatening to transfer drug offenders’ cases to New 
York courts. A lawyer illuminated the sharp contrast in a 1975 letter to Governor Carey, writing,  
“My office is half way between the Federal Courthouse at Foley Square and Special Narcotics 
Courts at 11 Center St. The difference between these two courts is the difference between life 
imprisonment and probation.”225 
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 These trends inconvenienced prosecutors and judges, some of whom joined earlier critics 
to ask Governor Carey to patch up the laws’ most glaring problems. Their critiques helped give 
Governor Carey political cover to re-examine the laws and alter their most glaring problems. In 
July of 1975, the legislature amended the law to expand plea bargaining and parole. It allowed 
A-III felons to plead guilty to as low as a Class-C felony with the consent of a judge and 
prosecutor. To keep the policy politically viable, legislators correspondingly toughened other 
sections of law by restricting plea bargaining for other felony classes. While some may have 
been motivated by compassion for small-time drug sellers, these amendments were primarily 
concerned with alleviating the stress placed on the legal system. Reforms enhanced the power of 
prosecutors, who could now exert more discretion in plea bargaining and had more leverage to 
entice low-level sellers to testify against their suppliers, but they did not fundamentally alter the 
mandatory prison terms and life sentences.226 After the amendments, New York’s drug policy 
was still the most severe in the nation.   
 After failing to stop the Rockefeller’s policy in the legislature, opponents turned to state 
and federal courts in their efforts to derail the law. Legal Aid groups challenged some of the 
early sentences on the grounds that the law was “disproportionately severe” and therefore, 
unconstitutional. The ensuing legal battles revealed in stark terms that the policy’s logic and 
legality rested on scapegoating sellers for the entire drug epidemic. Many of the legal debates 
centered on whether drug crimes warranted such extreme punishment and to what extent dealers 
could be held accountable for drugs’ social and collateral damage. 
 In 1973, Imogene Broadie, a 24-year-old woman, received the mandatory indeterminate 
life sentence for selling $1,300 dollars worth of cocaine. She challenged the sentence and the 
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entire drug law in state court, claiming that it was unduly harsh. Both appeals courts rejected her 
plea, acknowledging that the laws were severe but privileging the state’s need to address the 
urgent drug situation. The highest state court, the Court of Appeals, based its decision on the 
perceived failure of other strategies to manage the problem: “Facing a high recidivism rate in 
drug related crimes and an inadequate response to less severe punishment, the Legislature could 
reasonably shift the emphasis from rehabilitation to isolation and deterrence.”227 The court 
explicitly echoed Rockefeller’s assumptions about drug use: that pushers, as opposed to catering 
to widespread demand for drugs, were the force driving the drug epidemic and were therefore 
responsible for all its consequences:  
The drug seller, at every level of distribution, is at the root of the pervasive cycle 
of destructive drug abuse…The legislature could reasonably have found that drug 
trafficking is a generator of collateral crime, even violent crime. And violent 
crime is not, of course, the only destroyer of men and the social fabric. Drug 
addiction degrades and impoverishes those whom it enslaves. The debilitation of 
men, as well as the disruption of their families, the Legislature could also lay at 
the door of the drug traffickers. (Emphasis added.) 228 
 
The court claimed that the lengthy sentences, which might at first seem grossly disproportionate, 
appeared rational once drug sellers were defined as the malignant force behind all the social 
problems associated with drugs. These legal decisions added to a growing consensus that held 
sellers responsible for the drug problem and exonerated social conditions.  
 Plaintiffs tried but failed to have the laws declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. In the case of Carmona v. Ward, a U.S. District Court ruled the new drug laws 
unconstitutional because they were out of proportion to the severity of the crime. Martha 
Carmona was a 41-year-old Puerto Rican woman, living in New York and supporting her 21-
year-old daughter. Apparently not an addict, Carmona sold drugs on consignment and after two 
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arrests, pled guilty to one count of possessing more than an ounce of cocaine in her 
apartment.229After the plea reduction, she was sentenced to six years to life. Her co-defendant, 
Roberta Fowler, a 23-year-old mother of two, who had previously been in a methadone treatment 
program, was sentenced to four years to life for selling $20 of cocaine to an undercover agent. 
Since all drug felons faced the possibility of life in prison regardless of the degree of their 
involvement in the drug trade, the lower court saw little proportionality in the law and ruled it 
unconstitutional. A higher court, the U.S. Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed the decision 
in 1978, claiming that the legislature, not the courts, should determine what punishment is 
appropriate for a crime. Thwarted at the appellate level, Carmona and Fowler asked the Supreme 
Court to consider their case. Although the highest court denied their petition, Justices Marshall 
and Powell took the unusual step of issuing a dissenting opinion, which argued why the court 
should have heard the case. Justice Marshall wrote that the punishments were disproportionate 
and unfairly held Carmona and Fowler responsible for the entire consequences of the drug trade: 
“In sum, by focusing on the corrosive social impact of drug trafficking in general, rather than on 
petitioners’ actual—and clearly marginal—involvement in that enterprise, the Court of Appeals 
substantially overstated the gravity of the instant charges.”230 The justice also attacked the notion 
that the particular severity of New York’s drug problem shielded extreme, draconian policy from 
constitutional challenge: “However serious its narcotics problem, New York cannot 
constitutionally [punish] those with peripheral involvement in drug trafficking as if they were 
responsible for the problem in its entirety.”231 Despite these challenges, courts’ general 
affirmation of the Rockefeller Drug Laws reinforced the notion that racially coded “pushers” 
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drove the epidemic, as opposed to responding to its demands. 
  
“A Meaningless Conviction”: Drug Offenders’ Perspectives on the Rockefeller Drug Laws 
Not surprisingly, drug offenders offered a profoundly different perspective and a unique 
interpretation of the laws. While fewer wrote Rockefeller in the later years of his administration, 
many inmates wrote Governor Carey after he signaled his intent to moderate the laws upon 
entering office in 1975. While some people wrote in hopes of inspiring direct intervention in 
their individual case, others simply wanted to share their perspectives. Prisoners felt the drug law 
was profoundly unfair, both in conception and application, and often blended their criticisms of 
the policy with their own experiences of the failure of prison to address their struggles. One man 
explained:  
I am married and have 3 children and I miss them very much. I write this letter to ask you 
to please amend this drug law, this is the first time I have ever been in trouble and I feel I 
was sentenced very harshly just because I was a sick man and didn’t realize it until it was 
too late…This law is ridiculous. I agree that a man who is trying to get rich by selling 
drugs should be put in prison for a long time, but that should be left up to the judge, not 
Mr. Rockefeller…I lost my home because my wife couldn’t keep up the cost without 
going on welfare which I feel very strongly should be avoided, she is working and living 
at her mother’s house till I get home. The last year that I worked (1974) I paid $2,000 
dollars in taxes and this year because of a mistake any man could make I am costing the 
state thousands of dollars to keep me in a place like this.232 
 
The letter persistently asserted the author’s connection to society as a father, a husband, a 
taxpayer, and a worker—all identities explicitly erased in popular rhetoric about addicts. He 
points to the consequences of extracting him from his community, costs that public debate rarely 
addressed because addicts were consistently presented as isolated and apart.   
 Other writers struggled to communicate how the policy interfaced with their lives, the 
drug trade, and drug addiction in ways that politicians could not have intended. These realities 
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and perspectives were muted, if not totally silenced, in the public debate. One man wrote,  
Are such laws effective in achieving the desired end? I say no! Not when, in an 
effort to circumvent them, the drugs are put into the hands of our youth for sale 
and distribution, thus spreading the disease to the most vulnerable of our 
population. Not when the increased sanction only serve to raise the price of drugs 
thus enhancing the profits of those willing to take the chance. Not when we 
realize that the addict is a sick person who cannot be frightened away from his 
drug dependence by the harsher penalties. Not when the flow of drugs into this 
country continues mitigated. Not when addicts are sent to a prison, only to return 
to society with the same problem they went in with. 233 
 
Writers explicitly acknowledged that these laws juxtaposed their well-being to that of “society,” 
and willingly sacrificed their interests. The author concluded that some balance must be struck 
between the two: “In such laws, some equipoise must be arrived at between the rights and 
interests of society and those of the addict criminal victim.”234  
 Over and over again, addicts explained that the threat of punishment would not dissuade 
drug users. They repeatedly challenged the popular notion that long prison sentences, even 
without access to narcotics, would break an addict of the compulsion to do drugs. One 
representative letter outlined the futility of a long imprisonment that did not address addiction:  
Holding a man in prison for a long span of time does not liquidate the disease of 
drug addiction. You and I both know this…My sentence of six to twelve years 
will not serve any purpose unless I can receive the proper treatment and return to 
the mainstream of society as a meaningful and productive citizen.235  
 
Others prisoners felt that despite the semantic emphasis on “corrections,” prison administration 
reinforced this fundamental divide between full citizens and those incarcerated: “Reformation 
and rehabilitation is the rhetoric and systematic dehumanization is the reality…The penitentiary 
today amounts to a banishment from civilized society to a dark and evil world completely alien 
to the free world, a world that is administered by criminals under unwritten rules and customs 
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completely foreign to free-world culture.”236    
 Other letters spoke to the ways poverty and racism affected outcomes within the criminal 
justice system: 
Like me most of the inmates here at Attica Correctional Facility are poor black 
and addicted…This world don’t make any sense to me any more. I am serving a 
six year to life sentence for selling a drug I don’t remember doing...On the behalf 
of the inmate serving time all over the state can we look forward to the day when 
someone will stop and take a good look at those that have long histories of drug 
addiction and help us. Most of us are not violent criminals but people with heavy 
mental problems; drugs ease that problem when we are high…Being black is 
enough to get you convicted always. Even the all white middle class juries think 
they did their thing for justice with the young assistant district attorney walking 
out of the court room proud as a father of a newly born baby. A meaningless 
conviction. But it look good to those who don’t know any better including the 
member of the juries. Just another junkie off for a life bid in prison. Not just a 
black junkie, but any member of a poor family in New York state. There is no 
justice for the poor. Those who are caught in the web of dope world justice are 
out of the picture.237  
 
The man’s letter highlighted the vast gulf between his subjectivity as an addict who does not 
recall being arrested, much less committing a crime, and the subjectivity of the white juries and 
district attorney who pride themselves on jailing him. He recognized that the jury and district 
attorney seemed to sincerely feel justice was served by his conviction; the whole process looked 
valid “to those who don’t know any better.” His letter, and many others like it, stressed the 
inability of  long prison sentences to produce any positive outcome for those incarcerated. 
Instead, these punishments simply positioned poor drug users outside of the polity or “out of the 
picture.” Of course, Rockefeller’s plan was never to be judged by its ability to “help” addicts, 
nor did it claim prison should play any meaningful role for those arrested. For the purposes of the 
bill, long prison terms served only as an example to others, a graphic reminder of the 
consequences of transgressing the social norms.   
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While Governor Carey softened Rockefeller’s drug laws and began pardoning groups of 
people with sympathetic cases, the policy remained largely unchanged throughout the 1970s.238 
Interestingly, even with the near financial collapse of New York City and fiscal pressures on the 
state during the mid-1970s, there was little political will to revise the massive expense mandated 
by the Rockefeller Drug Laws. Treatment programs, widely discredited and without a viable 
constituency, were further dismantled in the years after Rockefeller left office. In 1974, New 
York City provided $15 million for Addiction Services Agency activities. Four years later, by the 
fiscal year 1978, the city only invested $3.3 million, a 77 percent decrease. New York, after 
leading the nation in drug-treatment programs, largely retreated from the field, leaving private 
and non-profit programs to offer addiction services with only limited government support. In 
1977, there were still 53,310 addicts in New York State treatment, costing about $135 million a 
year. At the same time, the state spent $190 million to house a fraction of that number of 
addicts—13,900—in prison.239  
Treatment advocates constantly couched their opposition to program cuts in comparative 
terms, defending treatment on the grounds of cost savings. A letter from the Phoenix House 
protesting a proposed 25 percent cut to drug treatment read,  
Although austerity is needed in our present financial crisis, the above cutbacks are 
both cruel and senseless. Cruel in terms of human suffering, and senseless in 
terms of economic illogic. It costs $13,634 a year to imprison an addict, and for 
juveniles the cost is even higher. In residential, drug-free treatment facilities such 
as the Phoenix House, the cost is only $2,677 a year. In other words, one of your 
tax dollars goes to jailing an addict and 25 cents to treat him. “Either way, you 
must pay.”240 
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These considerable economic tradeoffs, no matter how often and forcefully they were pointed 
out, failed to significantly undermine support for the mass incarceration of drug addicts.  
Over the next few years, national studies and frequent press investigations would confirm 
that the policies had little positive effect. 241 The laws endured, despite delivering exactly the 
disaster opponents predicted: they did little to lessen drug use, addiction, or trafficking while 
they dramatically increased pressure on the courts and criminal justice system. Although heroin 
use slowed in the 1980s because of supply interruptions, demographic changes, and the petering 
out that typically characterizes cycles of addictions, the laws failed to halt the next drug spate on 
the horizon—crack-cocaine—which would inspire a new level of hysteria, misery, and 
repression in the following years.242  
Nor did the passage of time improve the Rockefeller Drug Laws’ dismal record. Study 
after study concluded that drug treatment was a far more economical and effective way to reduce 
drug abuse and crime.243 The policy continued to flood the prison system with low-level, non-
violent offenders. In 1980, 11 percent of the prison population was drug offenders; by 2007, 35.6 
percent New York State’s inmates were incarcerated for drug crimes. Of all drug offenders in 
prison in 1999, almost 80 percent had never been convicted of a violent felony. The laws have 
disproportionately affected communities of color. Ninety perent of drug offenders in New York 
State prisons are African American or Latino, despite the fact that a majority of drug users and 
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sellers are white.244  
Yet despite some reforms over the following decades, the Rockefeller Drug Laws were 
remarkably resilient, resisting decades of activists’ efforts to repeal or seriously amend them. In 
2009, New York again faced monumental state deficits, and opponents hoped that the 
opportunity of considerable savings could finally inspire revision of the state’s drug laws. In his 
January 2009 State of the State speech, New York Governor David Paterson, a longtime critic of 
the Rockefeller Drug Laws, again reiterated the near total failure of the laws to control drugs, 
saying, “Few public safety initiatives have failed as badly and for as long as the Rockefeller 
Drug Laws.”245 Finally, in that spring, New York’s economic crisis and Democratic political 
majorities aligned with persistent community organizing to inspire substantive reform.246 
While focusing on their high costs and decades-long record of failure, it is difficult to 
understand the political longevity of punitive drug laws. However, for many people, the laws 
were a striking success. Although punishing policy may not have improved drug abuse or crime 
rates, they did critical work for important constituencies. This helps explain why, as opposed to 
avoiding New York’s example, 48 states instituted anti-drug laws with mandatory minimum 
sentencing in the decade after the Rockefeller Drug Laws passed.247 “Law-and-order” legislation 
paid handsome political dividends and Rockefeller’s case was no exception. His tough drug laws 
proved to be an invaluable asset to his political fortunes in the following years. All over the 
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country, people explained that Rockefeller’s viability as a Republican presidential candidate in 
an increasingly conservative party rested upon his actions at Attica, his crackdown on “welfare 
cheaters,” and perhaps most important, his success at passing the toughest drug law in the 
nation.248 Although Rockefeller did not capture the presidency, Gerald Ford appointed him as 
vice president after President Nixon’s resignation in 1974.249  
The New York laws succeeded because they empowered groups that felt marginalized by 
the tumultuous previous decades while providing an explanation for conditions in central cities 
and the rebellion and growing drug use among middle-class youth. The laws helped construct 
and shame a reviled outgroup that was held responsible for social disequilibrium and provided an 
object against which full citizenship could be measured. They not only expelled troublesome 
figures from public space but they constructed a caricature of deviance that stood in sharp 
contrast to normative, productive lifestyles. They helped repress the powerful critiques that 
freedom movements had thrust into the public consciousness while also setting the stage for 
deregulation and program cuts by further delegitimizing the United States’ tattered welfare state. 
These high-profile, performative laws promised an officially sanctioned assault on the public’s 
enemy, drug pushers, and tapped into a vein of public opinion that was furious about the alleged 
incompetence of liberal crime-control strategies. Through these “tough” laws, Rockefeller 
asserted a different vision of government; he painted the picture of a powerful, vengeful state 
that seemed unburdened by the legitimacy crisis of liberalism. The image of an authoritative, 
macho state was supremely attractive in the uncertain 1970s. Rockefeller’s deployment of the 
drug issue was an early illustration of the profound utility of graphically punishing legislation 
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and helped ensure the dominance of punitive social policy in American politics for decades to 
come.  
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STUDY TWO: DISCIPLINING THE “WELFARE QUEEN”: 
CAMPAIGNS AGAINST WELFARE ABUSE IN CALIFORNIA AND 
ILLINOIS, 1970-1978 
 
 
Linda Taylor received Illinois welfare checks and food stamps, even though she was driving three 
1974 autos—a Cadillac, a Lincoln, and a Chevrolet station wagon—claimed to own four South 
Side buildings, and was about to leave for a vacation in Hawaii.250  
   —Chicago Tribune article, September 29, 1974 
 
Linda Taylor was the original “welfare queen.” In 1974, she was charged with defrauding Illinois’ 
welfare programs by collecting welfare cash grants, social security, and food stamps under 
multiple aliases. At a time when welfare fraud was a national obsession, Taylor’s story generated 
sensationalized media coverage in her hometown of Chicago and across the country. Although the 
specifics fluctuated dramatically between accounts, news media and politicians described her 
deceptive techniques in careful detail. One Chicago Tribune article reported she had at least 27 
different names, 31 addresses, 25 phone numbers, and several husbands (most dead except for 
one 26 years her junior).251 Another explained that Taylor had illegally received more than 
$200,000 by using more than 100 aliases in 12 different states.252 Taylor’s physical form was as 
elusive as her legal identity. Investigators alleged she had 30 different wigs and had claimed 
benefits as a white, an African American, and a Filipina.253  
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 Although prosecutors were ultimately only able to prove Taylor had defrauded the state of 
$8,000 using four separate aliases, the case was a huge embarrassment for the welfare 
administration. Instead of treating Taylor’s actions as an anomaly, key conservative politicians 
and state bureaucrats claimed it was symptomatic of the permissiveness and incompetence of the 
entire welfare system. They used the controversy to spur an extensive campaign to crack down 
on welfare fraud; this served the politically expedient goals of pruning the caseloads and 
discrediting and disciplining the welfare bureaucracy.  
Illinois legislators were not the only people to exploit the story. Ronald Reagan told 
crowds the tale of the “Chicago Welfare Queen” at almost every speaking engagement during his 
1976 bid for the Republican presidential nomination. Although it was Chicago newspapers that 
originally crowned Taylor the “welfare queen,” Reagan borrowed the term and gave it national 
visibility.254 His version usually assessed the cost to the state at $150,000 and fixed the number 
of aliases around 80, and it was typically paired with reports of his victorious battles against 
welfare abuses as governor of California.255  
Welfare queen was a new moniker, but it encapsulated a set of stereotypes and 
assumptions Reagan had been drawing from since the early 1960s. For almost a decade, he had 
been railing against abuses and incompetence in the welfare system and reaping considerable 
political rewards. Although Reagan failed to capture his party’s nomination in 1976, he knew 
welfare was a winning issue for him. His welfare reforms in California had brought national 
acclaim, and were constantly used to evidence his fitness to lead the country and the newly 
                                                
254
 David Zucchino, Myth of the Welfare Queen (New York: Scribner, 1997), p. 65. 
255
 “‘Welfare Queen’ Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign,” New York Times, February 15, 1976, p. 51. 
 114 
revitalized conservative movement.  
The media spectacle of the welfare queen was embedded in anti-welfare politics that were 
instrumental in solidifying new understandings about work, family, and state responsibility 
during the 1970s. Born at a time of profound social upheaval and economic reorganization, 
Illinois’s and California’s high-profile welfare reform efforts were key sites where society 
wrestled over what constituted socially valuable work, appropriate gender roles, and the state’s 
responsibility to enforce these cultural norms. Hashing out these vital social negotiations within 
the framework of welfare abuse enabled the dominance of a punitive logic in the state’s response 
to economic inequality, especially concerning poor women of color. It forged links between 
income support programs, poverty, and criminality—associations that were central in 
stigmatizing welfare recipients and rationalizing an increasingly restrictive benefit structure.  
This study traces the image of the “welfare queen” back to its origins and investigates the 
political, cultural, and economic matrix from which it was born. It examines how a politically-
driven panic about welfare abuses intensified the increasingly racialized antagonism toward the 
state benefit program for single parents, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). 
Legislators’ punitive policy responses to welfare abuse—especially their recruitment of the 
criminal justice system—solidified welfare recipients’ cultural position as the antithesis of 
“workers,” and therefore, the opposite of taxpaying, respectable, productive citizens. The 
campaigns crystallized these conceptions and enshrined them in popular mythology while also 
clashing with—and stifling—the perspectives of welfare recipients. At a time when recipients 
were organizing a vocal, powerful welfare-rights movement, these state initiatives directly 
challenged activists’ claims to state support by virtue of their roles as mothers, citizens, and 
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consumers. In fact, they were instrumental in positioning welfare recipients as outside the polity 
without legitimate claims on the state. Similar to the politics surrounding the Rockefeller Drug 
Laws, these campaigns reoriented the purported mission of state programs from serving the 
marginalized population to protecting the “public” from that population. 
By stressing the role of policy in exacerbating racially charged anti-welfare beliefs as 
opposed to simply reflecting them, I argue against conceptualizing hostility to welfare as a 
mechanical reaction to African-American activism and political gains. As Neubeck and 
Cazenave’s Welfare Racism points out, “Typically racial state actors are portrayed as mere 
puppets of public opinion. This portrayal ignores the active role of racial state actors and other 
political elites in helping to generate and inflame these white racial sentiments and the periodic 
white racial backlashes they in turn fuel.”256 Since hostility toward recipients intensified during 
the highly publicized efforts to shrink welfare rolls through work requirements and fraud 
persecutions, this study stresses the powerful role of punitive state policy in directing public 
antagonism and racial animus toward specific targets.257  
The first half of this study chronicles the landmark welfare reforms that Ronald Reagan 
spearheaded as governor of California in the early 1970s. Through his high-profile campaign, 
Reagan articulated particular understandings of the causes and remedies for the “welfare mess” 
that would eventually become common sense. At the time, however, Reagan’s punitive approach 
to welfare was not seen as obvious or inevitable. In 1970, it was the Family Assistance Plan 
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(FAP), President Nixon’s guaranteed minimum income proposal that seemed destined to be law 
and become the dominant framework through which the state approached family poverty.  
Reagan’s reforms further stigmatized and ostracized welfare recipients through constricted 
eligibility standards, heightened scrutiny, strict work requirements, and increased reliance on 
criminal prosecutions in handling fraud and child support collections. While not as transparently 
punishing as “get-tough” criminal sentencing, eligibility reforms and work requirements were key 
components of a wider punitive trend in welfare policy. They positioned recipients outside 
mainstream society by subjecting them to state discipline and mandates.  
 Reagan’s welfare reforms were a decisive historical event embedded in a wider punitive 
transformation. They had a profound impact on the shape of the U.S. welfare program as well as 
wider understandings of civic belonging and political authority. Where Rockefeller’s punitive 
legislation repudiated his own earlier drug treatment programs, Reagan offered his welfare reforms 
to manage California’s welfare program as well as counter Nixon’s FAP. This study, therefore, 
demonstrates that punitive politics at the state level also intervened directly in federal politics. 
This focus on the political process highlights the rhetorical maneuvers and strategic organizing 
that went into enacting Reagan’s landmark welfare package. This approach illustrates that far 
from being inevitable or an insuppressible grassroots demand, punitive welfare policy and the 
accompanying heightened stigmatization of recipients were the result of concerted political 
organizing, especially among political elites. 
The second half of this study explores how the politics initiated in California were 
transplanted and reinterpreted in Illinois. It focuses on the state’s high-profile campaign to 
manage welfare fraud during the 1970s. In addition to being home to the notorious, original 
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“welfare queen,” Illinois is an apt case study because it was both a forerunner and a model for the 
anti-fraud efforts that accelerated across the nation throughout the decade. Where the section on 
California’s reforms focuses primarily on lawmakers, the Illinois section investigates the public 
support for the anti-welfare campaigns. It spotlights those people who reported their 
acquaintances for welfare fraud and examines how their participation reshaped the state’s anti-
fraud campaign. It also examines how the anti-fraud initiatives interacted with welfare recipients’ 
strategies for making ends meet on low monthly cash grants and explores how recipients 
interpreted and resisted the new policies.  
The anti-welfare fraud initiatives during the 1970s illuminate how charges of criminality 
were critical to accelerating the stigmatization of welfare recipients. The public spectacles of 
fraud prosecutions, mediated through a complicit media, further undermined support for the 
entire welfare program as heightened access to the program by morally and racially stigmatized 
parents dramatically increased welfare program budgets. Although the structure of the economy 
and low welfare grants made extensive fraud predictable, the state responded to these conditions 
with criminalization and surveillance, instead of social or economic intervention.  
Although it is rarely a focus in historical work, the perception that welfare recipients were 
fraudulent and deceptive was a primary factor in undermining support for the program.258 In Why 
Americans Hate Welfare, Martin Gilens’ extensive review of public opinion polls revealed the 
importance of the link between race, fraud, and criminality.   
 [A] large majority of Americans agree that government should provide 
monetary support to those who are unable to support themselves. But the 
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perception of welfare abuse is widespread. Indeed, as the survey 
evidence…suggests, it would be hard to exaggerate the level of cynicism toward 
welfare recipients held by the American public. This perception of welfare 
recipients’ dishonesty and freeloading is at the core of Americans’ conviction that 
welfare spending should be cut (emphasis added).259 
 
The state’s anti-fraud campaign framed welfare recipients—who were already burdened in 
the public discourse by the intersecting stigmas of race, class, and gender—as deceptive criminals. 
This obscured families’ material conditions and discursively constructed an isolated, suspect 
population. Cultural assumptions evident in this rhetoric were translated into policies that 
scrutinized and punished recipients while simultaneously constricting the availability of material 
support to low-income people. Instead of simply mirroring public attitudes, the relentless media 
attention about welfare fraud convictions and indictments tangibly linked criminality to what had 
been a more elusive, moral stigma against poor, single—usually Black—motherhood.260 The 
spectacle of the actual indictments framed welfare recipients as dishonest criminals, eclipsing 
their status as mothers and citizens. Additionally, these policies converged with other state 
initiatives, such as punitive criminal and drug policy explored in this dissertation’s other studies, 
to help solidify the public perception of a racialized, criminal “culture of poverty.”  
Characterizations of fraudulent welfare recipients were almost always accompanied by 
charges of laziness. Ironically, anti-fraud efforts in practice usually targeted those welfare 
recipients with unreported income, usually penalizing people who were working outside the 
home and receiving welfare. Therefore, while the era’s anti-welfare politics positioned recipients 
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as lazy non-workers, in practice the fraud campaigns criminalized those recipients in the formal 
workforce. The insidious effect of these politics was to erase both the wage and childrearing labor 
from public discourse while further restricting the financial resources of low-income parents.  
Contrary to the claims of many politicians, welfare was one in a collection of strategies 
families used for economic survival and not necessarily a significant part of recipients’ core 
identity. Welfare recipients floated between wage work and welfare or care-giving work, often 
using both simultaneously to support their families. My research seeks to denaturalize 
depictions of recipients as isolated types of poor people and “non-workers.” It problematizes 
the separation of welfare recipients from the working class or working poor.261 I argue that anti-
welfare rhetoric constructed and maintained this distinction by obscuring the labor involved in 
parenting, and depicting those recipients who did join the workforce as fraudulent and criminal, 
as opposed to average workers.  
 
Reforming Welfare during Economic Upheaval 
The profound economic transformations during this period intensified the political potency of 
the welfare issue. Among other things, welfare became a lightning rod for frustration over the 
disappearance of “family wage jobs” and accompanying pressure on women to enter the labor 
market while still balancing their domestic responsibilities. Dramatic capital reorganization 
beginning after World War II diminished the availability of blue-collar and industrial jobs, 
particularly in the northern urban centers. According to one estimate, only 40 percent of jobs in 
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1976 provided enough money to support a family.262 In response to these structural changes, 
surging inflation, and a desire for greater economic autonomy, women entered the formal 
workforce in unprecedented numbers throughout the decade. Where only 30 percent of women 
with children under six years old worked outside the home in 1970, 43 percent were employed in 
1976. By 1985, half of all mothers with preschool-age children help paying jobs.263  
As fewer working and middle-class women stayed in the home to care for their own 
children, the belief that welfare provided that opportunity to poor women of color was 
particularly infuriating. Of course, no group of mothers was more acquainted with the pressures 
of managing wage work and unpaid domestic labor than the population served by AFDC. Still, 
the era’s anti-welfare politics portrayed recipients as the antithesis of workers, often erasing 
altogether the labor of parenting and the domestic sphere. Unlike white feminists’ demands for 
greater access to the workplace and various professions, women of color in the welfare-rights 
movement fought for state support sufficient enough to allow parents to forgo wage labor. The 
welfare-rights movement called for notions of citizenship that did not depend on participation in 
the formal workforce. The politics of welfare reform in California and Illinois pushed in the 
opposite direction, positioning paid employment as the principal avenue to full citizenship and 
excluding welfare recipients from symbolic belonging in the polity through stigmatization, 
surveillance, economic marginalization, and criminalization.  
Denigrating the domestic labor and social value of welfare recipients helped to normalize 
and rationalize the economic arrangements that increasingly pushed all members of working-class 
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families into the workforce. The rhetoric surrounding these campaigns incessantly championed 
the virtue and American character of wage work, no matter how menial or unpleasant. It drew a 
sharp distinction between welfare “dependence” and wage labor, demeaning the first to exalt the 
latter. With capital reorganization upending traditional gendered labor arrangements, welfare 
recipients were used to advance and articulate definitions of valuable, dignified work by 
graphically representing its opposite. Of course, the very real psychological and social benefits of 
being positioned above welfare recipients did little to improve low-income workers’ economic 
conditions.  
 
Managing Caseloads: Race, Class, Gender and U.S. Welfare History  
The reform initiatives in California and Illinois were embedded in the long history of welfare 
bureaucracies’ struggles to limit costs while policing intersecting racial, gender, and class 
hierarchies. Since the earliest relief efforts, women who have received charity and public 
assistance have been the objects of suspicion and intense scrutiny of their financial and moral 
“worthiness.”264 Many of these practices were incorporated into the federal welfare program, 
Aid to Dependent Children (ADC—later renamed AFDC, for Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children), which was inaugurated by the landmark 1935 Social Security Act. ADC was originally 
intended to enable single mothers, usually white widows, to stay at home and raise their 
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children.265 To prevent undermining the male breadwinner ideal, the sculptors kept grant levels 
low to ensure that remarriage remained more lucrative than receiving welfare.266 State aid 
programs policed morality by implementing “suitable homes” regulations and “man-in-the-
house” rules, which made women ineligible for welfare if found living with a male companion. 
Racism and racial politics also fundamentally shaped social welfare programs, especially 
those instituted during the New Deal.267 Domestic and agricultural workers, commonly 
understood to be African Americans, were ineligible for social insurance, such as Social Security 
and unemployment insurance. When they were able to access state support, African-American 
families were forced to rely on the more paltry programs, such as ADC. In the South, many 
states barred Black women entirely from state aid, especially when their labor was in high 
demand during harvest times. These policies reinforced the long held assumption that African-
American women should belong to the formal workforce and remain ungoverned by white notions 
of domesticity. By barring many African Americans and unwed mothers, program administrators 
protected ADC from public criticism while keeping costs low and enforcing the dominant 
society’s morality.268  
During the mid-1960s and early 1970s, many welfare regulations were liberalized due to 
War on Poverty programs and pressure from “poverty lawyers” and civil and welfare rights 
                                                
265
 See Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare; Winifred Bell, Aid to 
Dependent Children (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965); and Gordon, Pitied but Not Entitled: Single 
Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-1935. 
266
 Gordon, Pitied but Not Entitled. For the early history of fraud investigations in Illinois’ mother’s pension 
program, see Joanne Goodwin, Gender and the Politics of Welfare Reform. 
267
 See Mary Poole, The Segregated Origins of Social Security: African Americans and the Welfare State (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); and Linda Faye Williams, The Constraint of Race: Legacies of 
White Skin Privilege in America (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003). 
268
 Bell, Aid to Dependent Children. 
 123 
activism.269 A vocal welfare-rights movement composed predominantly of poor women of color 
demanded—and, in many cases, received—larger grants and a more responsive grievance 
procedure. Activists advanced a unique feminist ideology that challenged their stigmatized 
position and claimed the right to state support by virtue of their status as mothers, citizens, and 
consumers.270  
In the pivotal 1970 case, Goldberg v. Kelley, the Supreme Court ruled that welfare was an 
entitlement that could not be summarily suspended without due process.271 Welfare grants 
increased in real economic terms, and courts ruled most states’ “substitute parent” or “man-in-
the-house” laws unconstitutional by the early 1970s.272 These and other landmark cases greatly 
expanded access to welfare programs by constricting the state’s ability to arbitrarily cancel grants 
or use morality or race as a rationale to deny aid.  
Legal reforms and welfare-rights activism combined with de-industrialization’s devastating 
impact on urban areas to swell the number of people receiving assistance, particularly among 
African Americans.273 Between 1965 and 1970, the program’s size doubled, growing from 3.3 
million to 7 million people nationally.274 Although the majority of welfare recipients had always 
been white, after 1958, almost half were people of color.275 As reforms opened the program to 
new groups, they also opened it to new attacks. Welfare administrators had long allayed public 
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hostility by denying aid to the most stigmatized women: African Americans and women with 
children born out of wedlock. As these people entered the welfare rolls in large numbers, the 
public’s already limited approval of welfare waned. Hostility toward the program intensified as 
welfare budgets grew and people increasingly saw the program as disproportionately serving 
African Americans. In this climate, the program struggled to find new ways to limit expenditures 
while simultaneously managing the socially marginalized populations now contained within the 
welfare program, instead of excluded from it.  
Fraud investigations, always a part of welfare administration, took on new importance as 
other tools to reduce welfare expenditures were ruled illegal. In 1961, the city of Newburgh, New 
York instituted a collection of draconian welfare policies that included forcing all recipients, who 
were commonly pictured as African-American migrants from the South, to pick up their checks 
at the police station for eligibility audits to “weed out the chisellers.”276 In 1962, a U.S. Senate 
hearing vilified the allegedly lax social workers in Washington D.C. who tolerated welfare 
fraud.277 These early, nationally publicized, anti-fraud initiatives targeted African-American 
communities and inflamed the racialized and stigmatized public image of welfare recipients.278 
The policies simultaneously limited program costs by thinning the rolls and discouraging new 
people from entering the highly scrutinized caseload.279 
By the late 1960s, welfare faced mounting criticism for its failure to incentivize wage labor. 
In 1967, the U.S. Congress responded by passing a series of amendments to the Social Security 
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Act, instituting a Work Incentive Program (WIN) requiring any recipient deemed ready for 
employment to get a job or enter a training program. Although the work requirement was rarely 
strictly implemented, states technically received the authority to designate what constituted 
“employable,” and could refer any mother, no matter the age of her children, to work if adequate 
childcare was available.280 Those failing to comply would lose their portion of the grant.  
In addition to the punitive features, the amendments addressed the erosion of grants’ 
buying power by mandating that states adjust benefit levels to reflect the community’s standard 
of need. They also implemented the $30 and one-third rule to entice recipients into the work 
force. The policy disregarded the first $30 of monthly earnings as well as one-third of the 
remaining income for calculating eligibility. In practice, this allowed recipients to maintain some 
cash support from the state as they earned new income from wage work. In theory, the 
amendments represented a significant departure from the original intent of AFDC, which was to 
enable mothers to raise their children without relying on earned income.281  
Hostility toward welfare hardened throughout the late 1960s, and the idea that recipients 
squandered their grants on frivolous consumer goods developed significant cultural resonance.282 
There was even a hit country song, Guy Drake’s “Welfare Cadillac,” that topped charts for more 
than a month in 1970. The song caricatured a family living in a dilapidated, neglected house while 
using their welfare checks toward the payments on a brand new Cadillac.  
Now the way that I see it 
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These other folk are the fools  
They’re working and paying taxes  
Just to send my young’uns through school  
The Salvation Army cuts their hair and  
Gives them clothes to wear on their backs  
So we can dress up and ride around   
And show off this new Cadillac.283 
 
In the midst of his struggle to overhaul AFDC, President Nixon asked Johnny Cash to sing 
“Welfare Cadillac” during a performance at the White House. Cash refused the administration’s 
request, but the president strove to find other ways to manage the welfare crisis while building 
bridges to those populations receptive to the themes in “Welfare Cadillac.”284  
 
Dueling Approaches to the “Welfare Monster”: Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan versus 
California-Style Welfare Reform 
Faced with widespread urban unrest, ballooning welfare budgets, and mounting antagonism 
toward AFDC from all quarters, Nixon set out to dramatically reform the welfare program. He 
announced his proposal in a nationally televised speech on August 8, 1969. He opened by 
explaining that the country grappled with two fundamental, but intertwined crises: “We face an 
urban crisis, a social crises—and at the same time, a crisis of confidence in the capacity of 
government to do its job.”285 Nixon proposed to remedy these problems by replacing AFDC and 
its intricate social work regulations and bureaucracy with a new, simplified cash benefit to all 
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families with dependent children living in poverty. While the details of the political struggles need 
not be rehashed here, certain features of the debate merit attention to put features of Reagan’s 
reforms in high relief. 
Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan was based on the concept of a negative income tax or 
guaranteed minimum income, which had been gaining adherents throughout the 1960s. A negative 
income tax triggered payments from the government to beneficiaries when earnings fell below 
specific levels. This effectively built an income floor below which no citizen would be allowed to 
fall.286 Throughout 1970 and 1971, lawmakers floated competing versions of the guaranteed 
income program, some with higher benefit levels, others at lower levels with more stringent work 
provisions.  As originally introduced, Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan guaranteed a minimum 
income for all families, granting $500 a year for each of the first two family members and $300 a 
year for each remaining member. Therefore, the state would pay a family of four with no 
additional wages $1,600 a year, approximately $9,000 in 2010 dollars.  
The FAP proposed to subsidize the income of low-wage earners, regardless of family 
composition. This feature was the most profound modification to AFDC, which only served 
families with an absent parent, usually assumed to be the father and primary wage earner, and did 
not offer grants to two-parent households. Under FAP, families could keep the first $720 of 
annual earnings in addition to their state benefits. As earnings increased above that amount, the 
welfare grant decreased by fifty cents for every additional dollar earned until the grant 
disappeared. A family of four could have earnings up to $3,810 before they lost state support. In 
this way, the planners hoped to address the two principal criticisms that plagued AFDC: that the 
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policy discouraged wage work and encouraged the breakup of families. The FAP was designed to 
incentivize both; it ensured that families with wages and two parents would always be better off 
financially than those without.287  
 The Family Assistance Plan remained the centerpiece of the Nixon administration’s 
domestic legislative agenda until it abandoned the proposal in 1972. In the interim years, the 
policy was widely accepted as a mainstream, even a conservative, approach to income inequality 
and the “welfare mess” in the United States. Nixon officials hoped that the FAP would address 
both the “welfare crises” and the “backlash” it supposedly generated. It was originally 
conceptualized as a program to address the unrest associated with African Americans, and aimed 
to ameliorate the urban turmoil and uprisings by restoring Black men as patriarchs and 
breadwinners in their families.288 However, in the months leading up to Nixon’s announcement, 
the FAP morphed into a policy aimed at white, male low-wage workers. The president’s political 
strategists intended the policy to build new Nixon loyalists amongst his coveted “silent majority” 
by offering new state support to disaffected, white working-class voters, especially from the 
South.289  
                                                
287
 Jill S. Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 118; and Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income. The FAP included a significant 
work incentive, which administrative officials characterized as a work requirement. The program mandated that any 
employable recipient who refused to work or enter job training would forfeit their portion of the family’s benefit. 
Mothers with pre-school age children and those unable to work would not face this penalty. The program, however, 
did not actually force recipients into work, it merely withheld a percentage of support and relied upon recipients to 
act in their own economic interests and join the formal workforce.  
288
 Administration officials believed that reestablishing traditional gender authority would help restore social peace. 
This was based on assumptions most notoriously espoused in the 1965 “Moynihan report” about the allegedly 
pathologizing effects of matriarchal families in Black communities. Daniel P. Moynihan, The Negro Family: The 
Case for National Action (U.S. Department of Labor: Office of Policy Planning and Research, 1965); and 
Quadagno, The Color of Welfare, 123-124.  
289
 Steensland, The Failed Welfare Revolution, 116. For detailed information about the debates within the Nixon 
Administration over the policy and politics of their welfare proposal, see 78-119. 
 129 
The FAP renounced those features of AFDC that were designed to accommodate the 
unique position of single mothers. With low grant levels for unemployed parents, it was designed 
to encourage women to rely upon a male breadwinner or wage work to make ends meet. For this 
and other reasons, the National Welfare Rights Organization vehemently opposed the FAP, 
claiming that it trapped women in unwanted or potentially unsafe relationships and coerced them 
into low wage, dead-end jobs without sufficient income to raise a family. They were primarily 
opposed to the standard grant levels, which were considerably higher than benefits in many 
southern states but actually lower than benefit levels in northern urban centers, where welfare-
rights organizing was most active.290 
Although the FAP prohibited states from decreasing benefits, NRWO organizers saw it as 
comparable to the fixed flat grants and other cost-saving measures they had fought at the state 
level across the country. The organization did endorse the idea of a guaranteed adequate income, 
and advanced legislative proposals with universal coverage (not just serving families with 
dependent children), a benefit floor of $5,500, and robust legal and procedural protections.291 
Welfare-rights activists insisted that benefit levels be high enough to allow single parents the 
opportunity to forgo wage work if they chose to do so. With this demand, the overwhelmingly 
Black and Latina welfare rights activists advocated for a choice that had rarely been open to 
women of color and was increasingly unavailable to other women in the United States.  
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The FAP promised to have as profound effect on the cultural and political landscape as it 
would have on the welfare administration. By expanding the program to serve the working poor, 
the FAP would have eliminated a program dedicated predominantly to serving unemployed, 
single mothers—increasingly from communities of color. The program designers intended the 
FAP to lessen the stigma of state support by folding the AFDC caseloads into the same 
administrative unit as the employed poor, thus eliminating the scrutiny of casework and 
eligibility qualifications. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, policy advisor to both Johnson and Nixon, 
emphasized this dimension of the plan in a memo to Nixon, explaining that under the FAP 
“receiving assistance is not conditioned upon being dependent; the working poor receive it as well 
as the non-working poor. Thus the great stigma of welfare is removed.”292  
Removing the degraded category of welfare recipient would have eliminated a touchstone of 
growing importance in U.S. political culture. Increasingly, welfare recipients were the objects 
against which normative, taxpaying citizens, and productive workers were defined. The FAP 
threatened to erase the distinction between programs serving employed and non-employed poor 
people, and therefore threatened to blur age-old divisions between deserving and undeserving 
poor. Although the political rhetoric did not often emphasize this point, the implications were 
not lost on members of the Nixon administration, many of whom opposed the policy on exactly 
these grounds.293  
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Nixon officials also intended for the FAP to confront the crises of political authority.294 
Nixon integrated the theme into his August speech, claiming that the new system would “show 
that government can be made to work.” At the conclusion of his address, he reiterated the 
mission, asserting that his proposal could help turn the corner “from an ominously mounting 
impotence of government to a new effectiveness of government.”295 Nixon planned to build his 
political constituency by intervening in the economy and offering concrete material benefits to 
lower income people. This is not to overplay the radicalism of the FAP, since in many ways it 
amounted to a public subsidy for low-wage employers. Nonetheless, it proposed making 
economic benefits and basic subsistence a right of citizenship for families. Under the FAP, 
receipt of state benefits might have become a symbol of civic belonging, as opposed to a marker 
of social marginality and exclusion.  
Despite these potentially transformative programmatic features, members of the Nixon 
administration employed more conventional anti-welfare rhetoric in their advocacy for the FAP. 
They continually disparaged the AFDC system and its alleged corrosive impact on the work 
ethic and family cohesion.  They positioned wage work as the main avenue to full citizenship for 
low-income parents, which helped to supplant discourses that attached a distinct, suppressed 
social value to work in the “domestic sphere.” Although the FAP united the working and non-
working poor programmatically, the rhetoric of the administration used to sell the proposal 
constructed a sharp, hierarchical divide between the two groups. For example, at a speech in 
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April of 1971 before the Republican Governors Association, Nixon decried the state of the 
welfare bureaucracy: 
It is incredible that we have allowed a system of law under which one person can be 
penalized for doing an honest day’s work and another can be rewarded for doing 
nothing at all…The person on welfare can often have a higher income than his 
neighbor who holds a low paying job.296  
 
Describing welfare recipients as “doing nothing at all,” his language obscured the parenting 
responsibilities that enabled families to qualify for welfare in the first place. Instead of faulting 
the economic transformations for the preponderance of low-paying jobs, Nixon channeled public 
attention to allegedly ill-conceived program regulations. By directing public hostility about 
economic hardship toward people’s neighbors and the state’s social service bureaucracies, this 
rhetoric elided other contributing factors.      
As Nixon struggled with Congress over the FAP, California lawmakers, spurred on by 
Governor Reagan, took matters into their own hands and attempted to control welfare through 
reforms at the state level. The welfare reforms advanced by Nixon and Reagan shared many 
objectives and cultural assumptions. They both aimed to decrease state welfare expenditures, to 
shore up traditional notions of family responsibility, and to position wage work as the remedy 
for systemic family poverty. In key ways, however, Reagan’s approach was at odds with 
Nixon’s. Instead of expanding access to state support, Reagan’s reforms constricted it. Instead of 
enlarging the state’s economic responsibility and imparting a new notion of economic citizenship, 
Reagan restricted the groups eligible for benefits and positioned those sustained by state 
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subsidies as outside of the civic body. Opposed to demonstrating state competency by offering 
material improvements, Reagan asserted government legitimacy though enhancing its punitive 
functions: the capacity to surveil, monitor, and discipline marginalized populations.  
 
“California…Showing the Way”: Governor Reagan Tackles Welfare Reform  
Governor Ronald Reagan began his second term in 1971 determined to tackle the state’s welfare 
system. Popular opinion judged California’s AFDC program to be spiraling out of control, and 
administrators warned that the mounting costs could bankrupt the state. The state’s program had 
grown even faster than the national average. Welfare caseloads increased 262 percent, with the 
number of recipients in California rising from 630,000 in January of 1960 to 2.29 million in 
March of 1971.297 Each month, 40,000 new people enrolled in the program, causing costs to rise 
25 percent.298  
 Beyond fiscal pressures, Reagan had political and ideological motives for focusing on 
welfare. The timing was auspicious because Nixon, Reagan’s rival for the 1968 Republican 
presidential nomination, had recently introduced the FAP, a policy easily caricatured as an 
unprecedented, foolhardy expansion of the welfare system. Jockeying for leadership of the 
Republicans’ increasingly powerful conservative wing, Reagan used the FAP specifically and 
welfare more generally to build his profile and distinguish his approach to governance. These 
were politically astute calculations and the governor’s welfare politics paid handsome political 
dividends in the short and long term.  
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 In 1970, however, welfare was not the obvious winning issue for conservatives that it 
appears in retrospect. Reagan’s reform campaign in California was critical in forging the cultural 
logic and crafting the social narratives that made the issue into such a potent force throughout the 
subsequent decades. In fact, when the governor considered tackling the “welfare mess” in 
California and making it a centerpiece of his agenda, all but one of his advisors argued against it. 
Robert Carleson, a key architect of Reagan’s welfare program, explained that  
[I]n those days the worst thing a governor could possibly do, and it wasn’t 
happening anywhere in the country, was to take on this insoluble mess, because to 
clean it up, you had to step on so many toes politically and emotionally that it was 
considered something every governor should stay away from. I have been told that 
he [Ronald Reagan] gritted his teeth and said, “It’s got to be done so we’re going to 
do it.299 
 
 According to Carleson, the governor had a dual mission in trying to reform California welfare 
system. First, he explained, was addressing the fiscal crisis: “We had to bring it under control to 
survive—for the budget to survive.” The second was more transparently political. Reagan wanted 
to show that welfare could be fixed at the state level and need not be taken over and expanded by 
the federal government. The governor’s reforms were “one last effort to prove that the state, even 
under all of the federal rules and regulations that existed at the time, could do the job.”300 
Although Reagan had a different philosophical approach to the issue than Nixon, he also saw 
welfare as a site to renew and rebuild faith in government.  
From the onset, therefore, Reagan’s reforms were connected with the larger project of 
discrediting the policy approaches entailed in Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan. While Reagan 
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remained circumspect and ostensibly loyal to his party’s leader through portions of the debate, 
his objections to the president’s program were widely recognized. During the few years the FAP 
was before Congress, Reagan testified against the plan in the Senate, lobbied California’s 
congressional delegation to withhold its support, and opposed the reforms in various other public 
settings.301 A 1970 Washington Post article stated simply that “everyone knows it is Governor 
Reagan leading a rearguard action against [the FAP].”302  
In an open telegram to the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Russell 
Long, Reagan explained that his reservations about the program “stem from both financial anxiety 
and philosophical antipathy.” He saw the FAP as an expansion of welfare and ascribed the same 
deleterious effects to both programs, claiming that 
[The FAP legislation] includes substantial incentives for desertion; in some cases, it 
could encourage the dissolution of families…[I]t would further weaken the moral 
fiber and fiscal integrity of the nation; it would drain the productive wellspring of 
America. Many individuals who are now being encouraged to break loose from 
welfare would, under the new provisions of the Act, find it more comfortable to 
sink back into a state of federal dependency.303 
 
As opposed to enhancing their capacity to support their families, Reagan believed giving 
government assistance to the working poor diminished their social position by placing them in a 
state of dependency. In this view, it was dependency on government— not poverty or lack of 
access to basic needs—that denigrated poor families.  
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While Reagan was attempting to scuttle Nixon’s national reforms, he also clashed with the 
White House over the administration of California’s AFDC program. He defiantly refused orders 
that the state implement the cost-of-living increases mandated by the 1967 amendments to the 
Social Security Act. California grant levels were woefully inadequate and did not approach the 
amount official government figures—which were notoriously low— deemed necessary to survive 
financially. State officials considered the minimum income for a family of four to be $328 a 
month, but the most AFDC provided was $221, only 67 percent of the recognized need. Benefits 
had not been increased for twelve years, and had lost much of their buying power through their 
failure to keep pace with inflation.304 California risked losing millions of dollars in federal welfare 
funds in penalty for Reagan’s noncompliance.305  
Facing mounting fiscal pressures and the risk of federal intervention, the governor resolved 
to have a plan in place to tackle welfare if reelected to a second term. In August of 1970, he 
convened a task force to develop his own recommendations for reforming the AFDC program. 
Reagan’s chief of staff, Edward Meese, penned a memo— sent under the governor’s name—that 
announced the group’s formation and outlining its mission of formulating administrative and 
legislative solutions to the welfare crisis. Sent to all senior staff and cabinet members, the memo 
introduced the binary schema that saturated the entire subsequent political debate: “This study 
will place heavy emphasis on the tax-payer as opposed to the tax-taker; on the truly needy as 
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opposed to the lazy unemployable.”306 Lest there be any doubt about the state’s position vis-à-
vis welfare recipients, the memo concluded:  
I am determined to reduce these programs to essential services at a cost the 
taxpayers can afford. This is our NUMBER ONE priority. Therefore, I am asking 
you to make available your best employees including directors for this all-out war 
on the tax-taker. If we fail, no one ever again will be able to try. We must succeed.307  
 
This rhetoric suggested that the state’s responsibility be limited to helping those citizens deemed 
productive and contributing. Declaring war on the tax-takers positioned welfare recipients (or 
only the subset of recipients imagined to be unworthy) not merely as a marginal group within 
society, but as categorical outsiders without claims on the state.  
Operating in secret and staffed by managers from agencies outside the welfare bureaucracy, 
the task force conducted hundreds of interviews and combed through all the relevant state and 
federal regulations.308 In December of 1970, it reported to the governor that the welfare system 
was indeed careening out of control, and dragging the state toward certain fiscal disaster. 
Attributing the problem to expansive interpretations of the enabling laws and regulations, it 
recommended a series of reforms, predominantly aimed at controlling costs, restricting eligibility, 
prompting workforce participation, and strengthening the support required of families, 
particularly absent fathers. These recommendations provided the framework for the detailed 
program of administrative and legislative reforms that Reagan championed at the outset of his 
second term. 
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Facing staggering welfare costs, states across the country were struggling to find ways to 
manage their budgets. Some attempted simple across-the-board cuts to grant levels.309 New York, 
for example, implemented a flat grant designed to arrest the runaway welfare costs, and in 1969, 
the legislature, at Governor Rockefeller’s urging, cut welfare budgets by 8 percent.310 California 
attacked the problem differently, through more targeted reforms. The Reagan Administration 
released a publication in 1972 that trumpeted its efforts, and positioned California’s approach as 
a model that deserved national emulation. Aptly titled, Welfare Reform in California ... Showing 
the Way, the publication compared California’s efforts to control welfare costs to the strategies of 
other states.  
Whereas some states were eliminating entire programs (such as AFDC-U) or rolling 
back grants across the board, California’s reform planners chose to “purify” the 
system, the goal was to preclude or uproot those from the system who legally 
“didn’t belong there,” while making grants more equitable—even increasing them as 
warranted—among eligibles who really did.311 
 
Politicians predicated the strategy of winnowing the welfare rolls on the premise that an influx of 
ineligible or undeserving people had caused the growth in program costs.  
 This reform strategy rested upon the notion that significant numbers of recipients were 
fraudulent or otherwise malingering, thereby helping to etch that assumption into public opinion. 
Although program administrators often claimed that purging the welfare rolls of ineligible or 
unworthy beneficiaries would redeem public faith in the welfare system, this strategy had the 
opposite effect. Incessant political and media attention to these campaigns solidified public 
suspicion of welfare recipients. It framed the welfare budget crisis as a product of deceitful, lazy 
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recipients and an incompetent bureaucracy, rather than as a function of demographic and 
economic shifts.  
To initiate his efforts, the governor first implemented a series of administrative reforms that 
did not require approval from the Democrat-controlled legislature. Reagan appointed Robert 
Carleson— an assistant director from the transportation department with no prior experience in 
welfare administration— to head the department during the transition. Carleson had been an 
enthusiastic member of Reagan’s task force, and had formulated most of the committee’s 
recommendations.  
Carleson first moved to rectify the welfare department’s allegedly incompetent, negligent 
management by replacing whole swathes of leadership and staff. The report that touted the 
state’s reforms program explained that the expertise and bureaucratic habits of social workers 
were antithetical to the administration’s new orientation: “Out the window went the tradition of 
having the Department run by social workers or unwitting captives; in the door marched a 
management-legal-fiscal-oriented team intent upon reshaping welfare into a viable system under 
which both the genuinely needy and the troubled taxpayer would find equanimity and relief.”312  
A series of seemingly banal reforms revealed the state’s efforts to reorient the program 
from servicing welfare recipients to serving “the public,” and reducing the costs for the taxpayer. 
In an oral history interview years later, Carleson explained that he needed to purge the 
department’s administrators, most of whom were social workers who “really believed that they 
were representing the people who came in the door. They weren’t representing the people who 
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were paying the bill or who were running the department.”313 These comments reflected the 
administration’s assumption that taxpayers and welfare recipients were fixed, distinct social 
categories with antagonistic interests.  
The department codified eligibility standards to mitigate the efforts of social workers, who 
had a “tendency to regard themselves as advocates for their clients,” to give recipients the 
advantage of extra benefits when regulations were vague. Reagan officials also made benefit 
calculations the purview of less expensive “eligibility workers” who were trained in technical 
regulations but did not have social work degrees.314 Other reforms tightened eligibility, reformed 
income limits, and instituted new efforts to prevent and correct abuse and fraud.315 Ostensibly 
because of the budget crisis, the department leadership submitted the new regulations as 
emergency measures to be implemented immediately, therefore bypassing the usual review and 
comment period in which officials anticipated resistance and challenges from welfare-rights 
groups.316 
Many of the reforms desired by the Reagan administration, however, needed to be enacted 
legislatively, and Reagan requested permission to address a joint session of the legislature to 
unfurl his legislative agenda.317 The Democratic leadership, aware that the governor intended to 
gain political advantage and reluctant to grant him a platform it, made the unusual decision of 
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refusing Reagan.318 The governor characterized the Democrats’ move as protecting the embattled 
welfare program, and he vowed to take his plan for action directly to the people. He unveiled his 
plan on March 3, 1971 at a public speech in Los Angeles. The televised address and surrounding 
controversy attracted considerable media attention.319  
Unlike those federal and state officials willing to tolerate the “uncontrolled upward 
spiraling of the welfare caseload,” Reagan declared that he stood resolved to tackle the 
problem.320 His speech acknowledged that the welfare system failed to provide sufficiently for 
the “truly destitute,” but did not attribute this to economic pressures or inadequate benefit levels. 
Instead, the system failed because its incompetent administration allowed suspect and un-needy 
populations to infiltrate the rolls. He explained that “[welfare] is spread thin in attempting to 
provide for too many who are not needy but who through loopholes are legally eligible to claim 
welfare benefits, and too many who are receiving aid illegally because there is just no way to 
prevent their cheating.”321 When the Reagan administration introduced its detailed welfare reform 
package in the legislature, the governor positioned his reforms as a model for the nation, clearly 
signaling that his proposals were intended to counter Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan. “No other 
solution is in sight anywhere in the nation,” he declared. “As usual, California is leading the way 
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with courage and imagination down the always uncertain and sometimes slippery path of 
reform.”322  
At the outset, the Democratic-controlled legislature did not feel insurmountable pressure to 
acquiesce to the governor, and his package languished in various committees through June. In the 
interim, Reagan officials initiated a full-scale campaign to organize public understandings of the 
crisis and generate support for the administration’s reforms. He consistently portrayed his 
punitive proposals as the only commonsense response to a corrupt system careening out of 
control. In one statement to the legislature, Reagan outlined the essential contours of his 
arguments for reforms: “Changes in our laws are imperative if we are to restore the balance 
between the legitimate interests of the taxpayer, and those of the honest, truly dependent welfare 
recipient.”323 He again portrayed welfare recipients—even the “honest” ones— and taxpayers as 
opposing and separate categories with inversely related interests. In claiming responsibility for 
only the “honest, truly dependent welfare recipient,” Reagan absolved the state of any 
accountability to the supposedly significant number of recipients he considered illegitimate and 
dishonest. 
In his advocacy for reform, Reagan also directly challenged the claims of welfare rights 
activists who demanded the freedom to choose whether to enter the workforce or to decline 
employment they deemed undesirable. In an interview with U.S. News and World Report, Reagan 
used the growing number of employed mothers to undermine welfare’s traditional mission of 
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removing women from workforce while raising children. Celebrating the story of a woman and her 
mother who carefully coordinated their childcare responsibilities in order to manage their shifts as 
firewatchers, he asked “When you look at that—well, by what right does a welfare worker say 
that just because a women has children no one should expect her ever again to be self supporting? 
There are millions of women who are out working and supporting their kids.”324  
 Although Reagan’s comments were ostensibly racially neutral, his subsequent comments 
implied that it was the African-American and Latina women agitating for welfare rights who 
lacked a work ethic.  
I remember a statement in one hearing where one of these women from the Welfare 
Rights Organization got fired up and screamed out: “And don’t talk to us about any 
of those menial jobs.” Now, I don’t think jobs are menial. You know, here’s a 
woman who is demanding her right to be supported by the working people, and 
she’s saying to millions of other people who are chambermaids in a hotel or maids 
in homes—she is insulting them and saying that somehow they’re beneath her and 
that she will only work if you can guarantee that the job will be at the executive 
level.325 
 
Such pronouncements positioned welfare recipients’ activism as an affront to other struggling 
families, and insisted that recipients, widely assumed to be women of color, were antagonistic to 
other wage-earning women. These politics relied on a racialized, symbolic logic to create the 
impression of a gulf between the material interests of working poor families and families receiving 
welfare. 
In early April, the New York Times ran an opinion editorial by Reagan titled “Welfare Is a 
Cancer.” He claimed that welfare is “a cancer that is destroying those it should succor and 
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threatening society itself.”326 Not only had welfare failed those unfortunate destitute people who 
had no other way to support themselves, but “it has failed those who want to find their way into 
productive lives as people—individuals with a purpose and a goal—not a faceless mass whose 
destiny is the dole.”327 With this language, the governor positioned productivity, individuality, 
and social value as antithetical to receiving welfare. At the editorial’s conclusion, he again 
reiterated the dichotomous positioning of welfare recipients and normative citizenship, declaring 
that the “only way to measure the success of the program is not by how many people have been 
added to the rolls, but how many have been removed and made productive citizens.”328 Within 
these discursive confines, there were few ways to be both a welfare recipient and an honored 
member of the civic community. With this rhetoric, popular notions of productive citizenship 
were given specificity through their contrast to welfare recipients and the particular collection of 
negative attributes ascribed to them. 
 Although Reagan officials were outwardly confident of public support for their endeavors, 
they left little to chance. In addition to extensive public appearances by the governor himself, the 
staff took the unusual step of organizing a citizens committee to generate public pressure on the 
legislature for reform. The committee was a diverse bipartisan group of reform supporters from 
around the state, which included administrators, a town mayor, a minister, a union leader, a law 
student, and a divorced working mother who chose not to receive welfare. Not a single welfare 
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recipient served on the committee.329 At the press conference announcing the committee’s 
formation, a reporter questioned the governor about appointing his own advocacy group: 
“[A]ren’t you in effect organizing your own pressure group and will it be part of their function 
to—to communicate with the legislature?” Reagan explained that he intended his committee to 
counterbalance the high profile welfare-rights activism:  
 [Y]es, I’ve been perfectly frank about it. I think there has to be a voice of the 
people that is heard, and I believe from my observation that the overwhelming 
majority of the people, regardless of party lines, are totally convinced that we are 
on a wrong path and that welfare is, as has been described here, a mess, and it must 
be reformed. Now, I am—if you look at the hearings that have been held so far, if 
you look at the demonstrations that have been held so far, a stranger in our midst 
would get a completely different idea. He would believe that public opinion was on 
the other side, and I think every one of you knows that public opinion is not on the 
other side, and I feel therefore anything they can do to simply reveal where the 
people stand is of great service.330 
  
By claiming that his appointed committee represented the “voice of the people,” Reagan’s 
rhetoric underlined the distinction, made throughout these debates, between full citizens—who 
the state was charged to serve— and suspect welfare recipients, who were outsiders without 
legitimate claims on government or their elected representative. Through such pronouncements, 
Reagan tapped into a vein of racialized hostility toward AFDC, helping to produce the public 
support he claimed legitimated his efforts.  
The statewide citizens committee coordinated the work of 120 local committees, which 
were largely organized by local Chamber of Commerce branches across the state.331 The Chamber 
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of Commerce selected welfare as one of its main issues and dedicated significant resources to aid 
Reagan’s campaign. The Chamber loaned executives to staff the local committees, which ranged 
from ten to a few hundred members. They also ran ads in newspapers to pressure recalcitrant 
lawmakers. For example, one conservative Democratic senator encountered a full-page 
advertisement that inquired “Why is Senator Collier holding back welfare reform?” in his 
district’s hometown paper.332 
The citizens committee also printed thousands of glossy brochures describing the welfare 
crisis and Reagan’s proposed reforms. Next to photos of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Bobby 
Kennedy, and Reagan, the brochure featured their quotes about welfare’s destructive, degrading 
effects on recipients’ spirits and the national fiber. “Remember!” the pamphlet proclaimed, “The 
burden you bear promises to grow larger every year…unless reforms are made NOW!” 
Supporters could tear off a section of the brochure to send the cards into their state legislators 
after checking off which aspects of the plan they “particularly liked.” For many voters, there was 
probably little to oppose in Reagan’s reforms as the brochure described them: “Requiring work-
for-welfare for the able”; “removing free loaders from the welfare rolls”; “limiting the amount of 
aid being paid those with high income”; and “tracking down absent, negligent fathers.”333 
Californians sent thousands of these cards into legislative offices through the spring and early 
summer of 1971, undoubtedly increasing the pressure on lawmakers to deliver some measure of 
welfare reform.334 
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In the event that the committee’s public relations and letter writing campaign did not 
convince its opponents, the Reagan administration secretly prepared to field a ballot initiative on 
welfare reform. The staff planned to rely on the infrastructure established by the welfare reform 
committees to quickly gather the needed signatures and place the measure before voters in the 
1972 primaries. The initiative threatened incumbents who had not supported reform by 
providing a readymade issue for their challengers. The administration designed the initiative to 
pressure both recalcitrant Democrats and Republican supporters of Nixon and the Family 
Assistance Plan. “Supporters of FAP knew that if Reagan succeeded in welfare reform in 
California, the largest state, their efforts to nationalize welfare were dead,” Robert Carleson 
explained in his autobiography.  
Therefore, we were fighting not only the Democrats in Sacramento; we were fighting 
the Nixon Republicans in Sacramento and Washington. This situation made a 
Reagan-led welfare reform initiative in the 1972 primary a threat to all of his 
opponents—Democrat and Republican, state and federal. We code-named the secret 
initiative plan “Operation Crossfire.335  
 
Someone in the governor’s office probably leaked the plans for Operation Crossfire to key 
members of the legislature as resistance slowly softened among Democrats and Nixon loyalists in 
the Republican caucus.  
 
The California Welfare Reform Act of 1971 
Then, on June 28, 1971, Robert Moretti, the Assembly speaker, broke the impasse by sending a 
letter to Reagan calling for productive and substantial bi-partisan negotiations of those issues 
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most pressing to California, the foremost being welfare.336 Commentators at the time and since 
have debated what inspired Moretti’s overture. Reagan claimed in his subsequent and frequent 
retellings of the story that Moretti was hounded to the bargaining table by the political pressure 
his campaign had generated. He would tell of how Moretti arrived at his office and declared “Stop 
the cards and letters, Let’s negotiate.” Others have claimed that Moretti was motivated to deliver 
some significant legislative achievements after four years of the gridlock with the Reagan 
administration.337  
Starting in late July of 1971, the parties entered into almost two weeks of intense 
deliberations, led primarily by Moretti and Reagan. Reagan was an accomplished negotiator 
seasoned by years as president of the Screen Actors Guild and emerged delighted with a final 
reform package where both sides had gained (and lost) key provisions. Accounts differ over 
which side prevailed on substantive policy matters, but few would dispute that Reagan 
triumphed politically. Carleson claims that through savvy negotiating and the governor’s ability 
to disguise which provisions were most important for them, Reagan was able to secure 80 
percent of their desired reforms, surrendering to the Democrats on nothing they deemed vital.338  
Moretti, on the other hand, maintained that the legislation ultimately reflected the 
Democrats’ principles and objectives. He claimed in an oral history interview years later that his 
team supported the new eligibility restrictions and anti-fraud measures that Reagan’s side 
presented as Democratic concessions. Moretti explained, “We[Democrats on the welfare 
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negotiating team] had no desire to protect the goddamn welfare cheats. We were just as glad to get 
rid of them as he [Reagan] was, but we were interested in protecting the aged, the blind, and the 
disabled mostly, and the children.” He continued by recalling that Reagan “wrote provisions in 
there that we never dreamed he and his people would accept—ongoing cost of living increases, 
expansion of day care programs and education programs...So we both paid to some extent, but I 
think we clearly won the legislative battle, the battle of writing the law, and he clearly won the 
PR battle.”339  
The California Welfare Reform Act of 1971 passed the legislature and was signed into law 
by the governor at an exuberant bipartisan press conference on August 12, 1971. Reagan relished 
his victory, telling reporters, “I expect to be happy for the next few weeks.”340 Because it 
reflected a political compromise, the provisions of the bill ultimately enacted by the California 
legislature were not totally ideologically consistent.    
Contrary to Nixon’s proposed Family Assistance Plan, these reforms marginally benefited 
those populations with no outside income, while dramatically constricting state support to those 
working for low wages. California increased grant levels to come into compliance with federal 
mandates, and the legislation codified ongoing cost of living increases to grants. Once 
implemented, the state, which had only provided between 67 and 71 percent of recognized need, 
finally covered 100 percent of the amount deemed necessary to survive.341 The reform package 
was also loaded with new features that intensified the scrutiny and stigmatization of welfare 
recipients. The legislation severed the program that served the blind, disabled, and the elderly 
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from the programs that assisted families headed by single and unemployed parents. People in the 
first category were transferred to a program modeled on pensions, like Social Security, to spare 
them from the more demeaning features—such as the continual eligibility reviews— of the 
standard AFDC administration. 
The Reagan administration declared that one of the four central objectives of its reforms 
was to “strengthen family responsibility as the basic element in our society.”342 Instead of 
offering wage supplements to install male earners as heads of households as Nixon’s Family 
Assistance Plan proposed, the Reagan administration relied heavily on the criminal justice system 
and other punitive policies. Largely obscuring the material hardship and lack of job opportunities 
facing parents in urban areas, the Reagan administration construed parents’ lack of economic 
contribution primarily as a moral and criminal failure and relied on punitive mechanisms to induce 
support payments. The California Welfare Reform Act stipulated that absent parents were 
obligated to the county for any benefits paid to their dependents, up to the court-ordered amount 
of child support. In other words, as the administration’s synopsis explained succinctly: “For the 
first time, the absent parent becomes legally indebted to the county for any aid paid to his 
children.”343   
The state rationalized relying upon district attorneys because it assumed the parents in 
question to already be criminals: “non-supporting absent fathers are often unstable individuals 
frequently known to the district attorney through his other work.”344 The administration 
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assumed people in this population were inherently suspect and would only respond to punitive 
state intervention. The administration’s report explained, “The district attorney has a far better 
chance at making these men ‘believers’ than any other local official, as he literally holds the key 
to the jail cell.”345 Recognizing that prosecutors were often loath to deal with child support 
issues, the law included economic incentives and annual audits to entice district attorneys to 
devote more of their scarce resources to what were previously low priorities.346  
In order to facilitate any future child-support collection efforts, the law also mandated that 
from this point forward every birth certificate identify the child’s putative father with his Social 
Security number. Coercing identification of the father not only endangered women facing 
domestic violence, but bound poor women and children more tightly to fathers, husbands, and the 
state at a time when women were seeking economic and legal emancipation.347 Taken together, 
these punitive features interlocked to position mothers and children as liabilities for their 
children’s biological parent, abrogating the state’s financial responsibility without diminishing 
government authority and control.  
Where the FAP approached recipients as rational economic actors who would respond to 
economic incentives, architects of the Reagan plan assumed recipients were lazy and had to be 
coerced into the labor market. To do so, the reforms employed work requirements that mandated 
employment through threat of penalty and sanction. Any able-bodied recipient with school age 
children and adequate daycare was required to accept whatever job was offered, or enter a training 
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program. If these two options were unavailable, the state became the employer of last resort and 
provided a job in the community. These work assignments offered no wages and recipients were 
compelled to work 80 hours a month in exchange for their benefits.  
These work programs were not allowed under the federal legislation enabling AFDC, so 
Reagan officials lobbied the Nixon administration for a waiver allowing this experimental program 
in California. More akin to penal work programs than job training, these policies succeeded 
symbolically by demonstrating the state’s intent to discipline recipients. Programmatically it 
never really launched and Governor Jerry Brown ultimately abandoned it in 1973 as impractical 
and inefficient.348  
 In negotiations with the Nixon administration over the court order to increase benefit 
payments, Reagan agreed to bring California into compliance and to curtail his assault on the 
FAP. In return, Nixon agreed not to withdraw millions in federal welfare support and eventually 
granted California the waiver from federal law needed to implement the pilot work program. 
Nixon perceived Reagan as a political threat and potential challenger in the 1972 elections, and 
recognized that welfare was a powerful tool to hammer him with from the right. A Los Angeles 
Times article explained the president’s predicament: “On the strength of this one issue, if it is 
handled adroitly, Reagan could mount an impressive national political campaign. The White 
House is aware of this fact, which is probably why it backed down this month and agreed not to 
cut off $700 million in welfare funds for California.”349 By granting the waiver, Nixon may have 
bought himself some temporary respite from Reagan’s attacks, but he cleared the way for the 
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governor to implement punitive work provisions in California. Even at the time, the Nixon 
administration recognized the potential danger of allowing California to implement “successful” 
reforms.350  
 
Cracking Down on Chiselers: California’s Campaign Against Welfare Abuse  
While the workfare provisions of Reagan’s legislation forced recipients into jobs, the other prong 
targeted those recipients already in the workforce. He intended his reforms to purge the rolls of 
non-needy recipients that collected grants illegally or through some “loophole.” His language 
consistently blurred the distinction between people with jobs who received welfare through fraud 
and those who qualified legitimately. The governor committed himself to purging the program of 
both categories, and suggested that both were “cheats” and “chislers,” even though many were 
legally eligible for aid. In order to encourage labor force participation, the 1967 Social Security 
amendments had allowed people to retain a portion of their benefits as they added earned income. 
The governor charged that the way benefits were calculated under these regulations allowed 
people to collect welfare who lived comfortable—even lavish—lifestyles. A Reader’s Digest 
article described the way Reagan framed the issue in his speeches: 
 “How many of you know you are paying welfare to a man making $16,800 a 
year?” he asked. He told of an all-too-typical welfare mother receiving $339 a 
month who took a $582- a-month job. “Did she go off the rolls?” Reagan asked. 
“Not at all. Instead they reduced her grant by $29. Here is an individual making 
$892 a month, a good portion tax-free, and eligible for free medical care and food 
stuffs—and you’re picking up the tab.”351 
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In these comments, he indignantly equated the regulations allowing recipients to add some earned 
income with fraud, obfuscating the multiple economic rationales for the policies.  
 To curtail the practice, his reform package included a series of mechanisms intended to 
constrict the ability of people to supplement welfare with low wages. In an era when both 
welfare and low-wage work failed to provide sufficient income to support a family, these changes 
promised to have profound implications for people’s daily lives. Through tightening and 
eliminating income disregards and work-expense deductions, the law reduced the amount and 
type of income people could receive and still be eligible for welfare.352  
In addition to limiting people’s ability to legally receive aid while employed, the reform 
package took new steps to crack down on those illegally using welfare to supplement low wages. 
The alleged welfare-fraud pandemic was an overriding justification for punitive welfare reform, 
and Reagan’s package included a number of provisions designed to crack down on the problem. 
While consternation about unworthy or non-needy people receiving state benefits have been a 
part of state aid since its inception, the issue of welfare fraud took on a new urgency in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Arguably more than any other politician, Reagan recognized the issue’s potential 
saliency early, and captured and deployed it in ways that resonated with the public and furthered 
key political objectives. His particular framing of fraud powerfully influenced wider public 
dialogue about welfare and poverty.  
                                                
352 They proposed to amend the application of the $30 and ⅓ formula established by the 1967 Social Security 
Amendments. Prior to reform, intake workers based their eligibility decisions on people’s income level after 
subtracting the allowed earnings and work expenses deductions. The Reagan Administration wanted to simply use 
gross income (with no deductions for childcare expenses, etc.) to determine whether someone qualified for state 
support. While a seemingly technical detail, using gross income instead of net income in eligibility calculations 
would considerably reduce the number of people eligible for benefits, disqualifying all those with relatively higher 
earnings but still struggling financially.  
 155 
Fraud inquiries are inherently politicized, and recipients have always been subject to 
considerably more scrutiny in AFDC than in other programs. Yet efforts to ferret out fraud 
almost always stumble over the rudimentary problem of defining which behaviors technically 
constitute fraud. Actions interpreted as criminal theft in one instance could be construed as error 
or overpayment in another. Assumptions about the social position of program beneficiaries were 
embedded in policy, since administrators responded to the same behaviors differently depending 
on which population they served. California regulations directed that cases of suspected fraud in 
the AFDC program be referred to the district attorney to pursue criminal indictment. However, if 
the fraud was committed by a recipient of Old Age Assistance or Aid to the Blind, restitution 
was sought first by request, then civil action, and only after those failed were cases transferred to 
the criminal system. In practice, this meant that fraud within those programs virtually never 
resulted in criminal action.353 
As early as 1967, Reagan authorized a panel to clear up debates about the actual extent of 
fraud and identify ways “to weed out welfare cheats now on California’s welfare rolls.”354 In the 
following years, a series of publicized studies discovered alarmingly high levels of fraud. Instead 
of basing estimates on the number of prosecutions, the new reports uncovered vast reservoirs of 
undetected fraud by carefully auditing sample sections of the caseload, searching for unreported 
income and other deception. A study released in 1970 found that 15.75 percent of the sample had 
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some evidence of fraud, mostly unreported income.355 Subsequent reports estimated still higher 
levels.356  
Politicians often used these reports of endemic fraud as evidence of the low moral character 
of many welfare recipients. More quietly, however, officials were aware that low grants and low 
wages made extensive fraud inevitable. In his oral history interview, Robert Carleson explained 
that the AFDC bureaucracy tolerated widespread misreporting of income because everyone 
realized that it was impossible to subsist on grants that had not increased since 1958. He 
explained that “the benefits were too low and people really couldn’t make it on those benefits, so 
the whole system was looking the other way.”357  The brute economic conditions made law 
enforcement officials reluctant to pursue criminal sanction since “the district attorneys weren’t 
going to prosecute welfare fraud and go before a judge when this person was only getting $221 
and they needed more money.”358  
Despite this awareness, the Reagan administration only moderately increased benefit levels 
(under pressure from the federal court order) and took few other steps to address the economic 
factors that would logically give rise to welfare fraud. Instead, they tackled the high profile 
problem through a series of reforms that increasingly surveilled and criminalized the caseload. 
The California Welfare Reform Act required that the income declarations of aid applicants be 
verified through crosschecking, as opposed to accepting their reporting on faith as had been the 
case. The law weakened privacy protections by authorizing caseworkers to inspect income tax or 
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unemployment insurance records to verify eligibility and double check applicants’ declarations. 
The periodic eligibility reviews filled out by welfare recipients became formalized legal 
declarations, and thereby turned any false reporting into perjury.359 
The Reagan administration also leveraged the newest computer technology to integrate and 
synchronize records of the various bureaucracies, diminishing the chance of collecting aid in 
various localities or from multiple programs. The most important new anti-fraud program was 
called the Earnings Clearance System. It allowed the state to cross-list recipients’ declared 
earnings with wages reported by employers for unemployment insurance. The discovery of 
significant discrepancies between these amounts signaled fraudulent reporting and was among the 
most common type of welfare fraud. The first run of the program in late 1971 found 41 percent 
of the targeted sample had significant discrepancies between the wages reported by employers 
and recipients. Following significant publicity about the program, the second run in early 1972 
found unreported income in 26 percent of the sample.360  
 The Department of Social Welfare claimed that the Earnings Clearance System increased 
fraud investigations by 50 percent.361 To handle the new influx of cases demanding scrutiny and 
follow-up, officials formed new administrative units, both within the welfare bureaucracy and the 
district attorney’s office, which were tasked specifically with ferreting out welfare fraud. 
Legislation increased the penalties for fraud, making the unlawful receipt of more than $200 a 
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felony punishable for up ten years incarceration.362 Not surprisingly, the state’s commitment to 
fraud detection resulted in dramatic increases in investigations and convictions. Fraud convictions 
doubled between 1971 and 1972.363 Ninety percent of the fraud in 1972 consisted of recipients 
concealing or under-reporting income.364  In the fiscal year 1971/1972, the operations security 
office accepted 15,054 investigations, and received convictions or favorable judgments in 1,425 
cases. By fiscal year 1973/1974, the agency initiated 47,582 investigations that resulted in 13,087 
convictions or court ordered restitutions, representing more than a nine fold increase in state 
issued fraud penalties in only four years. That year, courts ordered AFDC recipients to repay 
almost $9 million to the state.365  
As I examine more closely in the Illinois case, welfare fraud became a frame through which a 
variety of problems were mediated, ranging from the budgetary pressures of growing AFDC 
caseloads to the most intimate family conflicts. Conditioned by the state’s emphasis and 
responsiveness to the issue, citizens used fraud as an avenue to elicit government intervention in 
their lives. In one example, a lawyer earning a “substantial income” wrote Reagan complaining 
about abuse perpetrated by those determining eligibility for welfare. He told Reagan of a father, 
later revealed to be himself, who inadvertently received a letter implying that his 17-year-old 
daughter applied for and received state medical aid. The lawyer “contacted the eligibility worker 
and advised her that the child was presently on a tour of Europe, paid for by her father, and that 
the father would and could well afford any medical attention that would be needed by his 
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daughter. The only answer that the father received was that the file was ‘confidential.’” Unable to 
get information from the welfare bureaucracy, the lawyer turned to the governor: “As a father, I 
would like to know how one’s daughter can receive aid without the parents’ knowledge and as a 
taxpayer, I would appreciate some investigation as to the facts behind this application.” The man 
used space created by the anti-fraud campaign to demand that the state intercede on his behalf in 
a controversy primarily between him and his daughter. Reagan officials researched the lawyer’s 
complaint only to find that the daughter had received aid to secure a therapeutic abortion, which 
was confidential information that the state could not release.366 
Others endeavored to use the campaign to publicize the behavior of unruly family 
members. In one example, an engineering professor wrote a long letter detailing his concern about 
his ex-daughter-in-law’s parenting. While the narrative contained few actions that technically 
constituted welfare fraud, it recited a series of anecdotes juxtaposing the mother’s frivolous 
consumption with her children’s poor hygiene, dress, and nutrition. He recounted his alarm upon 
realizing his grandchildren were accustomed to eating their cereal with water instead of milk: “In 
this affluent age what would cause kids to expect water on cornflakes? The answer is found in the 
behavior and habits of their mother Mary Jane.” Although the state had little control over how 
recipients spent their stipends, the grandfather assumed that stories of Mary Jane’s disturbing 
consumer consumption evidenced the need for intervention in her case. In the cover letter 
introducing the longer narrative statement, the professor synopsized the plot:  
Briefly it is the story of Mary Jane, a young mother who, for no other reason than 
laziness and selfishness had become a welfare moocher. All of her cash income from 
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welfare, plus everything she can gain by selling free food and gifts from any source 
is spent on her own clothes and travel. Within the past year she has spent 6 weeks 
in Guadalajara, a month in New York area and eastern seaboard towns, and two 
weeks in Hawaii...Meanwhile, her 4 and 6 year old daughters, quite unnecessarily, 
suffer from malnutrition and a variety of illnesses, live in filth and are growing up in 
a psychological and moral atmosphere which is about as low as it can get. 
 
After a full-page diagram graphically representing the various characters, their interrelationships, 
and class positions, the professor detailed how the mother locked her children in an unventilated 
basement and ignored an ongoing kidney infection. Instead of framing such behaviors as child 
neglect, the professor sought remedy through the governor’s anti-fraud campaign. 
He explained in his letter that stories such as these were the key to inciting public outrage 
and organizing political support for welfare reform. He recommended that the governor exploit 
these narratives in his political battles:  
This leads to the suggestion that you give wide publicity to a series of case 
histories. The amount and variety of material is almost infinite. A good writer could 
present them in a manner sufficiently interesting and exciting to upstage much of 
what we hear and see in the media. Presented as true stories in frequent newspaper 
columns, broadcasts and /or news conferences these would surely result in reactions 
as violent and sincere as the reactions to Mary Jane’s stories have been. I am 
confident that there would follow a wave of public protest strong enough to 
overwhelm your legislative opponents.367 
 
Interestingly, the professor quite accurately prophesied the role individual anecdotal narratives 
played in rationalizing punitive reforms and welfare program retrenchment.   
 The spectacle of purging ineligible recipients from the rolls did little to redeem the image of 
AFDC. On the contrary, continual reports of fraud convictions and investigations only further 
stigmatized the programs and its beneficiaries. Public suspicion was only confirmed through the 
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hundreds and hundreds of articles uncovering people living shamelessly in luxury at the public 
expense.368 Strengthening the links between welfare and the criminal justice system, both 
symbolically and programmatically, hardened public antagonism and created greater symbolic 
distance between recipients and normative families.  
 Although the archival collections of citizen correspondence with Reagan remain unavailable 
to researchers, evidence suggests that the news reports chronicling fraud ignited fierce public 
support and indignation. A form letter response to citizens’ letters about fraud indicates there 
was heavy volume of mail on the topic, which probably encouraged Reagan to continue 
emphasizing the issue. It also acknowledged the critical role the media played in amplifying 
Reagan’s message. The stock response assured constituents that Reagan and most other 
taxpayers shared their outrage 
We receive hundreds of letters daily from overburdened taxpayers citing news 
accounts of welfare fraud—accounts which have been investigated and verified, not 
merely rumored. We have a responsibility to restore a balance between the 
legitimate interests of our taxpaying citizens and those of the genuinely dependent 
welfare recipient.369  
 
Amid the ongoing public spectacle of welfare fraud exposés and prosecutions, Reagan positioned 
himself as the agent who restored equilibrium to a social system favoring the poor and people of 
color over “taxpaying citizens.” 
 
The Aftermath of California’s Welfare Reforms  
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The programmatic effects of California’s Welfare Reform Act are difficult to definitely establish. 
The Reagan administration claimed that its program caused dramatic reductions in caseloads and 
pruned the rolls of the high-income recipients, while increasing support to the most destitute. 
While the number of recipients reached 2.29 million, the caseloads began a precipitous drop in 
1971. By 1974, they had decreased 15 percent to 1.94 million.370 In an era when most officials 
would have been delighted to simply slow the rate of growth, caseload decreases were big news.  
There were many, however, who disputed Reagan’s claims of success and attributed the 
decreases to general economic improvement, lower unemployment, smaller family sizes, and the 
leveling off that was inevitable once most eligible families were enrolled in AFDC. In the long run, 
the reforms did little to control costs, and welfare expenditures more than doubled in the decade 
following the enactment of the California Welfare Reform Act.371 Economists Frank Levy 
attempted to quantify the effects of the reforms while accounting for economic trends. He 
concluded that California’s welfare-reform program probably had little impact on cost and only 
should be credited for six percent of the much vaunted caseload decline.372  
This is not to suggest that Reagan’s reforms were irrelevant or inconsequential. While 
marginally increasing benefits to families with no additional income, they dramatically diminished 
the support that had previously been available to poor families with outside earnings. One 
poverty lawyer characterized the reforms as a “very perverse, Marxian redistribution of income 
amongst the poor” that reduced the benefits of the top third of welfare recipients to increase 
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payments to the bottom third.373 The thousands of fraud investigations entailed unprecedented 
interventions and scrutiny into many recipients’ lives, and even more dramatic consequences for 
those indicted, convicted, or forced to pay restitution to the state.  
Although debates continue about the programmatic effects of California’s reforms, the 
political implications were indisputably profound and clear-cut. Reagan’s welfare program 
steered national welfare policy away from guaranteed income proposals and toward an 
alternative, more punitive, and more restrictive path. They propelled Ronald Reagan further into 
the national limelight, and helped establish the terms of the national welfare debate for decades to 
come. They were instrumental in establishing what has become common sense about poverty, 
work, parenting, and the state’s capacity to meaningfully intervene in society.  
In the short term, Reagan’s programmatic accomplishments through the California Welfare 
Reform Act positioned him as the Republicans’ innovator in welfare policy, displacing and 
discrediting the Nixon administration’s approach to the problem. Through its much vaunted, 
inflated claims to success, Reagan’s program proved (to Republicans especially) that there was 
an alternative, efficient path out of the “welfare mess” that did not include a massive expansion 
of state entitlement programs. By the time the Nixon administration introduced a revised version 
of the Family Assistance Plan to Congress in 1971, commentators viewed California’s welfare 
reforms as the principal competing vision. Nixon sold the FAP as a way out of the current crisis, 
and did not emphasize the unique attributes of his approach or the merits of creating a guaranteed 
income floor for all Americans. Reagan’s “success” in California made the FAP seem like an 
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unnecessary risk. Lou Cannon, Reagan’s principal biographer who covered him for years in the 
capital press corps, explained, “The Family Assistance Plan had been on life support since 
Reagan first opposed it. The CWRA [California Welfare Reform Act] drove the final nails in the 
coffin.”374 
In “California-style welfare reform,” there was a consonance between Reagan’s rhetoric and 
his policies that combined to make a winning political formula. While there was a tension 
between the FAP’s programmatic design and the language employed to sell it, Reagan’s reforms 
contained features designed to address the various negative stereotypes of welfare recipients. As 
early as 1971, commentators noted how the absence of punitive mechanisms compromised the 
Nixon plan and opened him to political assault from Reagan. A Los Angeles Times article 
explained that 
 FAP, even the revised version, is basically a guaranteed minimum income plan that 
would double welfare rolls, but which is sold as a scheme to somehow save money 
and promote the virtues of work. Nobody really buys that argument, and that is 
why FAP is in trouble; every congressman sees it as an affront to that abiding 
Calvinism which is the American religion: work or go hungry; make it big and go to 
heaven.  
 It is the popular acceptance of that belief, and an accompanying contempt of 
the poor, that makes Reagan’s outright challenge to the Nixon Administration such a 
powerful political movement just now.375  
 
  Daniel Moynihan explained that fears of Reagan attacking the FAP loomed over President 
Nixon’s daily morning meetings: “The Right, in the person of Reagan, had come within breathing 
distance of the Republican nomination in 1968. The question had to be asked whether the 
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president, who had barely held his conservative support in 1968, would not lose it in 1972.”376 
These were not the unfounded fears of a paranoid president. There was evidence that Reagan’s 
political efficacy, especially regarding welfare, had people wondering if he was not uniquely 
suited for the presidency. The American Conservative Union newsletter reported that 
conservatives were questioning their endorsement of Nixon: “For the first time political observers 
have noticed a private, though not yet public, willingness on the part of Southern GOP leaders to 
admit they may have been mistaken in backing Nixon over Gov. Ronald Reagan in 1968.”377  
In 1972, the U.S. Senate Finance Committee voted to sever the FAP from the welfare bill, 
H.R. 1, and not a single Republican voted to support Nixon’s plan. The president, with 
diminishing enthusiasm for his signature domestic policy proposal, abandoned any effort to 
reintroduce or amend his program. In October, H.R. 1 passed Congress with no guaranteed 
income plan. The legislation did include, however, a series of provisions designed to press 
recipients into work. Senator Long designed the provisions with guidance from Robert Carleson, 
California’s welfare director who now advised the powerful chair of the Senate Finance 
Committee.378  
As the news media amplified and reinforced the governor’s claims of success, the Reagan 
reforms also became models for other states. One critic of the governor explained that the media 
helped position California’s reforms as a national model by failing to scrutinize Reagan’s rhetoric.  
I think they [other states’ officials] substantially believe the Reagan rhetoric about 
it [California’s reforms]. I think they believe it brought about reductions in the 
caseload. I think this reflects a serious limitation of the press—their inability to 
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stay on top of a story. Their interest in welfare in California waned because it was 
kind of a boring, confusing story. There are a number of reporters who didn’t 
believe what Reagan was claiming, but nobody took the time (to check it out).379 
 
In 1973, Nixon affirmed California’s position in the vanguard of welfare policy by appointing 
Carleson as U.S. welfare commissioner and special assistant for welfare to the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare.380 From this post, Carleson worked to encourage other states to 
adopt California’s approach to welfare.  
Carleson and other conservatives in the Nixon administration became increasingly 
influential as the administration approached its notorious demise. This conservative drift 
reflected base political calculations, and not necessarily the dictates of an increasingly reactionary 
public. As the Watergate controversy escalated, Nixon catered to conservatives in Congress 
because their support represented his best chance to avoid impeachment proceedings. 
Commentators recognized that these dynamics served to entrench Reagan loyalists in 
Washington. Lou Cannon prophetically reported at the time that “it now seems likely that 
Reagan appointees and Reagan programs will outlast President Nixon.”381  
When he did eventually win the presidency, Reagan brought his blueprint for welfare 
reform to the White House. He took many off guard by how quickly and effectively his 
administration attacked the welfare system. As historian Edward Berkowitz explained, “The 
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administration moved so quickly on welfare because it had over a decade of preparation. It hit the 
beach running, but running on a course set a decade before.”382  
California’s welfare reforms cast a long shadow that extended even beyond Reagan’s 
presidency.383 The seminal 1996 welfare reform law that abolished AFDC is widely understood, 
especially in conservative circles, to be the culmination of the project begun in California in 1971. 
Bob Carleson remained a powerful force throughout the decades, and he was instrumental in 
drafting and passing the legislation that finally abolished the federal entitlement to welfare 
support.  
Beyond their long-term policy effects, the reforms staked out a tough stance toward 
welfare that further marginalized recipients. They entrenched a logic that obscured the influence 
of market forces and interpreted poverty as the result of individual, cultural, and racial pathology. 
Other politicians, anxious to upstage Reagan or at least keep pace, rushed to match his rhetoric 
and replicate his policies. Nelson Rockefeller, who had preempted Reagan with his drug policy, 
hurriedly ratcheted up his attacks on the welfare program and welfare cheats. An article in the 
Sacramento Bee chronicled the competition between the two presidential hopefuls and 
speculating on who would appear tougher: “In New York this year that are saying Rockefeller, 
with his anti-narcotic program, has out-Reaganed Reagan on the law and order issue. Rockefeller 
also mimicked Reagan on the welfare fraud issue.”384  
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 Welfare reform became “the cornerstone” of Reagan’s political legacy as governor of 
California.385 Although innumerable contingent factors aligned to cause the reforms to 
exert such a powerful force on U.S. political culture, Reagan skillfully deployed punitive 
politics to navigate political challenges and rationalize his vision for government. He 
trumpeted his success throughout the following decade to evidence his capacity for 
grappling with the nation’s tough social problems. Years later, Robert Moretti, Reagan’s 
adversary in the initial 1971 negotiations, discussed the political consequences of the law: 
“That was the basis on which, I think, he became president or certainly one of the main 
factors, because he continually pointed to, and still points to, welfare reform in 
California.”386 Throughout his future campaigns, Reagan continually recounted (in an 
arguably dramatized version) his exploits disciplining the excessive, permissive welfare 
system of California. During his 1976 speaking tour, he juxtaposed his success with 
stories of Linda Taylor’s extravagant abuse. Through these public pronouncements and 
the surrounding politics, the collection of racial stereotypes intertwined with mounting 
preoccupation with welfare costs and fraud to coalesce into the caricature of the “welfare 
queen.”   
 
Creating Criminals: Illinois State Anti-Fraud Initiatives 
Although Reagan co-opted the welfare queen story, the scandal surrounding Linda Taylor 
originally emerged from the local politics of Illinois. In the mid 1970s, bad publicity, federal 
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scrutiny, and spiraling program costs combined to inspire state lawmakers to launch a high 
profile anti-fraud campaign.387 Where California’s welfare reforms were driven by the governor’s 
office, the main impetus for reform in Illinois was a powerful bipartisan committee of state 
legislators called the Legislative Advisory Committee to Public Aid (LAC). This committee was 
charged with advising and assisting the agency that actually administered the welfare program, the 
Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA). Led for most of this period by Republican State 
Senator Don Moore (R., Midlothian) and emboldened by the high profile fraud case of Linda 
Taylor, the Legislative Advisory Committee became singularly committed to reducing welfare 
rolls through stringent eligibility reviews. Although Republicans enjoyed significant support from 
Democratic lawmakers, they strategically championed the anti-fraud cause throughout much of 
the 1970s in their struggle to regain control of the General Assembly. 
The following section uses Illinois’ state anti-fraud campaign to explore how the themes 
that coalesced in California translated in the politics of other states. This research also explores 
the ways that citizens—both the targets and the fervent supporters of the anti-fraud initiative —
understood and influenced politicians’ anti-fraud efforts. Illinois is an apt case study because it 
was both a forerunner and a model for the anti-fraud efforts that accelerated across the nation 
throughout the decade. Despite the fervency and high-profile nature of its anti-fraud initiatives, 
the Illinois case was not an aberration and can provide insight into the larger national 
phenomenon. Illinois’ exponential growth in fraud arrests and investigations during the 1970s 
corresponded roughly with national trends. 
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Illinois welfare rolls surged between 1967 and 1973.388 Controversy regarding incompetent 
management had circled around the Department of Public Aid since the late 1960s and the state’s 
high error rates put Illinois in danger of sanction by the federal government. Often 
indistinguishable from bureaucratic bungling and the results of chronic understaffing, mistakes in 
cash grant amounts were handled administratively prior to 1973. Fraud by recipients was rarely 
prosecuted since it was extremely difficult to prove criminal intent. When an overpayment was 
detected, the state simply readjusted the grant amount or dropped the recipient from the rolls.389  
In 1974, the Chicago Tribune began covering the bizarre case of Linda Taylor. Although 
Chicago journalists dubbed Taylor the “welfare queen,” high-ticket welfare fraud was hardly 
Taylor’s only legal transgression.390 The Chicago Tribune recounted tales of Taylor’s alleged 
robberies, bigamy, and kidnapping and told how she had collected fees as a “voodoo doctor” and 
tried to claim the inheritance of a policy runner who had died with $700,000 in his home.391 
Despite these diverse charges against Taylor, welfare fraud remained her defining feature and the 
press always referred to her as the welfare queen. 
Connecting queens to popular images of welfare recipients symbolically transmitted 
multiple messages with derogatory racial, gender, and class subtexts. 392 Surrounded by 
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extravagant luxuries and services, queens are assumed to perform neither caregiving work nor 
waged labor. Linking these images to welfare recipients discredited poor women’s voices and 
insinuated that their claims of material hardship were disingenuous and malicious. By evoking 
socially unsettling images of politically powerful women, the phrase welfare queen also had racial 
connotations. It implicitly referenced popular beliefs, associated most frequently with the 
Moynihan Report, which attributed the “pathology of the Black family” to its alleged matriarchal 
structure. Since it could instantly convey multiple stereotypes, it should not be surprising that 
the moniker welfare queen quickly gained such currency.  
State legislators used the Taylor case to evidence the need for a comprehensive crackdown 
on welfare abuse. The welfare administration, IDPA, responded to political pressure by initiating 
a series of bureaucratic efforts to identify ineligible recipients. In February of 1975, it instituted a 
“redetermination program,” which called for caseworkers to visit the home of each welfare 
recipient three times a year; it resulted in the cancellation of more than 40,000 cases in the first 
two rounds.393 To find people who were illegally working, state officials used newly developed 
computer technology to cross list the names of people receiving welfare with lists of state 
employees or recipients of unemployment insurance. Despite the worsening economic climate, 
bureaucrats strived for “caseload stabilization,” which meant stopping and even reversing the 
caseload increases. Through these programs, IDPA dropped people from the program faster than 
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new eligible cases were added, and caseloads stabilized in 1974 for the first time in more than 
three years. The caseload even decreased for a few months that year despite the recession.394  
Still frustrated by the alleged lack of cooperation by the IPDA, LAC initiated numerous 
efforts to coerce collaboration through threat, public humiliation, and enticement. Legislators 
worked closely with the media to publicize stories about the inefficient welfare bureaucracy and 
the behavior it tolerated.395 Although IDPA already employed fraud investigators, the LAC hired 
its own staff of off-duty police officers to track down ineligible welfare recipients.396 In practice, 
this meant identifying the two behaviors that most frequently constituted fraud: failing to report 
additional earned income or an extra wage earner (usually a husband or a boyfriend) living with 
the family. 
The LAC also established an anonymous, 24-hour-a-day hotline that people could call to 
report suspected fraud. LAC investigators circulated memos to police stations that implored 
officers to include welfare fraud in the crimes they watched for during patrols.397 After 
researching cases, LAC staff would hand over the files to welfare caseworkers for termination or 
readjustment of the cash grants. If there was sufficient evidence, they would send the cases to the 
state’s attorney’s office for criminal prosecution. The members of the committee staff would 
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then proceed to badger the reluctant and understaffed state’s attorney’s offices and local law 
enforcement into prosecuting the cases.398  
The LAC also sponsored legislation that was designed to entice prosecutors to prosecute 
welfare fraud more enthusiastically. Concerned that low penalties discouraged prosecution, 
legislators crafted a bill that allowed welfare fraud to be tried as a felony instead of a 
misdemeanor. Other legislation allowed the state’s attorney offices to keep 25 percent of the 
money recovered from welfare recipients after successful prosecutions. Chairman Moore 
explained, “This incentive plan should help ‘sweeten the pot’ and inspire our prosecutors to 
even greater heights.”399 In 1977, the state’s attorney office established a separate division 
dedicated entirely to prosecuting welfare fraud.400 
To eliminate theft and prevent recipients from falsely reporting missing and stolen welfare 
checks, Public Aid started mailing all grants directly to banks and currency exchanges, instead of 
peoples’ homes.401 Recipients had to report in person to collect their checks and were required to 
present three forms of identification and sign a receipt in order to match signatures.402 Although 
this program was expanded to the entire state in 1977, it was tested in Chicago starting in 1975. 
Intensive scrutiny of all welfare recipients illustrated the extent to which these policies were 
directed at a stigmatized group of people, not specific criminals within a group of respected 
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citizens. Both the language used and the location of the pilot programs revealed a particular 
concern about urban, usually Black, welfare recipients.   
Efforts to start fingerprinting the entire caseload were perhaps the most dramatic evidence 
that officials saw all recipients as suspect. Although fingerprinting ostensibly served the 
administrative purpose of preventing recipients from collecting grants under multiple aliases, it 
also clearly reinforced an already stigmatized position by linking the recipients to explicit images 
of criminality.403 Despite its obvious parallel to processing criminals, the plan received 
considerable support.404  
By the time that prosecutors were finally able to convict and sentence Linda Taylor to 
three to six years in prison, media attention and public outrage had shifted from her individual 
story to the hundreds of fraud cases that the state’s campaign had unearthed.405 In October of 
1978, the Chicago Tribune remarked on how the pervasiveness of welfare fraud made Taylor’s 
case seem less remarkable and instead simply representative of a larger pattern.  
Once the focus of national outrage, the flamboyant and mysterious Chicago woman 
has relinquished her throne to hundreds of others who have developed equally 
outrageous schemes to bilk the welfare system of millions of dollars each year.406 
 
Although the idea of the welfare queen never lost its link to fraud and criminality, its original 
connection to Linda Taylor and high-ticket welfare fraud receded as welfare queens multiplied 
before the public gaze.  
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Over the course of the decade, Illinois devoted increased resources to investigating fraud. In 
1979, agencies initiated 5,833 investigations and referred almost 2,000 cases to law enforcement 
for prosecution. This represented a 479 percent increase over the number of cases initiated in 
1971 and a 1015 percent increase in the number of cases referred to law enforcement. Although 
practices varied among states, this remarkable growth in fraud investigations was paralleled at the 
national level. Between 1970 and 1979, there was a 729 percent increase in the number of fraud 
cases initiated nationwide.407  
Initiatives sponsored by the LAC enjoyed wide support within the Illinois General 
Assembly. For example, the bill to raise penalties for welfare fraud sailed through the 
Democratic-controlled House of Representatives 124 to 26.408 The main critics of these policies 
were African American legislators and community leaders from Chicago. For example, Senator 
Richard Newhouse (D-Chicago) spoke out in the community and in the Senate. At a public 
meeting in 1977, he explained:  
“Welfare cheaters” has become the new code word for the poor, for minorities in 
general and those temporarily down on their luck. Here in Illinois, we presently 
have three separate agencies seeking out “welfare cheaters” at goodness knows what 
cost to the taxpayer.409 
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In 1978, Senator Newhouse issued a press release condemning the state for “squandering more 
than $3 million peeking under the beds of welfare recipients.”410 He also challenged the much-
publicized idea that the anti-fraud efforts resulted in savings for the state. “Then—with 
appropriate fanfare—the state proudly proclaimed that it had recovered the magnificent sum of 
$1 million as the result of its $3 million effort.”411 He insisted that anti-fraud efforts were racially 
charged initiatives designed to stigmatize the poor, especially from Black urban neighborhoods.  
Jesse Jackson called the fraud investigators “welfare bloodhounds” and pointed out that the 
state made no similar effort to track down the $100 million of uncollected income taxes.412 
Because the dominant discourse about fraud erased recipients’ poverty and rendered their 
perspectives suspect, these critical voices were unable to significantly intervene in the public 
discourse about welfare fraud. 
Although Illinois was not monolithically behind efforts to crack down on welfare fraud, 
only a few legislators wasted political capital on impeding anti-fraud initiatives directed against 
socially stigmatized poor parents. In fact, bureaucratic inertia was probably legislators’ biggest 
adversary in their efforts to politicize the fraud issue and shrink the welfare program. To 
implement their policies, the LAC had to pressure two reluctant, overburdened agencies into 
expending their limited resources on criminalizing actions that had previously been handled 
administratively. This transformation could not happen overnight and required considerable 
political and bureaucratic mobilization. As the LAC’s chief investigator acknowledged in a front-
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page Wall Street Journal article, “We’re trying to convince people that welfare fraud is a crime 
just as bank robbery and homicide.”413 Despite these struggles, legislators had powerful allies in 
their campaign: a large percentage of the public and the media. The more people heard about 
welfare fraud, the more infuriated they became; many even embraced the opportunity to join in 
the campaign themselves. 
 
Cadillacs, Turtles, and Revenge: Community Participation in Identifying Fraud 
Most of the public became informed about the state’s anti-fraud efforts through the media. 
Although some media, such as the African-American newspaper the Chicago Defender, 
published articles critical of the campaign, most mainstream papers tacitly assisted the 
investigations. Members of the LAC worked closely with journalist George Bliss from the 
Chicago Tribune in his multiple exposes about Linda Taylor and the resistance of IDPA to 
initiate further investigations. Investigators’ reports acknowledged his help in generating public 
pressure on welfare administrators.414 The LAC clearly saw the Tribune as a partner in their 
efforts, as illustrated by a letter to the Tribune editor that concluded: “We certainly appreciate 
the support of the Chicago Tribune in our ongoing investigations.”415  
In addition to echoing the indignant and alarmed tone of state legislators, newspapers 
publicized the state’s hotline for reporting welfare cheaters. They frequently included the phone 
number in stories about the LAC’s efforts and occasionally even designated separate space in 
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their articles to promote the state’s hotline.416 Set apart from the article with lines or a box, the 
announcements were essentially advertisements for the hotline and a clear endorsement of the 
state’s campaign. A 1976 article that ran in the Markham Star Tribune assured readers that there 
was no risk in reporting fraud and that all tips would be taken seriously. “All calls will be 
confidential and callers are not required to identify themselves. All reports will be checked.”417  
The Chicago Tribune also aided the campaigns by publishing the lists of names of those 
charged with welfare fraud. When the state’s attorney started returning indictments in groups of 
50 or 75, the paper would run all the names, along with addresses and places of illegal 
employment, at the end of the article in smaller print.418 This public shaming of welfare 
recipients broadcasted the LAC’s message more powerfully than simply repeating legislators’ 
allegations or speeches. Reading about actual indictments played a key role in convincing the 
public that the welfare program wasted their tax dollars on financially secure, manipulative 
criminals.  
People responded to this news of rampant welfare fraud in various ways. Some angry 
citizens answered the articles by writing letters to their paper’s editorial page. One man 
demanded that judges who handed down light sentences for welfare fraud be removed from their 
jobs immediately, and asked, “Aren’t such judicial decisions tantamount to aiding and abetting 
                                                
416
 See for example Jay Branegan, “State Calls Courts Soft on Fraud,” Chicago Tribune, February 19, 1978, p. 44. 
417
 Ted Chan, “Welfare: What Can a Small Staff Accomplish?,” Markham Star Tribune, April 1, 1976, p. 1. 
418
 See, for example, Jay Branegan, “Jury Indicts 53 for $508,000 in Welfare Fraud,” Chicago Tribune, July 20, 
1978, p. 2; Jane Fritsch, “31 More Indicted in Welfare Fraud Probe; Total Now 342,” Chicago Tribune, May 1, 
1979, p. 3; and Jane Fritsch, “75 Indicted in Welfare Fraud, Netting More than $1 million,” Chicago Tribune, June 
29, 1979, p. D1. 
 179 
criminal acts?”419 Another woman, furious about the waste of “our money,” wanted to be a part 
of the effort to hunt down welfare cheaters. 
I could think of a hundred people, including myself, who are tired of seeing our 
money wasted, and would love the opportunity to volunteer for a part in the 
investigations, without a penny for it. Just for the satisfaction of doing something! 
But that’s the trouble with the system, they’ll never let the people become 
involved. 420 
 
It seems that these sentiments were not aberrations. As the anti-fraud investigations produced 
more and more convictions, the public became increasingly invested in identifying and punishing 
“cheaters.” Concern seemed to intensify throughout the decade as people became convinced that 
fraud was endemic to the entire program. One legislator wrote to encourage the LAC to expand 
their work after reviewing a poll from his district that revealed 96 percent of his constituents 
thought “too many people on welfare are receiving benefits to which they are not entitled.”421 In 
1978, a poll of 800 Illinois voters showed that 84 percent ranked controlling welfare and 
Medicaid fraud and abuses their highest legislative priority, polling above controlling crime and 
government costs generally.422 
Despite their similar economic and social positions, many living among recipients shared 
these anti-fraud sentiments. In the fiscal year of 1977, the state’s fraud hotline received 10,047 
calls, with the numbers mounting each month.423 Between 1977 and 1980, it received more than 
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30,000 tips.424 Since the tippers reported specific instances of welfare fraud, these numbers 
suggest extensive involvement by people who frequently interacted with or lived near welfare 
recipients. 
Although the intake records for the hotline are not available, it is possible to piece together 
anecdotal evidence about why people participated in this campaign. Tippers rarely had a clear 
understanding of what technically constituted fraud and instead turned in the more traditional 
targets of state sanction, such as morally stigmatized unmarried mothers. Many tips were 
inspired by a sense of frustration and injustice about a cheater who seemed to be getting ahead 
unfairly. The tippers expressed anger that others were getting financial support that they had not 
“earned.” These complaints echoed the state’s assumption that work did not include unpaid 
domestic labor or raising children. Tippers directed their complaints at objects of personal 
frustration and were remarkably unsuccessful at identifying criminal behavior. The almost 32,000 
tips resulted in the adjustment or cancellation of 3,400 grants, making the informers effective in 
finding fraud only about 10 percent of the time.425  
Tippers were most frequently alerted to fraud by seeing material possessions denoting 
status. These complaints reflected the assumption that welfare recipients should not have access 
to consumer goods. Recent historical work has argued that the ability to acquire consumer goods 
had become increasingly understood as a right of citizenship. In her book, Consumer’s Republic, 
Lizabeth Cohen argued that citizenship and consumerism became hopelessly intertwined in 
American society in the prosperous decades after World War II. A new material abundance was 
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omnipresent in political rhetoric and corporate advertising but the poor, especially people of 
color, were largely excluded from the fruits of the post-war consumer boom.426 
In her work on the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), Felicia Kornbluh 
illustrated the importance of this new consumerism for welfare-rights activism.427 She showed 
that recipients demanded sufficient resources to support their families in dignity, which implied 
access to consumer goods. Kornbluh explained,  
One key way that welfare recipients understood and expressed themselves as 
rights-bearing citizens was as consumers in an affluent society. NWRO members 
criticized both the private marketplace and the welfare system for failing to allow 
welfare recipients to participate fully in the post-World War II consumer 
economy.428 
 
Like other women in the United States, welfare recipients insisted that they were entitled to 
consumer goods, such as perfume or a decent dining room table. These activists articulated a 
different claim to rights and dignity, one based on their positions as mothers and citizens, which 
did not depend on participation in wage work. By claiming entitlement to material comforts by 
virtue of their citizenship, recipients directly challenged dominant ideas about the social and 
material value of domestic and care giving labor while also collapsing the category of consumer 
and citizen. 
In contrast with the high-profile activism of the NWRO, many people were offended when 
welfare recipients possessed consumer goods. Tippers who notified the state about fraud 
assumed that nice or new possessions were sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the 
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recipient. In one typed, anonymous letter sent to a state senator, the author reported that the 
family next door had a house full of children and that the parents floated between welfare and 
wage work. Offended by the family’s unimpeded access to various commodities, the author 
explained, “They made the comment that whatever they want they will go buy…They go to 
town every week and spend between $40 and $50 for new clothes and foolishness. They buy 
turtles, guinea pigs, white mice and a lot of toys that are broken up in one day.”429 The crime, in 
this writer’s mind, was illustrated by the existence of frivolous toys and pets. Although there 
was no explicit fraud stated in the letter, the investigators followed up on this tip and found that 
the family had not received aid for more than a year.430  
Although not stated explicitly, it seemed that the tipper could not afford such luxuries for 
his or her own family and found the comparison with his or her neighbors disturbing. The author 
wrote, “These people are living high on the hog and sitting home doing nothing and we have to 
get out and work to support them.”431 Tippers assumed that their neighbors were not 
contributors to the state organs that funded welfare programs. This rhetoric created a dichotomy 
between “taxpayers,” which served as a proxy for full citizen, and welfare recipients, who were 
inaccurately presented as not contributing to the polity and therefore, having no claim to the 
benefits of citizenship. 
The use of “we” suggests that both parents in the tipper’s family were forced to work for 
wages. As the economy struggled throughout the 1970s and women continued to move into the 
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formal workplace, fewer and fewer families could rely solely on one breadwinner’s wages. 
Therefore, assumptions about a “family wage,” on which welfare policy was originally built, 
were increasingly inapplicable to the lives of poor and working-class families. Their inability to 
earn enough to keep a member of their own family at home probably contributed to resentment 
toward welfare. 
Other examples suggest that tippers may have felt that welfare gave their neighbors unfair 
advantages, especially when used to subsidize low-wage work. Chief Investigator Tom Coughlin 
explained to reporters that the best informants were “the outraged, average community 
taxpayer.” He explained, “One man called here and started chastising me…He accused me of not 
doing my job because the man across the street was on aid, working, and driving a new car.” In 
this case, the new car, a symbol of status and consumerism, angered the neighbor and inspired 
him to inform the authorities. The investigator explained that there was nothing he could do 
unless the tipper could name the place of employment. An hour later, the tipper called the 
investigator back to report that he had looked through his neighbor’s window with binoculars 
and, upon seeing his work shirt, found out he was employed at Sears.432 The press and law 
enforcement usually would have condemned spying on people as a violation of privacy but in 
this discourse, welfare recipients had entered a semi-criminal category where surveillance was 
encouraged.  
One man wrote a letter to LAC Chairman Moore to remind him that food stamp fraud was 
also a problem. Although he had no specific person to report, he simply wanted to alert the 
authorities that there were a lot of people using food stamps and some of their actions made him 
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suspicious. “What makes this so noticeable is that some of these people using food stamps are 
often dressed in fine clothing and purchasing items considered for expensive taste. Need I say 
more?”433 The concluding question revealed that the author assumed a common understanding 
about the limits of recipients’ rights to nonessential or frivolous commodities. According to this 
logic, people surrendered their cherished American rights of consumer choice once they started 
receiving food stamps. Simultaneously, it became any citizen’s right to monitor, judge and report 
recipients’ decisions. By excluding welfare and food stamp recipients from this consumer 
society, tippers were also reinforcing the image of recipients as a separate and degraded category 
of second-class citizen.  
The campaign against fraud also caused people who were bothered by deviant social 
behavior to feel that the state might intervene to discipline their neighbors. Another anonymous 
letter, written in 1974, testified to the power of the media’s representations of welfare queens. 
“In wake of recent newspaper stories concerning welfare cheaters, I would like for you to 
investigate another ‘unfortunate’ person who is collecting food stamps and welfare checks while 
riding around in a white late model Cadillac.”434 Again, this tipper named no act that technically 
constituted welfare fraud. Instead, the welfare recipient’s guilt was established by her access to 
status symbols and her sexual impropriety. The letter detailed the woman’s use of her parents’ 
Cadillac, her lack of attention to her child, and her “marathon sexual activities.”435 It concluded, 
“As a concerned citizen of this area, I think you should investigate this woman’s daily activities 
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(and nightly ones as well).”436 This tipper seemed more interested in convincing the state to 
regulate the recipient’s sexual behavior than addressing her use of the welfare program. By 
highlighting her inappropriate connection to a key symbol of post-War prosperity, the Cadillac, 
the complaint interlaced traditional assumptions with more contemporary concerns.437 It 
connected the older rhetoric that considered normative sexual behavior a condition for receiving 
aid with the more modern anxiety regarding poor women’s inclusion in the consumerist society.  
Revenge and personal disputes also motivated people to report their acquaintances for 
welfare fraud. Although it is difficult to establish what percentage of the tips were thus inspired, 
it is not surprising that this would occur. The state promised to investigate all leads and did not 
require any proof or documentation from the anonymous tippers. Even welfare officials 
occasionally acknowledged that the calls were not always civically motivated. As one Public Aid 
employee explained, “We get a lot of grudge calls from people upset with their neighbors, and we 
have a couple of callers who just give us doses of music, but we’re obligated to check all calls if 
they give us the necessary information.”438 
A few specific examples illustrate this phenomenon. In one case, it was clearly a woman’s 
estranged husband who informed authorities she was working while receiving welfare. He even 
went on a stakeout with LAC investigators to help identify her.439 In another example, a couple 
testified against their downstairs neighbor who had not reported to Public Aid that her husband 
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resided with the family. The defendant attempted to have her neighbors’ testimony thrown out 
on the grounds that they had frequently fought and were biased against her. It also turned out 
that the witnesses were themselves under investigation for welfare fraud and were possibly 
hoping for leniency if they cooperated with their neighbor’s prosecution.440 Although the files do 
not clearly establish what happened, it seems that the parties involved reported each other and 
were certainly using the state to settle personal scores.  
These examples suggest that people became involved in the fraud campaign for reasons that 
deviated from the state’s motivations. Not aware of the specifics of welfare policy, neighbors 
watched recipients for signs of social and cultural transgressions. They duly noted evidence of 
sexual impropriety, even though the state could no longer legally deny benefits using this 
criterion. Many of these tippers were probably struggling financially—only one accident, lost 
job, or pregnancy away from welfare themselves. The staggering unemployment and inflation 
throughout the period undoubtedly exacerbated these frustrations. Since neighbors were 
notoriously ineffective at identifying actual welfare fraud, the hotline’s main success seems to 
have been providing an outlet for dissatisfaction about constricting economic opportunities. By 
helping find “cheaters,” citizens were able to harness the state’s power to address concerns in 
their personal lives. Their participation, however, further legitimized the state’s campaign and 
added another technique for monitoring poor families. This street-level surveillance enabled 
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citizens to intervene in the performance of recipients’ stigmatized position; it barred recipients 
from subverting that position through acquiring consumer goods connoting status.441 
 
“The Crime of Survival”: Welfare Recipients and Fraud Prosecutions 
The LAC legislators were probably correct when they charged that welfare fraud was 
rampant in Illinois in the 1970s. A high percentage of recipients probably committed fraud as the 
state defined it; there is little other explanation for how they managed to survive on the checks 
from Public Aid.442 The final section of this study investigates how recipients used fraud to 
survive on paltry cash grants and how they reacted to the state’s anti-fraud initiatives.  
 Welfare recipients were personally, racially and socially diverse. However, they 
supposedly all shared two conditions: poverty and parenthood. They probably also shared an 
awareness that it was incredibly difficult, if not almost impossible, to support a family on a 
welfare grant.443 In 1974, the welfare grant for a family of four was approximately $288 per 
month, plus $65 in food stamps. Based on 1972 prices, this was 35 percent below the lowest 
floor set by the federal government for a four-person family.444 Even after adding wage work, 
many families still lived below the federal poverty line.445 This difficulty was exacerbated by the 
failure of the already low grants to keep pace with the era’s rampant inflation. The national 
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recession, which started in 1973, added to the economic insecurity of poor families. 
Unemployment rose to 8.3 percent by 1975 and real weekly earnings fell 0.4 percent annually 
during the 1970s.446 
The state’s indictments illustrate that many of the cases that became defined as fraud were 
attempts to supplement welfare grants with additional income from low-wage work or living with 
another wage earner. Herbert Saul was a typical case. He was sentenced to two years probation 
and $13,024 in restitution for working at a furniture store while also receiving welfare. He 
explained his crime to a journalist concisely, “I have a wife and three kids and I’m loaded with 
medical bills. That is all I can say.”447 Although recipients were depicted as lazy, the main crime 
constituting welfare fraud was working, holding a job on top of raising children. Similarly, 
although publicly viewed as promiscuous single mothers, Public Aid most often sanctioned 
women for living with their husbands or longtime partners after claiming to be single, deserted, or 
separated. 
Investigators’ files also illuminated the techniques parents used to make ends meet while on 
welfare. Many recipients chose not to notify welfare administrators when they got new jobs in 
order to avoid having their cases reassessed and grants reduced. Although many people held low-
wage jobs with formal employers, one woman’s grant was reduced because she failed to report 
babysitting income.448 Some worked under different names, usually maiden names, or used fake 
social security numbers to avoid detection by Public Aid. Other recipients reported checks 
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missing and cashed both the original and the duplicate. One woman paid her nephew’s friend $40 
to rob her on the way home from cashing her welfare checks. After she reported the money 
stolen, the fake robber returned the original money.449 In one particularly bizarre case, 
investigators struggled to ascertain who had been cashing the checks of a man murdered months 
before.450  
It is impossible to ascertain the true extent of fraud without access to extensive interviews 
or surveys where recipients felt safe enough to tell the truth about their behavior. Surveys 
conducted during the 1970s in Seattle and Denver showed that 50 percent of recipients admitted 
to “cheating” in order to get by financially.451 In an interview with the Chicago Tribune, an ex-
fraud investigator for IDPA estimated that 25 to 50 percent of welfare recipients committed 
some degree of fraud. She explained that, “the extent of the fraud varies. Some of it is rather 
minor, some of it is huge. But people are forced into committing fraud because of the silly rules 
of the system.”452 
Many of the less extreme techniques mentioned above must have been relatively well 
known, and recipients shared information about how to supplement grants without being 
detected. One woman told a reporter how she was terrified to find out that people were suddenly 
being jailed for working while on welfare.  
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“I had a good job,” she said, “but then I got laid off. I had a baby and so I got on 
welfare. But then I got my job back and everyone told me to just stay on welfare 
and not tell them that I was working again. So I did. Everyone was doing it… But 
now what am I going to do? Go to jail?”453 
 
She and other welfare recipients had come to believe that this behavior was not risky or could not 
be detected.  
The woman went on to explain how the extra income from fraud impacted her family. “I 
moved from my apartment with roaches to a decent apartment. I could go to the store and load 
up the basket instead of buying hamburger and chicken necks. I could send my baby to Catholic 
school.”454 In this case, she felt fraud was the only way to raise her family’s standard of living to 
what would be considered comparable to an average American family.   
Other recipients also felt that the state’s anti-fraud campaign blocked one of their few 
available avenues for economic advancement. When one woman was arrested for working while 
receiving welfare, the investigator reported that “she felt she was getting arrested for trying to 
upgrade herself, and she thought this was just terrible.” She then informed the men that when she 
got out of jail, she intended to kill herself and her two children.455  
Some committed fraud out of what they considered dire financial need. The Chicago 
Defender carried a story about Shelley Miller, father of three, who was indicted for illegally 
collecting aid while he was employed as a community service worker for the Chicago Department 
of Human Services. In the article, he admitted to lying about this income but refused to plead 
guilty because he held the system responsible for his situation.  
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Prior to applying for this assistance two years ago, my family was nearly starving. I 
couldn’t buy clothes for my wife or shoes for my kids…The money we were 
receiving from Public Aid we weren’t stealing from the poor, because we are the 
poor. And if you add that $261 a month to my income of $5,000 a year, I still was 
below the poverty line.456 
 
The article explained that Miller was an upstanding and active member of the community who 
was recognized by both Mayor Richard J. Daley and Alderman Vito Marzullo for his work with 
West Side youth. Because of the pride in his commitment and connection to his community, 
Miller explained to the reporter that he almost cried when asked to resign from his job.  
I grew up on the West Side. I’ve worked in the community with the youth and I’ve 
never been involved in crime. But if I’m convicted and put on probation, then it will 
be three strikes against me. I’m black, I don’t have a college education and I’ll have a 
criminal conviction on my record.457  
 
The indictment would cripple his ability to support his family, who were already struggling to 
get by.  
The state’s crackdown probably had equally severe implications for other families. The 
lives that were most disrupted were those families where a parent was sent to jail or became a 
felon. Recipients endeavored to mitigate the consequences through various strategies, such as 
legal challenges or fair hearings. Miller, for example, collected more than 120 signatures in a 
petition to support his not-guilty plea. In addition to the families convicted criminally, thousands 
more had their grants reduced or eliminated through new stringent administration. The 
deployment of new technologies that matched the welfare rolls with employee lists forced many 
to choose between welfare or wage work, neither of which provided sufficient income 
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Anti-fraud efforts contributed to the increased surveillance of poor urban neighborhoods. 
Recipients’ homes were inspected more frequently and they were forced to comply with 
continual bureaucratic examinations of their personal and financial decisions. This heightened 
presence of state officials intertwined with the increased policing that followed the massive social 
and political upheavals of the late 1960s and 1970s and contributed to the growing 
criminalization of inner-city space.  
Many of the strategies implemented to prevent fraud had far-reaching, negative 
consequences for poor communities generally. For example, Mary Cowherd, a resident of 
Chicago’s Robert Taylor Homes, testified before a legislative committee about the consequences 
of the decision to send all welfare checks to currency exchanges instead of people’s homes. She 
explained that on the day that the checks arrive “it looks just like a bread line…it’s like a 
concentration [camp] line…Then you go to the currency exchange and they charge you 5 or 6 
dollars to cash a check. And then…you get ripped off outside of the place.”458 Since the whole 
community could see who had just cashed their check, the state’s anti-theft initiative turned 
recipients into “sitting ducks” and increased robberies. The punitive policy was therefore both 
demoralizing and counterproductive. It also forced all recipients to perform in a degrading theater 
that constructed them as a distinct, suspect segment of society.  
This formal monitoring by various state agencies was intensified by the knowledge that 
neighbors, acquaintances and ex-lovers had the power to report recipients to Public Aid. Welfare-
rights activist and recipient Kathi Gunlogson explained: 
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I really feel like when someone applies for Public Aid, they are giving up a great 
majority of their constitutional rights. And one of those things is privacy. If 
somebody down the block from you sees somebody moving in a new table, which 
they may have given you, and you never had one before, they can go and call Public 
Aid and tell them that you are going against the laws. And Public Aid [does] not 
have to tell me who that person is that informed on me. But they can decide to cut 
my grant.459 
 
Reminiscent of previous examples, Gunlogson’s anecdote illustrated that recipients also 
understood that consumer goods triggered fraud complaints. In becoming a welfare recipient, 
Gunlogson felt that she had forfeited her right to privacy and the right to face a hostile accuser. 
She argued that these conditions amounted to stripping welfare recipients of the intertwined 
rights of citizenship and participation in the consumer economy.  
In testimony before members of the state legislature, Frank Smith articulated a similar sense 
that welfare policy deliberately degraded recipients. He explained,  
I think that the Department [IDPA] is geared to cause people to commit 
crimes…[T]hey treat us as if we are less than human beings…You know, but I have 
personally went out and committed a crime, a crime I call survival. And a lot of 
guys that’s sitting down there in Menard [Prison] right now committed that crime 
of survival because they were unable to take care of their families. And it’s mainly 
because of the Department of Public Aid not taking them at heart [sic] once they 
come to you and have no other place to go.460  
 
Smith felt financial options were so constrained that poor people could not survive without 
breaking the state’s rules. His language united welfare policy and criminal law into a single, 
undifferentiated oppressive structure. Indeed, he saw his survival within these structures as 
essentially and inevitably a criminal act. Shelley Miller, the recipient profiled in the Chicago 
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Defender, echoed these sentiments when he explained that welfare forced people to “live worse 
than animals.” He claimed that the structure of the welfare program made crime inevitable: “they 
force people who are unemployed and on welfare to go out there and commit crimes because they 
don’t provide enough on their welfare budget to coincide with the cost of living today.”461 
Although opinions about the welfare program undoubtedly varied among recipients, it should not 
be surprising that a percentage of them considered the entire program a dehumanizing effort to 
criminalize the poor, especially people of color. 
Examining recipients’ perspectives on fraud highlights the immense gap between legislators’ 
rhetoric and the material conditions of poor families. The architects of Illinois anti-fraud 
initiatives were not in conversation with welfare recipients nor with statistics about falling wages 
and rising prices. Their policies were designed to discipline the welfare queen: a deviant woman 
burdened by neither work nor family. They almost never acknowledged brutal poverty in Illinois 
or that the welfare grant kept families living below the federal poverty level.462 They did not 
discuss racism and the devastating levels of unemployment in central cities. Their language and 
policies reflected the assumption that only wage labor constituted “work.” In this rhetoric, work 
and welfare were diametrically opposed. The caregiving labor that welfare was originally designed 
to remunerate was rendered invisible and irrelevant.  
The campaigns of Illinois and California also restricted welfare recipients’ ability to use 
low-wage and informal work to subsidize the unmanageably low welfare stipends. They 
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constricted the amount of financial support available to poor parents at a time of narrowing 
economic opportunities, especially for communities of color in northern urban centers. 
Juxtaposing elites’ rhetoric and the experience of people on welfare illuminates the human costs 
of the welfare queen trope once its logic was translated into state policy. It reveals that 
legislators’ political responses were the product of specific cultural, racial, and economic 
assumptions that were divorced from the material realities and perspectives of most recipients. 
Instead of new financial supports or other drastic social intervention, legislators responded to 
welfare fraud through costly punishment: increased scrutiny, stigmatization, and criminalization.  
The political spectacle of tough work requirements and fraud prosecutions solidified a 
salient, maligned social category against which productive workers and taxpayers were defined. 
By portraying welfare recipients as the antithesis of full citizens, elites used the degraded image 
of welfare recipients to buoy the social and cultural (but emphatically not the economic) position 
of low-wage work. The focus on crime, laziness, sexual impropriety, and fraud obscured—if not 
completely expunged—the material conditions of struggling families from the public dialogue. 
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STUDY THREE: “WE’VE JUST GONE BERSERK IN TERMS OF 
PUNISHMENT:”463 THE DEMISE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 
AND THE RISE OF DETERMINATE SENTENCING IN CALIFORNIA, 
1968-1980 
 
In 1976, California state lawmakers from across the ideological spectrum joined together to 
abolish the central pillar of half a century of penal practice: the indeterminate sentence. An 
equally diverse and unlikely collection of interest groups supported their work. Prisoners, law 
enforcement professionals, prosecutors, leftist radicals, and “law-and-order” activists all joined 
in their rejection of the indeterminate sentence and its underlying rationale, the “rehabilitative 
ideal.” Under this long-reigning philosophy of penology, the stated purpose of incarceration had 
been to cure deviance, rehabilitate offenders, and reintegrate them back into the polity. Ever 
since the Progressive Era, prisons’ purported function was primarily to reform criminals, not to 
avenge their crimes, and sentencing policy had reflected this rehabilitative mission. Instead of a 
fixed prison term set upon conviction, the judge handed down a sentence range—an 
indeterminate sentence. Parole boards actually controlled the duration of incarceration, 
periodically evaluating prisoners and setting a release date once a prisoner was deemed 
sufficiently reformed. When longstanding critiques of the state’s efforts to rehabilitate criminals 
escalated in the 1970s, support for indeterminate sentencing evaporated almost completely, 
which lead lawmakers to replace it with determinate, or fixed, sentencing.  
With the old rationale for penal custody largely discredited and abandoned, lawmakers 
faced the more contentious task of constructing a new justification for incarceration. This process 
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inspired fervent disagreements over prisons’ core function, who should control them, and 
ultimately, whose interests they should serve. People of all political persuasions used this critical 
juncture to advance their unique visions for the penal system and reinvigorate the public’s 
beleaguered faith in the state’s legitimacy and competency. Proposals from the left reflected 
aspirations to build a more democratic society that expanded the rights, opportunities, and 
participation of marginalized groups, while finding alternatives to coercive institutional 
practices. More radical voices called for fundamentally reorganizing society to alleviate the 
structural inequalities that caused crime and led certain groups, especially within communities of 
color, to be constructed as criminal. Politicians on the right forwarded policies that moved in the 
opposite direction, entrenching the boundaries between normative and criminal citizens and 
narrowing the populations that the state was committed to serve, cultivate, and protect. “Law-
and-order” proponents pressed for “tough,” punitive new approaches that positioned law 
enforcement and militaristic (as opposed to welfarist) strategies as the best antidote to rising 
crime and disorder.  
The implications of struggles over sentencing stretched much beyond criminal policy. 
Through these debates, society renegotiated the state’s basic responsibilities to its law-abiding 
and criminal citizens. The debates also provided a forum from which people staged their 
resistance to the liberation struggles of African Americans and other mobilized groups. 
Ultimately, therefore, resolving these policy struggles was part of answering larger questions 
about who should be held responsible for social problems; whom the state ultimately served; and 
who merited full rights and responsibilities in society.  
This study chronicles the fall of the indeterminate sentence and the rapid—but highly 
contested—rise of a new, punitive sentencing regime. Although this story primarily unfolded in 
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the California legislature, it also engages relevant developments and discourse within the media, 
popular culture, and prisons. Primarily, I trace how discrediting the rehabilitative ideal 
eventually led to the ascendancy of mandatory sentencing regimes, the phenomenal growth in 
carceral institutions, and a particular notion of appropriate state functions and character. In-depth 
research of these struggles reveals that far from being inevitable, the rise of punitive criminal 
policy was the product of unique conditions, contingent developments, and the strategic and 
discursive postures taken by participants with varying degrees of agency. Embedding the 
legislation in its cultural, social, and political matrix illustrates its larger relevance, and enables a 
more nuanced, textured understanding of what drove events.  
Prisoners and their representatives played a central role in destroying the indeterminate 
sentence and the therapeutic rationale for incarceration, which they felt was at the heart of the 
hypocrisy and oppression of penal practice. Although not always audible to those outside prison 
walls, inmates were actively engaged in political deliberations about the institutions that 
governed them. In the early 1970s, inmates appeared to be on the verge of gaining more voice, 
responsibilities, and authority within prisons and criminal policy. They testified on the conditions 
they endured, compiled and issued reports on their grievances, and almost secured the right to 
organize union-like structures within the prison. They helped sculpt the arguments that 
discredited the indeterminate sentence and convinced legislators of the hollow promise of 
rehabilitation. Prisoners hoped that abolishing indeterminancy would help reduce their 
stigmatization and enhance access to full citizenship and economic opportunity. However, just as 
they seemed to be making headway, the political terrain shifted dramatically. Fear of crime 
escalated, law-and-order politics triumphed, and prisoners quickly lost their foothold in public 
discourse. Instead of further integration, lawmakers enacted more punitive policy that fortified 
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the rhetorical, physical, and legal isolation of convicts from civil society.  
Contrary to the popular assumptions about this phenomenon, the drive for punitive 
criminal policy was not simply a Republican or even conservative project. During the 1970s, 
prisoner rights activists accepted punishment as a legitimate function of incarceration, arguing 
that it was better to acknowledge the system’s true function than sustain the legitimacy bestowed 
by the phony emphasis on rehabilitation. More important, however, were the many Democratic 
politicians whose “get-tough” proposals helped position punitive strategies as the common-sense 
response to crime and disorder. Although they ultimately reaped fewer political rewards than 
Republicans, Democrats were instrumental in “stiffening” criminal penalties and entrenching a 
punitive logic. At the heart of this dynamic was a near-compulsive political imperative to appear 
“tough” on crime and embrace policies that advanced a macho and muscular vision of state 
authority. In both parties, police and prosecutors became popular political candidates because 
few challenged their masculine authority and resoluteness. Politicians feared being characterized 
as “soft” or unmanly on crime, even where there was little evidence that “tough” approaches 
were effective. Results, efficiency, and productive use of tax resources were secondary concerns. 
The reform and reintegration of offenders was periodically and inconsistently pursued. And by 
the end of the 1970s, the idea that criminal policy should account for or address “root causes” of 
crime had almost completely disappeared from public discourse, and was inevitably branded as 
“soft” and permissive when it did appear.  
Racial antagonism drove punitive trends in criminal policy, and this research illustrates the 
manner in which various groups, especially law enforcement, harnessed it. This case study, 
however, will not recapitulate the racializing and “otherizing” processes that anchor the drug-law 
study. The purpose here is to complement this analysis by focusing on how prisoners, moderate 
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politicians, and gendered renderings of the state intersected with these dynamics and influenced 
events. As evidenced throughout the case study, this emphasis does not diminish the central role 
of racialized fear and antagonism. Nor does it suggest that prisoners and other activists were 
hoodwinked or bungled into inadvertently enabling the punitive ascendancy. In fact, I reject the 
overly mechanistic notion that leftist activists’ strategic miscalculations or increasing radicalism 
triggered their opponents’ rise.464 Refocusing on the political and intellectual landscape that 
historical actors navigated helps reveal why they embraced particular choices and how the 
various contingent forces conspired to produce the particular politics and policies that manifested 
in California. 
 This study is divided into two sections. The first half examines the social, political, legal, and 
programmatic factors that led to the widespread repudiation of the rehabilitative ideal. It briefly reviews 
the origins of the indeterminate sentence in the early 1900s before exploring how the policy actually 
operated in California during the 1960s and early 1970s. It then investigates the movements and 
intellectual dialogue concerning the role of prisoners and prisons in society and concludes by illustrating 
how historical developments affected specific debates about criminal policy, particularly inmates’ 
critiques of the indeterminate sentence.  
 The second section reviews the actual legislative developments, focusing on the law that first 
abolished indeterminate sentencing and legislators’ subsequent attempts to “fix” problems in the original 
law. It chronicles how the original coalition that favored reform fell apart and “law-and-order” 
advocates came to monopolize the issue, forwarding escalating punishments and increasingly silencing 
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prisoners. The final section discusses the ways these political events helped determine that punitive 
toughness would become the dominant, essential attribute of criminal policy. 
  
The Long History of Therapeutic Incarceration and the Repudiation of California’s 
Indeterminate Sentence 
 
The indeterminate sentence was a key Progressive reform born out of distaste for penal practices 
that were established during the Jacksonian era. Those Jacksonian-era strategies were themselves 
the result of “civilizing reform” to the habits of punishment of the colonial period. In the early 
days of the republic, Americans, influenced by European enlightenment philosophers such as 
Cesare Beccaria, began to question the effectiveness and morality of corporeal punishments, 
such as public pillory, flogging, and executions. Reformers insisted that these practices were not 
only inhumane but also ineffective in controlling crime or inspiring respect for government 
authority. States began instead to confine offenders in carceral institutions, which had previously 
been reserved for debtors and those awaiting trial or corporeal punishment.465 
Beginning in the 1820s, new generations of reformers, often Quakers, advanced the notion 
that punishment should discipline and reform the deviant’s mind, not merely hurting, scarring, or 
killing the body. Believing that new social mobility and instability caused criminality, these 
reformers designed prisons to offer the solitude, silence, discipline, work routine, and moral 
guidance thought to be lacking in society. Reformers hoped that isolating offenders from 
corrupting influences would enable their eventual reintegration, while prisons, in turn, could 
provide a positive model to society. In practice, however, these new institutions became violent, 
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coercive, and corrupt, often marked more by torture and idleness than penance and rehabilitation.  
It is therefore not surprising that Progressive-era reformers scrutinized the prison and its 
unfulfilled promise. These activists, overwhelmingly white middle-class reformers concerned 
about the social consequences of rapid industrialization, urbanization, and mass immigration, 
fundamentally revamped penal practices while maintaining earlier reformers’ faith in prisons’ 
capacity to rehabilitate offenders. Abandoning the earlier hope that an ideal prison routine would 
cure all deviance, they insisted that each prisoner’s treatment must reflect the individual’s unique 
background and circumstances. In alliance with prison officials, Progressives rebuilt the 
institution, largely abandoning the lockstep shuffle, enforced silence, and the infamous striped 
uniform. They allowed more freedoms, such as visitation and correspondence. They instituted 
sentencing reforms that reflected their emphasis on individual casework. Progressives argued 
that the fixed sentence length, set by judges at an offender’s trial, was merely retributive and did 
not account for a person’s unique past and progress within the institution. In its place, they 
implemented the indeterminate sentence, where judges—under the legislature’s general guidance 
—issued a sentence range determined by the crime committed and the person’s circumstances. 
The power to actually release inmates, however, was transferred to newly created parole boards. 
These boards monitored the inmate’s progress and decided when the convict was reformed and 
ready to reenter society. For those people best treated in their communities, states instituted a 
system of probation, which released offenders directly after conviction and supervised them in 
their communities to ensure good behavior and compliance with the court’s specific terms.  
Such reforms were often grounded in a medical analogy for crime. The criminal offender 
was characterized as ill, demanding the expert care of trained specialists. Just as a doctor could 
not predict when a patient would fully recover, reformers argued that experts needed to monitor 
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criminals individually to evaluate when they were sufficiently rehabilitated. The massive transfer 
of discretionary power to unaccountable parole boards and probation workers did not disturb 
Progressive reformers, who trusted in the benevolence of the state and specialist expertise. In 
fact, many argued that only the state had the capacity and responsibility to reconcile the 
antagonistic interests in society, cure the various forms of social deviance, and integrate the 
maximum number of people into mainstream, middle-class norms. These reforms entrusted the 
state with immense power and discretion on the faith it had the capacity to transform 
marginalized and deviant characters into productive, contributing, tax-paying citizens.466 Unlike 
the later generations of activists, who targeted the penal system during the 1960s and 1970s, 
Progressives did not call for the revolutionary remaking of society, especially the economic and 
racial order, to reduce crime. Although many believed criminality often grew out of poverty, 
they saw no need for radical economic restructuring, merely the profound and concerted 
intervention by a well-meaning state.    
Appearing first in the 1870s, states quickly embraced the new policy and by 1922, 37 states 
had adopted some form of indeterminate sentencing and 44 had instituted parole boards.467 By 
1923, half of all people held in state prisons were serving indeterminate sentences.468 This swift 
transition cannot be explained by the moral suasion of idealistic reformers alone. A majority of 
criminal justice officials found something convenient or profitable in the transition to greater 
indeterminacy. District attorneys found probation and sentence ranges strengthened their hand 
during plea bargaining. Through indeterminate sentences, prison wardens gained an invaluable 
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leverage over inmates, since they held the power to extend an individual’s sentence almost 
indefinitely. Less reliant on physical discipline, prisons also gained new social legitimacy by 
replacing corporal punishment and their custodial mission with curative, rehabilitative 
institutional purpose. Politicians appeared humane in their approach to crime while 
simultaneously deflecting public outrage about crimes committed by released offenders onto 
parole boards that did not have to answer to the public in elections.469 
 Despite the advantages to the various institutional actors, indeterminate sentencing failed 
to deliver on its lofty promise. From the outset, rehabilitation remained a largely elusive goal. 
Recidivism rates stayed high and therapeutic programs were usually lacking in quality and 
availability. Likewise, probation was poorly implemented, with inconsistent supervision and 
little treatment.470 Although it is difficult to isolate the exact effect of the indeterminate sentence 
over time and various state administrations, it probably increased the average time people served 
in prison.471 Prisoners also deeply resented being subjected to the arbitrary power of parole 
boards and guards.472 Nowhere was the promise of rehabilitation more hollow than in the penal 
systems of Southern states. The legacy of slavery, a demand for cheap labor, and a violent 
commitment to maintaining white supremacy combined to produce convict-leasing systems 
across the South that barely even paid lip service to the new rehabilitative trends.473 Even outside 
these Southern penal systems, racial disparities saturated the implementation of the indeterminate 
sentence.  
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 For decades, a commitment to rehabilitation and corrections was the central ideological 
column that supported the criminal justice system. In application, these programs were sustained 
by their usefulness to politicians and prison authorities and less by their ability to fulfill their 
promise. When a series of factors undermined faith in the state and the political utility of the 
indeterminate sentence in the 1970s, the coalition that had sustained and defended the 
indeterminate sentence quickly dissolved.  
 
Life Under Indeterminate Sentencing: California’s Prisons Before Sentencing Reforms 
California had the exemplar state correctional system and its rehabilitative programs and 
indeterminate sentence were considered national models.474 Established in 1917, the state’s 
indeterminate sentencing system granted almost complete discretion over male prisoners’ 
sentences to the Adult Authority, California’s parole agency. Female prisoners were monitored 
by the separate, but parallel, Women’s Board of Terms and Parole. Judges sentenced convicted 
offenders to “the term proscribed by law,” which was usually a broad sentence such as one year 
to life. After serving a percentage of their minimum term, prisoners appeared before the parole 
board, usually every year, to be considered for release. The Adult Authority consisted of nine 
members appointed by the governor for four-year terms. The authority broke into teams of three 
(or two) to conduct approximately 25 hearings a day, customarily lasting between seven and 20 
minutes each. One member would interview the prisoner about his activities in prison, his 
attitude toward his crime and imprisonment, and anything else that might appear of interest in the 
file. The other board members were often silent because they were reading the file of the next 
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case, where they would lead the interview.475  
 Adult Authority members based their decisions on their interview and the inmate’s 
central file. The file could hold comments and reports from judges, district attorneys, 
psychiatrists, and prison guards. The prisoners had no representation or access to the information 
in their files that weighed so heavily in the hearings’ outcomes. Guards and other correctional 
staff did not write formal recommendations for parole boards, but they recorded any disciplinary 
infractions, complaints, and hearsay they deemed relevant. Prisoners frequently complained 
about the power of “silent beefs,” the negative reports in their files from unknown sources. Since 
there were no strict codes designating what evidence was admissible, prisoners claimed that 
information was used against them that had never been proven in court. Take, for example, the 
story of an 18 year-old sentenced to five years to life for an armed robbery in which no one was 
injured. His file contained a letter from the district attorney accusing the young man of a vicious 
double homicide. Even though the district attorney was unable to prove the case after three jury 
trials, the prisoner believed the Adult Authority held the charges against him in parole hearings, 
causing them to hold him in prison for 15 years—eight years longer than the average time served 
for a convicted first-degree murder and fourteen years longer than the average for a first-offense 
robbery.476 Inmates also claimed that they were penalized for conducting legally protected acts, 
especially activism within the prison or pursuing legal appeals regarding their individual cases or 
prison conditions. Even associating with known “writ writers” could compromise one’s chances 
of parole.  
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 There were no transcripts and few formal records of the hearings, and parole boards were 
not compelled to explain their verdicts. Prisoners were informed of the Adult Authority’s 
decision a few days later and there was no option of appeal. If the board was not inclined to 
divulge its logic, prisoners could never be sure of the real grounds for their decisions. In some 
instances, examiners might suggest that an individual would be well-served by further vocational 
education, addiction treatment, or religious instruction. However, since inmates appeared before 
different examiners each year, there was no guarantee that the suggestions offered would further 
prospects for parole from the next year’s panel. This led to an atmosphere of paranoia and 
tension within institutions, since inmates would spend hours analyzing board members’ 
questions and rulings, trying to find patterns in their decisions or clues to how the board would 
rule in their own cases.  
 Not surprisingly, therefore, the principal complaint against the parole boards was that 
they exercised their considerable authority arbitrarily. There was inconsistency between the time 
served within criminal categories. For example, two people imprisoned at the same time and 
same place for the same crime could be released years apart. Sordid anecdotes of murderers 
getting paroled before burglars spread quickly in prison yards and caused significant hostility 
and unrest. Although unpredictable in individual cases, trends in Adult Authority’s decisions did 
reliably reflect general societal prejudice and panics. There were well-documented racial and 
gender disparities in time served. Although slightly more difficult to isolate statistically, there 
was little doubt that people of color fared worse before parole boards. Women, whose hearings 
were conducted by the separate women’s parole board, unquestionably served less time than men 
for similar crimes.477As originally conceived, the indeterminate sentence’s ability to adjust to an 
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individual’s unique circumstances was its most innovative, promising feature. In practice, the 
policy’s uneven application and apparent arbitrariness undermined its claims to deliver justice. 
  The rehabilitative emphasis was not consistently integrated into penal practice and 
clashed with other policies. Perhaps most inconsistent with the rhetorical emphasis on 
reincorporating prisoners into society was the practice of considering inmates in a legal status of 
“civil death.” This extended beyond denial of civil rights during imprisonment to the critical 
period of reentry and re-assimilation during parole supervision. The document issued to parolees 
explicitly announced their limited civil rights. “Your Civil Rights have been suspended by law,” 
it explained. “You may not marry, engage in business, nor sign certain contracts unless your 
Parole Agent recommends, and the Adult Authority approves, restoring such Civil Rights to 
you.”478Although employment rights were restored—such as access to disability compensation, 
unemployment insurance, and social security—parolees were required to disclose their criminal 
records to potential employers. Inmates claimed this all but ensured that the most critical path to 
social reintegration—a job—was barred to them. Until 1974, California law denied people who 
had served time in state prisons the ultimate symbol of civic belonging—the vote—for life, even 
after they had served their time and were removed from parole. After 1974, prisoners were still 
prohibited from voting while incarcerated and on parole.479 
 
Prisoners and Social Movements  
In addition to being home to the most robust prison treatment programs in the nation, California 
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was also the site of the most active and radical prisoners’ rights organizing during the 1960s and 
early 1970s. Through concerted organizing, prisoners struggled to position themselves as social 
agents and critics with a legitimate voice in public discourse. In the process, they challenged the 
state’s therapeutic role and fundamental tenets of liberalism. Experiencing the indeterminate 
sentence and the institution of civic death as part of a single, oppressive system, prisoners 
attacked them both. They also challenged prisoners’ symbolic role in society, the limitations of 
their rights, and social assumptions about the responsibility for crime and deviance.  
From its earliest incarnations, this movement was intimately intertwined with social 
movements in the world outside of the prison. It was enabled by the legal challenges from 
imprisoned World War II resisters and the Nation of Islam during the 1950s and early 1960s, 
whose efforts opened up prisons to increased public scrutiny and reformed penal operation, 
especially regarding racial segregation and religious observation.480 Outside movements became 
more sympathetic as arrests during protests and civil disobedience brought new groups into 
contact with the penal system and highlighted the role of the law in defending what many came 
to consider a brutal and unjust status quo.  
 In the 1960s, demographic shifts in the inmate population and political changes ushered in 
an era of increasing revolt and instability within institutions. Large numbers of inmates joined 
independent study groups, educating themselves about their ethnic and racial heritage and 
reading critical political writings. Tension mounted as Black prisoners, influenced by the Nation 
of Islam and the growing Civil Rights Movement, resisted the racism in prison administration 
and among white prisoners. As convicts became more politicized and organized, many turned 
toward more structural and class-based critiques of prisons and their role in society. Riots 
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mushroomed over the following decade, with five nationally in 1967, 27 in 1970, 37 in 1971, and 
48 in 1972. 481 Although some of these uprisings were attributed to racial tension between 
inmates, most were sparked by prison conditions.  
Following a 1967 riot between ethnic and racial groups at San Quentin prison, prison 
activists called for inmates to deemphasize their divisions and identify as an oppressed collective 
that had a common enemy in the prison administration. The fact that treatment staff—such as 
librarians, counselors, and teachers—took up weapons to help guards regain control of the prison 
further strained prisoners’ faith in rehabilitative programs.482 More and more, inmates interpreted 
the rehabilitative mission as hollow verbiage papering over the reality of brute, punitive custody. 
In late 1967, a San Quentin underground newspaper, The Outlaw, publicized a list of grievances 
shared by inmates, paramount among them being the Adult Authority; it called for prisoners to 
put aside racial divisions and participate in a general strike beginning on February 15, 1968. The 
nonviolent “Convict Unity Holiday” lasted a week and, at times, shut down 75 percent of the 
prison. Outside of San Quentin’s gates, between 400 and 500 supporters rallied in support of the 
striking prisoners, entertained by bands such as the Grateful Dead.483 
The developing affinity between prisoners, Black Power groups, and San Francisco Bay 
area New Left activists brought unprecedented attention to the conditions and social significance 
of incarceration. Activists called into question the fundamental legitimacy of the prison, 
positioning prisoners not as individual deviants but as members of an oppressed class—often 
considered political prisoners—whom the state targeted because they resisted subjugation. 
Activists challenged dominant notions of criminality, arguing that survival within a capitalist 
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system forced many to commit acts defined as crime. Flipping the conventional script, these 
voices positioned the convict as a new breed of outlaw hero and argued that the true criminals 
were the elites perpetuating a violent and unjust exploitative system. One of the most influential 
examples of this trend was Eldridge Cleaver, a former San Quentin inmate and Nation of Islam 
minister who eventually become a powerful and charismatic leader of the Black Panther Party. 
Cleaver’s hugely influential 1968 book, Soul on Ice, rejected the notion that crimes were caused 
by individual pathology demanding therapeutic treatment. Instead, crimes could be considered 
insurrectionary acts, or at least desperate attempts by subjugated people to lash out at their 
oppressors.484 Many in California’s New Left looked to radical inmates as potential movement 
leaders and prisons as a central battleground in their struggle against the American state.485  
While many radical prison activists called for open insurrection against the state, more 
moderate elements pushed for limited legal reforms through courts and the legislature. Among 
the most critical changes was the legislature’s 1968 revision of Section 2600 of the Penal Code 
that retreated from considering inmates “civilly dead.” The bill guaranteed access to most printed 
materials and the right to correspond privately with legislators and legal counsel. Inmates also 
secured the right to inherit personal property and own their written material. These changes 
unleashed a flood of confidential correspondence to lawmakers, who now had exposure to the 
vast range of inmate grievances. They also sparked a series of lawsuits throughout the early 
1970s in which the courts steadily expanded prisoners’ rights.486  
With new protections and support from outside the prison, inmates kept up the pressure 
inside carceral institutions. In August of 1968, a second convict strike at San Quentin demanded 
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fair wages and an end to the indeterminate sentence. During the strike, a group secured 
permission from the warden to collect prisoners’ grievances about the institution.487 The inmate 
activists gathered 4,500 comments from the four major cellblocks and compiled the complaints 
into a report to the state legislature.488 However, the San Quentin warden refused to release the 
more than 70 page “Convict Report on the Major Grievances of the Prison Population” to the 
legislature when the authors submitted it for duplication and approval. Not deterred, the inmates 
made copies clandestinely, and delivered the contraband document to legislators in front of the 
committee, three reporters, and a surprised warden.489 The very first sentences of their report 
read: 
Prison “time” does not rehabilitate. On the contrary, it corrodes whatever creative 
individuality a person possesses, and operates against realistic readjustment on 
release...The California Adult Authority and the Department of Corrections, while 
mouthing policies of “rehabilitation” to sell their staggering budget to the 
Legislature, in reality follow the philosophy of “punishment,” and terms are fixed 
and release dates are determined accordingly.490  
 
According to the report, punishment and control were the true objectives of the penal system and 
rehabilitation merely hypocritical legitimization. In fact, the authors insisted that prisons 
accomplished the opposite of their purported goals, as inmates became less prepared for life 
outside the longer they were imprisoned: 
“[T]he California penal system has little or no corrective or rehabilitative value. 
We feel to the contrary, that is it more likely to be destructive to the individual 
character, and that, overall, the prison environment as presently constituted has a 
design such that it serves as the primary obstacle to the necessary and desired 
reformation of character of those so imprisoned.491 
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 The authors saw “civil death” as an absurd and backward way of preparing people for full 
citizenship, writing that “The theory that an offender may come to appreciate more highly the 
values of citizenship by having that citizenship, and its inherent values, taken from him is an 
obvious exercise in illogic.”492 They continued, “While fairness and equity and the rights of man 
are being preached at him, the prisoner finds that he cannot find fairness in his treatment, nor 
equity in his term of imprisonment, and his rights are non-existent. He treated like an animal, and 
told to act like a man.”493 Throughout, the paramount example of the system’s injustice was the 
Adult Authority. In the report, imprisoned people positioned themselves as the legitimate 
authority—and even specialists—on managing criminality and the conditions of their captivity.   
 The most famous person who served an indeterminate sentence in California was George 
Jackson. Convicted for the armed robbery of a gas station at 18 years old, he received a sentence 
of one year to life in prison. During the eleven years he spent incarcerated, Jackson become an 
outspoken and high-profile revolutionary writer and a flashpoint for both the left and right in 
debates surrounding prisons. An active Marxist organizer and educator, he eventually joined the 
Black Panther Party. In January of 1970, prison officials at Soledad prison charged Jackson and 
two other radical inmates with murdering a white guard (supposedly in retaliation for a guard’s 
shooting of an inmate days before). The case became a cause célèbre for the left, which believed 
the three men, widely know as the “Soledad Brothers,” were innocent and targeted for their 
political work. Jackson became even more notorious when, in August of 1970, his brother, 
Jonathan Jackson, stormed a Marin County courtroom, taking five hostages and demanding the 
immediate release of the Soledad Brothers. All the abductors, save one, and the hostage judge, 
were killed as Jackson tried to make an escape. George Jackson’s collection of letters, entitled 
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Soledad Brother, was released in fall of 1970, bringing him even more celebrity among the New 
Left and antagonism from the Department of Corrections.  
 In August 1971, prison guards shot and killed Jackson during what authorities claimed 
was an escape attempt. Two guards and three white prisoners were also killed during the 
confrontation, their throats slit before authorities retook the area. The details of the confrontation 
remain sharply contested to this day, and inconsistencies within the shifting official narrative 
made movement participants immediately suspicious that Jackson had been the victim of a 
targeted political assassination by the state. For many on the left, he instantaneously became a 
movement martyr, an iconic fallen revolutionary hero whose demise proved the true brute nature 
of the American system. For the right, George Jackson epitomized many of the perils threatening 
the nation: the danger of organized, militant people of color, the failure of the liberal state to 
maintain order, and the lack of respect for traditional authority, especially law enforcement. For 
these “law-and-order” constituents, the fact that leftist activists lionized an incarcerated Marxist 
Black militant, charged with murdering multiple guards, proved how far things had deteriorated 
and how desperate was the need to reestablish order and sanity.494  
 This sentiment only intensified in early September when the prisoners of New York 
state’s Attica prison, agitated by the news of George Jackson’s death, took over a block of the 
prison, holding 42 guards hostage and demanding improvements in prison conditions and 
treatment. After days of negotiations and the accompanying national media frenzy, Governor 
Nelson Rockefeller ordered state police to retake the prison. They killed ten hostages and 29 
inmates in the frenzy of their attack. 495 Again, the country was polarized between horror at the 
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state’s action, which many considered a brutal massacre, and disgust that social order had 
deteriorated to the point where mutinous inmates were voicing demands through mediators of 
their choosing.  
 During this period, there was a fascination with prisoners that extended beyond those on 
the left and permeated popular culture. The rebel hero of 1960s film could be a convict, 
presented as a viable subject struggling against oppressive authority. The popular 1967 film Cool 
Hand Luke depicted a prideful prisoner—played by Paul Newman—whom the state was intent 
on breaking. The film highlighted Luke’s virtue by juxtaposing an oppressive, venal penal 
system to his perseverance, loyalty, anti-authoritarianism, and independence.  
The next year, Johnny Cash recorded a concert before the incarcerated men at Folsom 
Prison. Singing most of the songs from the perspective of criminals and prisoners, Cash bluntly 
described crimes, voiced antipathy to prison administration, and expressed a longing for 
repentance and social connection unmediated by the state. He even debuted a song, “Grey Stone 
Chapel,” which was written by an inmate in the audience—directly giving voice to the 
supposedly civilly dead. Initially skeptical of such a risky project, Columbia Records released 
Johnny Cash at Folsom Prison with little fanfare and promotion. Nevertheless, the album slowly 
gained popularity among underground DJs, and eventually caught fire on the pop and country 
charts.496  
 With prisoners becoming increasingly powerful symbols in popular culture, they 
continued to agitate to improve their conditions. Despite tensions between them, radical and 
more moderate groups came together to organize an action at Folsom Prison in November of 
1970. Prisoners went on strike for 19 days, demanding the right to unionize, and an end to the 
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indeterminate sentence and the Adult Authority.497 Although the strike was broken, afterwards 
prisoners, ex-convicts, and outside allies banded together to form the Prisoners’ Union, an 
organization dedicated to building a rank-and-file collective to influence penal policy and 
practice.498 While the organization was moderate compared to those committed to building a 
revolutionary vanguard, all prison activists agreed that the determinate sentence was among the 
most despised and emblematic of the correctional system’s hypocrisy and viciousness.  
 The Prisoners’ Union disseminated its views through its newspaper, The Outlaw. 
Originally an underground newspaper published by inmates at San Quentin, the Prisoners’ Union 
took over The Outlaw after the authorities finally suppressed its publication within the prison in 
late 1968.499 In The Outlaw, the Prisoners’ Union advocated convict unity and warned against 
riots, which it felt played into prison officials’ hands.500 While they repudiated violent resistance 
and eschewed revolutionary rhetoric, the members of the Prisoners’ Union did not see 
themselves as mere reformers. Willie Holder, the group’s leader, explained the union’s  mission 
in this way: 
The Prisoners’ Union is an organization of convicts, ex-convicts and interested 
citizens dedicated to bringing about change in a decadent, barbaric prison system, 
a system designed to de-humanize men and women in the most agonizing ways 
that only men can devise, one that has over the years of penology become 
ultrasophisticated; a sophistication that would shame a sophist but only elicits the 
word REFORM from the penologists...We in the Prisoners’ Union do not want 
reform, we want a permanent change. This means a good hard look at structure. 
Unity is the only answer for a solution.501 
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These calls for inmate solidarity and structural change appealed to many prisoners and the 
organization grew in numbers and influence during the early 1970s.  
The Prisoners’ Union built membership within the prisons and support outside. Inside 
organizers, most notably the Nation of Islam member Harlan Washington, united previously 
warring factions within San Quentin prison. The union organized mass interracial meetings until 
the warden realized what was happening and transferred leaders to other institutions. By 1973, 
more than 3,000 inmates belonged to the Prisoners’ Union, and The Outlaw boasted a circulation 
of 5,000 within the prisons, with 25,000 total subscribers by mid-decade.502 Although never as 
high profile as individual prisoners such as Eldridge Cleaver and George Jackson, the Prisoners’ 
Union was seen as a legitimate representative of inmates’ interests in public forums throughout 
the 1970s. The organization inserted prisoners’ voices into debates in the legislature and the 
media and positioned inmates as active, rights-bearing citizens. Because of its engagement with 
public policy, it was integral to the development of California’s determinate sentencing law.  
 Between revolutionary prisoners, violent revolts, and activist organizing, California’s 
prisons seemed virtually unmanageable. When paired with many politicians’ increasing 
sympathy to prisoners’ plights and the persistent interventions of the courts, the entire system 
seemed unstable and poised for profound change by the early 1970s. Prisoners, more impatient 
and politicized than at any time in recent history, faced brutal repression but also unprecedented 
opportunities for alliances with sympathetic groups and movements on the outside. Outside allies 
joined prisoners’ assault on the status quo and together they were instrumental in tarnishing the 
image of carceral institutions. Law enforcement officials felt their authority threatened by the 
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political changes, particularly the viability of prisoners’ voices in public discourse. With this 
backdrop of general chaos and upheaval in California’s carceral institutions, various groups, 
motivated by divergent interests, turned their attention to the policy that seemed to symbolize all 
that was wrong with the system, the indeterminate sentence.  
 
Discrediting Indeterminate Sentencing in California 
The indeterminate sentence had few fervent supporters by the mid-1970s. Depending on 
perspective, opponents condemned the unchecked power of parole boards for being overly 
lenient, excessively punitive, or wholly arbitrary. While indeterminate sentencing had never been 
without critics, this scrutiny intensified in the 1960s and 1970s and within a few decades, fixed 
sentencing replaced indeterminate sentencing laws in almost every state in the nation.503 This 
transformation is often understood as part of the right’s political ascension through “tough- on-
crime” rhetoric and policy. Originally, however, it was prisoners and critics from the left who 
first led the assault on the status quo within the penal system. 
  The more radical critiques of indeterminate sentencing were animated by the social 
movements of the time. One of the first and most prominent of these was Struggle for Justice, 
published in 1971 by the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). Previously, reports of 
the failures of correctional programs were attributed to insufficient funding or flawed 
implementation. Struggle for Justice called the entire logic into question. Challenging the 
fundamental tenets of the therapeutic model, the AFSC argued that indeterminate sentencing put 
a benevolent disguise on penal practice and was deeply implicated in the oppression of the poor, 
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minorities, and other marginalized groups. 504 Seeing crime as an outgrowth of systemic 
inequality, the authors ultimately saw the best hope for remedies in government policy that 
reallocated power and resources within the nation. They proposed that incarceration be used 
minimally and sentences become standard and proportionate, dictated by the crime committed 
and not the vagaries of the individual criminal.505  
 Two years later, the journalist Jessica Mitford published Kind and Usual Punishment, an 
influential and scathing attack on the legitimacy of the entire penal system. A work of 
muckraking based largely on evidence from California, Mitford’s book aimed at a wide, popular 
audience.506 She detailed the hypocrisy, paternalism, and brutality of the system and called for 
systematic restructuring of penal practice. She saw hope in the nascent prison union movement, 
which she believed fundamentally challenged the legal and discursive separation of the prisoner 
from society:  
The union movement is no modest reform proposal, no effort to gild the cage. By 
striving to establish the rights of the prisoner as citizen and worker, it seeks to 
diminish the distinction between him and those on the other side of the walls. In a 
profound sense the ultimate logic of such a movement is abolition, for to the 
degree that those distinctions are obliterated, to the same degree the prison is 
stripped of its vital functions.507 
 
These indeterminate sentencing critics often presented the commitment to therapeutic custody as 
a thin veneer painted over a brute, violent, repressive system. They charged that cloaking these 
oppressive functions with benevolent, therapeutic rationales shielded their true operation but also 
legitimized them. The belief that these policies crushed individual authenticity and produced 
conformity led some critics to actually favor explicitly retributive and punishing law. In their 
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estimation, abandoning the normalizing, reformative aspirations of prisons and embracing a 
punitive rationale was more honest and better protected individual autonomy.508 By 1975, 
conservative critics such as Ernest van den Haag and James Q. Wilson joined writers on the left 
to argue that retribution and fixed sentencing had a legitimate role in penal practice.509  
 Legal professionals also took aim at the indeterminate sentence. In a widely debated 
work, Federal District Court Judge Marvin Frankel called for the state to link the degree of 
punishment directly to the crime committed and not the individual offender. He advocated for 
sentencing commissions—removed from political pressure but subject to judicial and legislative 
approval—to set guidelines for the fixed sentences associated with each crime.510 In 1974, the 
criminologist Robert Martinson synthesized decades of empirical studies on therapeutic 
programs into an oft-quoted and highly influential article called “What Works in Prison 
Reform?” Martinson argued that cumulatively, the research illustrated rehabilitative efforts were 
fundamentally ineffective and did not significantly reduce recidivism. The article was often cited 
to evidence the increasingly resonant (but not necessarily factually accurate) mantra within 
criminology that “nothing works.” This emphasis on the state’s impotence in the face of rising 
criminality served as a dramatic repudiation of the Progressive-era faith in government’s ability 
to regulate marginality and conquer deviance.  
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 Declining support for the rehabilitative mission coincided with these attacks from 
intellectuals and professionals on the left and the right. However, while these critiques certainly 
facilitated this process, it seems unlikely that these manuscripts drove the rapid disavowal of 
indeterminacy. Attacks on the legitimacy of corrections professionals, especially the arbitrary 
power of parole boards, cannot be separated from the wider scrutiny of authority during the time 
period. Mass social movements challenged the righteousness and wisdom of previously 
venerated individuals and institutions, such as politicians, police, military officials, the clergy, 
and college administrators. There was also widespread frustration across the political spectrum 
toward bureaucratic administration and specialists’ authority. Within this context, people from 
all walks of life questioned the capacity, legitimacy, and benevolence of the state, especially 
regarding its claims to protect citizens through therapeutic incarceration. 
  
Prisoners’ Assault on the Indeterminate Sentence 
Regardless of the influence of larger cultural trends, California legislators turned their attention 
to prisons and sentencing policy because the inmates themselves made it impossible to do 
otherwise. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, California prisons were increasingly volatile and 
the turbulent conditions within prisons combined with escalating fear of crime outside to make 
criminal policy highly politically charged. The affinity between inmate and outside movements 
increased the stakes of struggles with corrections officials for everyone involved.  
Despite rhetoric that positioned inmates as civilly dead and nonviable actors in the public 
sphere, prisoners had a large influence on the shape and texture of the criticism of determinate 
sentencing. While the writings of radical prisoners heavily influenced attitudes about 
incarceration, especially for the New Left, average prisoners also played a powerful role in 
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public debate. Prolific inmate correspondence informed legislators and social critics, such as 
Jessica Mitford, about the realities of penal practice. Therefore, attention to these voices is 
critical because prisoner critiques actually shaped debates, popular understanding, and 
ultimately, public policy.   
Although accorded little attention in scholarly accounts, contemporary observers often 
attributed the willingness to reevaluate penal policy to the upheavals within prisons. One 
journalist explained that, “Out of the violence and turmoil inside American prisons that boiled 
over in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s, a new consensus is emerging. Mainly, that the basic 
assumptions on which prisons have been operating for the last 50 years have been disastrously 
wrong.”511 And in their own efforts to explain the escalating revolts and desperation, prisoners 
again and again faulted sentencing practices. The McCay Commission, appointed to investigate 
the uprising at New York’s Attica prison, found the indeterminate sentence and parole release 
“were by far the greatest cause of inmate anxiety and frustration.”512 
 Prisoner hostility toward sentencing practice in California must have been exacerbated by 
Governor Ronald Reagan’s direction of the Adult Authority. Reagan faced prison crowding and 
fiscal constraints in the late 1960s, but he rejected calls to build new prisons and instead used the 
indeterminate sentence as a mechanism to manage corrections budgets. He called on the Adult 
Authority to reduce prison populations.513 In practice, this meant granting parole to larger 
percentages of the inmates at their annual hearings, thus relieving population pressure by 
releasing more prisoners. This policy decreased California’s inmate population from 29,000 to 
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19,000 by the end of 1971.514 Even though this massive release of convicts did not statistically 
increase crime rates, prison unrest and newspaper reports of crimes committed by parolees—
especially a high-profile murder of an Orange County schoolteacher—pushed parole board 
decisions into the public spotlight.515 Probably because of these pressures, Reagan reversed 
course in January of 1972 and had aides meet with Adult Authority members to request that they 
“get tough” in their parole reviews. As one newspaper article explained, the fallout from this 
“secret meeting” was “that sentences of virtually all male felons in California prisoners were 
arbitrarily stretched out.” It continued, “This decision came at a time when the Adult Authority 
had been progressing toward more early releases and the recidivism rate was near the lowest 
point in California’s history.”516 The results of Reagan’s order were dramatic: between 1971 and 
1973, the percentage of prisoners actually paroled fell from 44.7 percent to 29.5 percent.517 And 
parole revocations increased, climbing from 1,654 in 1971 to 2,255 in 1973.518 In 1971, more 
than 70 percent of prisoners who came before the parole board received release dates. After the 
order, that number plummeted and by 1975, less that 20 percent of inmates were given the 
certainty of fixed release dates at their hearings.519 This could only have heightened the 
sentiment among inmates that sentencing in California was arbitrary, political, and unfair.  
An article published in The Outlaw captured the hostility many prisoners felt toward the 
indeterminate sentence:  
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The Indeterminate Sentence and Adult Authority or parole boards are perpetrators 
of a terminal disease; a cancer devised by man to dehumanize men, women and 
children. They are the most sophisticated, nonjudicial, arbitrary, paternalistic, 
arrogant, abusive, inhumane, insensitive, manipulative, bureaucratic, redtape, 
double-talking, bullying administrative body that sits in judgment over other human 
beings.520 
In fact, it is virtually impossible to overstate prisoners’ hatred of the indeterminate sentence. 
Jessica Mitford reported that the indeterminate sentence was prisoners’ number-one complaint. 
She wrote, 
At a meeting of ex-convicts, I asked what they conceived of as the major grievance 
of the California prison population. There was near unanimity: surprisingly, the 
wretched physical conditions of prison life are by no means the major concern. The 
food, they say, is generally lousy. Medical treatment amounts to criminal neglect in 
many instances. The highly touted vocational training is a fraud…But these features 
of prison existence, disheartening, degrading, and dangerous though they are, pale 
in importance, say the convicts, beside the total arbitrariness of the bureaucracy that 
rules every aspect of their existence. One former inmate summed it up: “Don’t give 
us steak and eggs; get rid of the Adult Authority! Don’t put in a shiny modern 
hospital; free us from the tyranny of the indeterminate sentence.”521 
An Outlaw article written by two ex-convicts echoed this appraisal, bluntly asserting that the 
Adult Authority was the primary political issue for California’s inmate population: “The 
abrogation of the indeterminate sentence is the first and foremost proposal that must be 
submitted to the legislature. This is more paramount than any facet of reform in relation to the 
penal system in California.”522 
To understand the urgency with which prisoners revolted against the rehabilitative ideal, 
it is imperative to explore their critiques more closely. Without scrutinizing their understanding 
of the indeterminate sentence, inmate demands that punishment be the stated function of 
incarceration and willingness to grant politicians sentencing authority can seem imprudent or 
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even downright foolhardy. At an operational level, most disdained the Adult Authority’s 
arbitrary power over their lives and the uncertainty and tension produced by living year to year 
without a certain release date. Ideologically, prisoners varied in their assessment of indeterminate 
sentencing; some faulted the entire premise, while others condemned the administration of 
principles they generally accepted.  
 Most inmates critiqued the hypocrisy of a system that claimed to cure but actually 
punished. They experienced this allegedly benevolent institution as torturous—made all the 
worse by its professed claims to rehabilitate. One prisoner wrote to Jessica Mitford, “That the 
indeterminate sentence is predicated on one’s supposed adjustment in the institution and chance 
of making it on the outside is just so much rubbish. Punishment is the hallmark of this penal 
system, just as it is in most of the others.”523 Advocates echoed prisoners’ claims that 
punishment was already the reality of the system. The AFSC’s report Struggle for Justice 
claimed that, “Although punishment is no longer a fashionable rationale for criminal justice, the 
punitive spirit has survived unscathed behind the mask of treatment.”524  
 This cynicism about the operation of penal institutions does not suggest that all prisoners 
and their allies thought it impossible for the state to facilitate rehabilitation. In their writing, 
organizing, and study groups, inmates forwarded their own visions of redemption and 
reintegration. Many people argued that the key to true rehabilitation lay in removing the legal 
and symbolic barriers to full citizenship. Among male prisoners, these claims were often 
connected to wider concerns about restoring or securing masculinity, which many felt was 
deliberately undermined by prison administration. Two inmate authors writing for The Outlaw 
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linked calls for conjugal visits and jobs to this need to preserve their manhood: 
This [minimum wage jobs in prison] would enable prisoners to make allotments 
to their families, thus maintaining their status as the bread winner…Prisoners 
should be allowed to maintain their responsibilities as providers and continue 
their sex life. These are the two components essential for his manhood. Should a 
prisoner be denied his manhood because he is a prisoner? 525  
 
 Many focused their criticism on the administration of rehabilitation programs but 
did not reject the notion outright. The frustration with bureaucratic administration and 
social science expertise among the general population was particularly acute among 
prisoners. One man wrote to Jessica Mitford that he preferred dealing honestly with brute 
punishment than “compassionate professionals.”  
God help us from the “gung ho” professionals who want to help us. Too often 
they’re just as dangerous as the retired, military orientated, correctional officer, 
who sees every “number” as a threat, psychopath, and lunatic, who should be 
treated as such. At least he’d find his satisfaction in harassing you, or clubbing 
you to death. While the compassionate professionals will keep you incarcerated, 
for however long, in the interests of helping you.”526  
 
The same author explained that true reform entailed allowing prisoners a degree of self-
determination and listening to what they needed: “Perhaps if they began putting rehabilitation 
into the hands of the experts (US). Rather than the ‘professionals,’ there could be such a thing as 
rehabilitation. But of course even this poses problems in itself. FACT: the professionals have 
failed.”527 Therefore, between the “soft power” of therapeutic corrections professionals and 
“hard power” of brute, punitive custody, some inmates actually favored the latter. Such 
sentiments were undoubtedly bolstered by the widespread cynicism and disrespect throughout 
U.S. society for professional, bureaucratic expertise and, more specifically, by the mounting 
attacks within the criminal justice field on the effectiveness of rehabilitative programs. 
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 The stigma people experienced upon their release from prison only intensified their scorn 
for authorities’ claims of benevolence. The prejudice and hardship faced by newly released 
convicts, especially those on parole, totally discredited officials’ declared intention of 
reintegrating people into society as full citizens. The families of inmates also felt that, in 
practice, prison administration served to segregate and ostracize former prisoners from society, 
as opposed to reintegrating them. A flyer produced by a San Francisco organization of families 
and friends of convicts articulated this critique:  
We find we are stigmatized by the public just for loving a convict. We risk 
loosing [sic] jobs if our associations with convicts are known and may run the 
same risk in friendships. Often we are unable to rent housing, obtain credit, and 
we have difficulty being licensed for various professions. We are penalized for 
telling the truth. When our men are released, the stigma they carry makes it 
extremely difficult to find employment, and they even lose some of their rights as 
citizens. Society refuses to take any of the responsibility, responding only with 
never-ending blame; the myth of rehabilitation serves only to salve the social 
conscience.528  
 
From this perspective, the “myth of rehabilitation” cloaked the true operation of the penal system 
and meant little for those actually subject to the system.  
 Other prisoners rejected the entire premise of rehabilitation and challenged the state and 
dominant society’s definition of deviance and criminality. In their critiques, they challenged not 
just the coercive and ineffective nature of therapeutic programs but also the normative 
assumptions about the ideal citizens the programs aspired to build. An ex-convict explained in an 
Outlaw article how the training programs that parole boards pushed did more to enforce the 
performance of dominant gender roles than prepare people for a trade. She wrote:  
[N]one of there [sic]courses or trades can be related to the real job statistics on the 
outside. Sisters in prison are encouraged to participate in group therapy; where a 
sister tends to role play when the pressure is on, or to superficially pretty herself, 
when all the time she’d being geared toward rehabilitation; breaking the sisters 
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into society’s role: passive, brainless and obedient. For our brothers, they are 
encouraged in the same ways, only to be programmed to fit his predefined role as 
a “man in society.” By doing this to our brothers and sisters the prison officials 
are attempting to mold them into submissive subjects of society.529 
 
These assessments were embedded in a sweeping, structural critique of how power operated in 
society. Prisoners resisted the efforts of corrections programs to create normative, docile citizens, 
as well as the penal system’s role in producing deviance and constructing them as “others.” 
Resonating with critiques advanced by social commentators outside the prison walls, many 
prisoners denied having an individual pathology and instead saw their criminal actions as 
stemming from economic, racial, and social injustice. One inmate wrote to Jessica Mitford:  
We no longer personally assume the identity, or assimilate the labels of “the 
sick,” “the evil,” or “the criminal,” and we are thusly further liberated. Crimes are 
often committed with brazen faces—but they are always committed with 
underlying desperation of one form or another. We are tugged, towed, twisted, 
shoved, held back, shaped and formed through physiological, sociological, and 
environmental factors which are, or were evidently beyond our control. In 
retrospect, we see that we are no less than the overt reflection, or the symptom of 
the illness of society from which we are derived.530 
 
This rejection of being labeled as “criminal” was buttressed by the wider trend, most pronounced 
among intellectuals and activists on the left, of interrogating how mainstream culture maintained 
an unjust status quo through constructing marginalized people as deviant.  
Inmates, therefore, opposed the rehabilitative ideal on both ideological and practical 
grounds in the growing number of forums open to their input. Simultaneously, law-and-order 
advocates, who perceived the rehabilitative mission as ineffective coddling of prisoners, joined 
the attacks against the indeterminate sentence. With crime rates climbing, therapeutic programs 
were easy targets for critics long hostile to welfare-state strategies. And once these critics added 
their voices to those on the left in calls for abolishing the indeterminate sentence, the policy 
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would not withstand the assault.  
 
Remaking Penal Practice: The Legislative Struggles to Destroy and Rebuild Sentencing 
Policy 
 
By the early 1970s, the indeterminate sentence had few remaining defenders. Observers on the 
right claimed parole boards released violent and dangerous criminals too soon, endangering the 
public in an era of skyrocketing crime rates. Critics on the left argued the opposite: that the 
policy kept people in prison too long, reflecting an overreliance on ineffectual and punitive 
custody. Prison administrators, who yearned to cool down their turbulent institutions and 
alleviate the pressure of intense public scrutiny, were increasingly open to reform. While these 
groups had little in common beyond their opposition to the indeterminate sentence, together they 
easily overcame the institutional inertia and any remaining proponents of the policy.  
As early as 1971, the Adult Authority and Governor Reagan’s head of Corrections, 
Raymond Procunier, initiated reforms to start informing inmates of their release dates within the 
first months of their incarceration. Officials believed this would limit the unrest and frustrations 
the uncertainty of open-ended sentences caused.531 The plan lost momentum, however, in the 
midst of Governor Reagan’s “get-tough” crime policies, and was ultimately abandoned.532  
Not long after, courts introduced new urgency by issuing a collection of opinions that 
challenged the status quo of penal practice.533 Throughout the 1960s, prisoners, with the 
assistance of activist lawyers, successfully challenged their status and treatment. The resulting 
legal decisions enhanced due process protections for prisoners and criminal defendants. Richard 
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McGee, who headed the California Department of Corrections from 1944 to 1961, saw the 
courts’ new assertion of prisoner rights as the catalyst for the shifts in sentencing. In a law 
journal, he offered his explanation for the sudden traction of reform efforts:  
[T]he California [indeterminate sentencing] law and the manner in which it was 
administered has been subjected to criticism from many sources and for numerous 
reasons for many years. As long ago as the late 1940s, I remember standing 
before a legislative committee to defend the law against an abortive attempt to 
repeal the act...It was not, however, until the Federal courts began taking note of 
the constitutional rights of prisoners and parolees that the system began to 
crumble.534 
 
The subsequent efforts to adjust penal practices with the court’s new orders created openings for 
people intent on abandoning indeterminate sentencing all together.  
In Re: Lynch (1972) and Re: Foss (1974), the California Supreme Court intervened in 
California’s practices, declaring there must be symmetry between the crime committed and the 
punishment. They found the upper limit of some sentences to be unconstitutionally long, 
constituting cruel and unusual punishment. The implications for the 1975 case Re: Rodriquez 
extended beyond the individual petitioner and forced the state to revise its practices. Rudolpho 
A. Rodriguez, a Santa Monica man imprisoned 22 years for lewd conduct with a child, 
challenged the Adult Authority’s right to incarcerate him indefinitely.535 Corrections officials 
classified Rodriguez—despite his near-perfect record in prison—as a “warehouse case,” and 
repeatedly refused to release him or set a parole date. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia 
(although “in remission”), and declared unfit to reenter society. Rodriguez’s lawyers claimed that 
his feelings of persecution were actually caused by interminable incarceration and multiple 
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rejections by the parole board.536 While the court upheld the legality of indeterminate sentencing, 
it concurred with Rodriquez’s lawyers that the Adult Authority had violated the cruel and 
unusual clause of the state constitution by not setting a release date proportionate to the crime 
(or, by never setting a date at all and potentially holding him for his entire life). Together, these 
rulings diminished the weight of therapeutic considerations in sentencing by ordering that parole 
boards must also strive for consonance between the crime committed and time served.  
Meanwhile, in the legislature, John Nejedly, the Republican State Senator from Walnut 
Creek and Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Penal Institutions, started exploring 
proposals to replace California’s indeterminate sentence. Nejedly would become a chief architect 
and shepherd of legislation to replace the old sentencing scheme. Compared to other ex-district 
attorneys, he was moderate on criminal justice issues, and held the arbitrary and unjust 
application of indeterminate sentencing responsible for prison unrest. In December of 1974, he 
first introduced Senate Bill 42 (SB42), the determinate sentencing bill that would slowly wend 
its way through multiple revisions to eventually sweep away almost 60 years of penal practice.     
Coupled with recent court rulings, the looming threat posed by SB42 intensified pressure 
on the Adult Authority. Raymond Procunier, the controversial, blunt-talking, prison 
administrator who previously headed the Department of Corrections, was tapped by Democratic 
Governor Jerry Brown to lead the Adult Authority and its effort to align its practices with the 
shifting legal and political landscape. Hoping administrative reforms could stave off a more 
drastic overhaul, in April of 1975 Procunier issued Directive 75/20, which ordered parole boards 
to immediately set offenders’ release dates commensurate with their crime and prior criminal 
records. The move, backed by Governor Brown, was widely interpreted as a bid to contain 
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damage from attacks on the Adult Authority from prisoners, the courts, and the legislature. It 
would not be successful. In reevaluating all prisoners to set release dates, the new policy inspired 
the release of approximately 5,000 inmates, many of whose sentences had been arbitrarily 
stretched out by Reagan’s “get-tough” order in 1972.537 This, in turn, set off an avalanche of 
attacks from law enforcement and other law-and-order proponents, who charged that the surge of 
released felons endangered society.538 These claims were undoubtedly bolstered by news reports 
that Rudolpho A. Rodriguez, the man whose lawsuit helped spur these releases, was rearrested 
only four months after his release for fondling a young girl.539  
It was the courts, however, that derailed the Adult Authority’s efforts to save the 
indeterminate sentence. In early 1976, they struck down Procunier’s directive on the grounds that 
it failed to conform to the indeterminate sentencing law’s mandate that parole boards consider an 
individual’s rehabilitation in prison when setting prison terms. Since Directive 75/20 ordered 
sentences fixed before an inmate’s progress could be evaluated, the Adult Authority could not 
account for personal development in prison.540 Thus the last administrative effort to salvage 
indeterminate sentencing was thwarted by the policy’s insistence that sentence length reflect a 
prisoner’s attitude behind bars.  
By the time the court struck down Procunier’s administrative directive, SB42 had already 
passed the Senate by wide margin. The proposed legislation abolished the indeterminate sentence 
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and replaced it with a sentencing grid that detailed set prison terms for various offense levels. In 
the new scheme, a judge would choose among three possible sentences for each crime category: 
an average or median sentence, which would be used in most cases; a mitigated sentence, which 
reduced the term to account for extenuating circumstances; and an aggravated sentence, which 
lengthened the sentence when some factor made the crime exceptionally objectionable. All 
prisoners would additionally qualify for “good time,” which allowed for a one-third sentence 
reduction for good behavior in prison. The new system retained parole supervision upon release 
for an established period of time, usually just one year.  
As the law moved through various committees, the diverse coalition of prisoners, 
prisoners’ advocates, and law enforcement fundamentally agreed on the failure of the state’s 
rehabilitative mission and the need for certainty in sentencing. They differed, however, on policy 
specifics, most significantly the appropriate duration of sentences. SB42 resolved these disputes 
in the short term by not succumbing to calls to either lengthen or shorten prison terms and 
holding them relatively steady. The sentence lengths in the proposed bill roughly corresponded 
to the average time inmates had served under the indeterminate sentence. With the possibility of 
an additional one-third reduction for good time, people had reason to believe that sentences 
would actually be reduced by the new system.541 
 Prisoners and prisoner advocacy organizations fervently supported abolishing the 
indeterminate sentence and played an active and influential role in SB42. The sponsoring 
legislative committee received testimony and input from inmates continually throughout the 
process. Willy Holder, the leader of the Prisoners’ Union, testified so regularly before the 
committees that he developed a familiar rapport with legislators. Throughout 1975 and 1976, as 
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SB42 moved toward final passage, the Prisoners’ Union remained at the table in negotiations 
over what would replace the indeterminate sentence, pressuring politicians to reduce sentence 
lengths, abolish parole supervision, and limit the amount of arbitrary discretion in the system.  
  This involvement reflected a growing and highly controversial assumption that inmates 
and ex-convicts could be a trusted source of expertise on their own punishment. Outside groups, 
such as the AFSC and the Prisoners’ Union, kept California’s incarcerated men and women 
informed about legislative negotiations and identified the key officials to pressure throughout the 
process.542 Soliciting prisoners’ participation in designing policies that governed them had vast 
political significance. It moved against the tradition of an inmate’s “civil death,” countering the 
long practice of rhetorically and physically severing prisoners from the “public” while they were 
incarcerated, on parole, and even long after they were released.  
Some prisoners and ex-convicts felt their separation from the polity acutely, which 
contributed to their cynicism toward the Department of Corrections’ claims to rehabilitate. This 
issue surfaced at a Senate hearing in an offhand exchange between Senator Parnas and Willie 
Holder, the director of the Prisoners’ Union who served 20 years on and off in prison for 
burglary and forgery.  
HOLDER: The prime goal of all criminal justice legislation should be to increase 
prisoner confidence as well as public confidence in the administration of justice.  
PARNAS: Excuse me for interrupting you, but I simply wanted to indicate that in 
drafting this statement we considered prisoners part of the public, and by saying 
improve or increase public confidence we meant to include prisoners, ex-convicts, 
convicts, what have you.  
HOLDER: Having been an ex-convict, you know, a good majority of my life, and 
a citizen just about the same amount of time, you know, I felt that I was excluded. 
I really did, and I’m sure that the prisoners that read this will feel that they were 
being excluded, too, because of all the monkeys that you’ve got on your back.543 
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Holder’s testimony reiterated the common sentiment among prisoners that penal practices 
conspired to expel them from the public, despite all the insistence to the contrary.  
 
 Ironically, it was legislative advocacy around SB42—a law designed to repudiate the 
state’s commitment to reintegrate convicts into the public—that inspired many prisoners to feel 
like viable, engaged citizens. One man held at California’s Men’s Colony wrote to Nejedly that, 
“For the first time in ten years of being under the Department of Corrections’ thumb, myself and 
every other state prisoner feels that we have a chance to be heard through your bill, SB42.”544 
More remarkable, many politicians viewed prisoner support for SB42, not as a liability for their 
legislation, but as evidence of its soundness. When the bill was before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, Senator Nejedly presented six boxes, which held 9,000 letters from inmates and their 
families, to demonstrate the inmate’s overwhelming engagement and support for the proposed 
reform.545 
 Correspondence sent to legislators revealed prisoners’ intense investment in the fate of 
SB42. In the letter quoted above, the inmate described the anxious hopeful mood in California’s 
carceral institutions:  
At this very moment, on every prison yard, in every prison in California, the 
attention of the prisoners are drawn to one thing, the passing of your bill SB42. 
The anticipation is near the point of a person waiting on a last minute stay of 
execution, only to a lesser degree. What it is, is that we are waiting for the lights 
to be turned on. We have been in kept in darkness so long that is doesn’t even 
seem realistic. If we could see the light at the end of the tunnel there would be less 
time spent in despair, and less “living for the moment” and one could plan for the 
future, no matter how far away.546 
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Another letter revealed how closely inmates monitored the legislation’s progress: 
I was very happy to learn that your Senate Bill 42 got out of committee. You 
never realized how much all of the inmates here were hoping it would. All day 
they asked—has it passed the committee? Do you think it will go through? So 
much concern and so much thanks and happiness after learning that it did clear. 
You are to be congratulated and commended for such a humanitarian book of 
revised statues that treat an inmate as a human being.547 
 
Writers equated indeterminate sentencing with denial of citizenship rights and an assault on their 
very humanity, and connected passage of the bill with expanding prisoners’ faith in the political 
system and society in general.  
I placed the copy of the Senate Bill no. 42 in the prison law library where is was 
read by hundreds of prisoners…From my conversations with them, I gather that if 
this bill becomes law, there will be a rebirth of respect for the law and the State of 
California in the way which its justice is administered. To send a man to prison to 
destroy him is one thing; to send him to prison as a societal experience whereby 
he acquires a respect for the society is quite different and produces a better 
citizen.548  
 
While these correspondents may have amplified prisoners’ enthusiasm for Nejedly’s 
benefit, there is little doubt that inmates followed SB42 extremely closely, believing it 
intimately intertwined with their fates.549 
 The Senate passed SB42 by 36 to one on May 15, 1975. This wide margin reflected the 
diverse coalition arrayed against the indeterminate sentence from across the ideological 
spectrum. The bill stalled, however, a few months later in the Assembly when the Criminal 
Justice Committee declined to vote on it. Liberal advocates thwarted SB42’s progress, although 
the District Attorney’s Association also opposed the bill on the grounds that sentences were too 
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lenient. The Assembly Criminal Justice Committee was known to be among the most liberal in 
the legislature and was traditionally the source of progressive criminal justice legislation. The 
liberal members saw themselves as the brakes on “get-tough” legislation that came from other 
committees and the Senate. When SB42 came before the committee, it heard testimony from the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Northern California, which opposed the legislation 
because the sentences were too long. Furthermore, since the bill allowed the legislature to set 
sentence length, the committee saw no mechanism to stop lawmakers from lengthening them in 
the future. It also called for increased administrative discretion in setting early release for 
deserving prisoners. Allegedly convinced by this testimony, the committee, led by longtime 
champion of prisoners’ rights legislation, Alan Sieroty, chose not to vote on the bill. This 
effectively ended the legislation’s chances of passage during the legislative session, although it 
did not kill the bill outright.  
 The Prisoners’ Union was furious with the ACLU. They publicly attacked it for 
elitism and failing to consult with inmates, and organized a picket in front of the ACLU 
office. Willie Holder charged that,  
The ACLU lives in a world of abstract civil liberties and ivory towers, more 
appropriate to an academic setting than the reality of prison life. Their lobbyists 
rode in on a high horse right before the hearing and made pronouncements that 
the bill wasn’t pure enough. They never asked convicts or us or any other prison 
group what their ideas and feelings were. I’d like to know who in the hell these 
people think they represent.550  
 
These criticisms caused a rift between the ACLU’s board of directors and its staff. After the 
public clash, the board sided with the Prisoners’ Union and prohibited its staff from working 
against determinate sentencing legislation in the future. The confrontation between the Prisoners’ 
Union and the ACLU illustrated the extent to which prisoners’ interests and philosophies guided 
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legislative advocacy and ultimately, influenced policy development. It is remarkable that the 
union representing criminals was able to publicly rebuke an established organization, such as the 
ACLU, and force it to reverse its position. In this climate, prisoners were able to assert their right 
to be represented and expected advocacy groups and politicians to respect, accommodate, and 
even acquiesce to their interests.551   
 Prisoner activists complained that ACLU staff, despite their benevolent motives, failed 
to comprehend the profound differences between facing a fixed sentence and an indeterminate 
one. An article published in The Outlaw explained:  
What they [ACLU] cannot grasp is that quantitative time and qualitative time are 
not necessarily the same. If a man or woman has a flat three years to do, and 
knows that most other people who committed the same act are looking at the same 
three years, it is possible to kick back, think it over, get what you can from what’s 
there, and make plans for getting out. The body is caged but the mind is free. 
If a man or woman only spends two years inside, but all the while has 
hopes that a petition of some kind would cut them loose sooner (because others 
have made it), and fears that they would be trapped inside for far longer (because 
others have lost it) and wasted mental energy trying to fall into the right category 
for the Graders and Sorters—then that two years can be a draining, embittering 
eternity. It is Death Time; time that generates a “fuck ’em in their ass” attitude.552 
 
As the author explained, many inmates found that the discretion exercised by liberal, therapeutic 
treatment specialists seemed far more difficult to tolerate than the certainty of a fixed sentence, 
even if applied in the name of brute punishment. The Prisoners’ Union claimed that female 
prisoners also supported the repeal of indeterminate sentencing, even though they stood to lose, 
since they averaged far shorter sentences than men for comparable crimes. Activists claimed that 
being governed by the arbitrary whims of parole boards was so heinous that female prisoners 
would accept longer prison terms in exchange for the certainty of fixed release dates. Patricia 
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Holder explained to a reporter that, “I’m not advocating longer sentences by any means but I’ve 
talked to the women in prison and they would rather do double time than do time under the Adult 
Authority. They’d rather know how much time they’ll spend.”553  
 These debates are not the only evidence of inmates’ growing authority in matters 
concerning their custody. During 1975, high-level officials from the Department of Corrections 
entered into negotiations with the Prisoners’ Union about plans to organize union-like structures 
to represent inmates inside institutions. Although the plan ultimately galvanized opponents and 
rationalized new efforts to curtail inmates’ influence, the negotiations marked a high-water point 
for the Prisoners’ Union. The union put forward what the corrections administrators saw as a 
“reasonable and moderate” proposal to build trust between the parties. They planned to initially 
build union support and infrastructure inside a single institution and then slowly expand into 
others. The Prisoners’ Union proposed forming committees—comprised of one Prisoners’ Union 
member, one Department of Corrections representative, and one member chosen by both—that 
would rule on conflicts over appeals, transfers, and disciplinary matters, as well as examine 
prison policies generally. Although the committee’s decisions would not be binding at first, the 
parties agreed they would carry moral and social influence.554 Despite their limited initial 
proposal, the union openly declared that its ultimate aim was to abolish the Adult Authority, 
restore prisoners’ human and civil rights, and act as representatives in collective bargaining over 
wages, conditions, and disciplinary hearings. For this brief moment, both corrections 
administrators and the Prisoners’ Union saw the possibility and appeal of sharing power and 
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responsibility for administering prisons.   
In January of 1976 the administrators were about to introduce this plan to a wider group 
of corrections personnel when the California Correctional Officers Association (CCOA) got 
wind of it. Enraged, the union that represented correction officers released the proposal to the 
press, accompanied by a scathing attack. They threatened to strike if such a plan were 
implemented and demanded the resignation of the director of corrections and the secretary of 
health and welfare for even considering such an “insane” and “idiotic” idea. Almost every major 
news outlet in California—and some national programs—carried the story, paired with the 
indignant comments of wardens and superintendents furious about the proposal. “Law-and-
order” politicians soon joined the fray. H. L. “Bill” Richardson, state senator and Republican 
whip, who had made crime his signature issue, told the press, “Any appointee who has actively 
helped in this insane effort should be fired…We’re talking about Bolsheviks, inside and outside 
who want to foment as much internal strife in this country as they possibly can.”555 While CDC 
administrators probably negotiated with the Prisoners’ Union because they saw the organization 
as a moderate alternative to revolutionary prisoners advocating armed resistance, conservative 
legislators labeled all prisoner activism dangerous and saw dialoguing with them as treasonous.  
 The political fallout of the leaked plan immediately shut down the negotiations to allow 
Prisoners’ Union organizing in one institution. The union interpreted the resistance as politically 
motivated “calculated hysteria” but also saw a deeper significance in the refusal to grant inmates 
authority within prisons. An article in The Outlaw explained,  
A more formidable obstacle, however, is an insidious, mistaken notion which we 
strongly believe is at the root of the prison administrations’ unwillingness to 
accept the proposed plan. This is the belief that prisoners are fundamentally 
inferior. They are either dangerous animals or mostly weak people subject to 
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domination by the few dangerous animals. They are, according to this view, 
incapable of participating in sustained, responsible action and becoming dignified, 
honorable human beings.556 
 
According to this analysis, corrections employees rejected the notion that prisoners were capable 
of reasoned civic participation, especially for the responsibilities of self-government. For 
inmates, the adamant refusal to acknowledge their capacity for “responsible action” or being 
“capable human beings” underlined the hypocrisy of the Department of Corrections’ claims of 
facilitating rehabilitation and reintegration into the polity. Reiterating a familiar theme, prisoners 
equated being excluded from full citizenship with being permanent outsiders who were perceived 
as less than human.  
 The Prisoners’ Union, however, retained more faith in the political system than the 
officials had in them. In an Outlaw piece entitled “Prisoner Organizations Are Inevitable,” the 
author advanced a whiggish understanding of history, where prisoners and other marginalized 
groups would inevitably gain greater rights and respect.  
One of the few consistent trends over the past few decades has been a slow, very 
painful, but steady increase in the rights of people formerly excluded from any 
decision making arena. The struggle is no less intense now; the outcome in any 
single situation is problematic, but overall the extension of power to more and 
more people cannot be stopped… 
Two hundred years ago, the only people who could vote were white male 
landowners who were not in prison. The requirements that a person own property, 
be of a particular race or a favored sex have been dropped; only those classed as 
felons remain disenfranchised. The process of extending basic recognition to 
prisoners has begun—100 years ago a Judge in Virginia could correctly say that 
prisoner forfeit all rights save the right to breathe.  
Things are different now. Whether we will be the particular agents who 
enable a union of prisoners is an open question, dependent on forces larger than 
our energies or hopes. What is not open is the increased recognition of the 
humanity of people locked inside, and of what is necessary if they are to remain 
fully human; this includes the right to organize around the problems common to 
all.557 
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This faith in the certainty of progress through struggle was probably common among activists on 
the left. For prisoners, it carried a potential risk. Throughout the efforts to expand inmates’ rights 
and reform California’s prisons and sentencing procedures, the momentum seemed to be on the 
side of “progress.” For many, the notion that events could reverse course or policy could move in 
a more restrictive direction did not seem to be a serious threat. Prisoners and their allies often 
saw the long-term struggle as between the discredited status quo of liberalism and the inevitable 
expansion of marginalized people’s autonomy. Most contemporary commentators also assumed 
that the United States was poised to decrease reliance on all institutions of overt social control, 
especially the prison.558 Few anticipated the era of unprecedented mass incarceration and 
dramatic constriction of inmate rights that was around the corner.  
Simultaneously, “law-and-order” advocates—particularly corrections employees— 
attacked prisoners’ new rights in the hopes of recalibrating the balance of power within 
institutions and in politics generally. Prison guards and wardens, enraged by perceived attacks on 
their authority from both their bureaucratic managers and the prisoners they guarded, became an 
increasingly organized, influential force. While inmate activists proceeded on the assumption 
that society would inevitably expand rights and widen inclusion in society, law-enforcement 
interests joined with conservative forces; they were determined not merely to return to the status 
quo by rolling back inmates’ recent gains, but actually to remake the penal landscape altogether. 
Instead of integrating prisoners into society, “law-and-order” reformers operated on the premise 
that law-abiding citizens were diametrically separate from criminal elements. Emboldened by 
their success at derailing the Prisoners' Union’s plan, wardens and the Correctional Association 
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became more effective at rhetorically positioning their interests as synonymous with the public’s, 
depicting themselves as the tough, manly antidote to the violent chaos on the streets and within 
prisons.  
 The calls for punitive crime-control strategies by elites developed dialectically with 
discourse among the general populace. Those conceptualizations and arguments that resonated 
were repeated incessantly, eventually solidifying into mantras that echoed persistently 
throughout these debates. The themes appeared and reappeared in citizen letters, politicians’ 
speeches, newspapers, and conversations at family dinner tables and employee lunchrooms. 
Proclamations about the need for tougher, more punitive responses to social disorder were most 
remarkable for their redundancy and consistency. People reported feeling endangered and 
enraged at the government’s failure to protect them, which they equated with being robbed of 
their citizenship rights. They accused the state of protecting the rights of criminals and other 
outsiders at the expense of “tax-paying” and “law-abiding citizens.” Letter writers were 
indignant about a topsy-turvy world where the wrong people had rights and protections. In one 
representative letter, a woman explained:  
I think we have cried long and hard for the criminal, it is about time for the 
victims whose families weep in silence while the American Civil Liberties Union 
and ambulance chasing lawyers get front page coverage for the poor deprived, 
lonely, persecuted criminal who may finally serve some time in a correctional 
facility after having been picked up perhaps two dozen times for various 
offences…I certainly don’t believe housing them in country clubs and spoon 
feeding them will ever make worthwhile citizens out of a criminal, particularly 
those involved in violent crime.559 
 
 The writer explicitly rejected the notion that decent prison conditions or therapeutic programs 
could “make worthwhile citizens.” The letter did not propose that a tougher approach would be 
more effective at reforming criminals, but instead rejected the possibility of ever making 
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criminals into citizens.  
Embedded in this type of critique was profound hostility to reliance upon therapy, 
rehabilitation, or structural reform to address crime. Many commentators insisted that attending 
to “root causes” was counterproductive; they argued that emboldening and coddling criminals 
actually made the problems worse. An editorial that articulated this logic ran in the Herald 
Examiner:  
It has seemed that while more and more dollars have been allocated to crime 
prevention programs, and a greater emphasis at all levels of government on social 
services which address themselves to alleviating the conditions on which the 
criminal element thrives, we have witnessed not only more violations of the law, 
but a tendency toward more violence in the acts committed.560  
 
Therefore, therapeutic approaches to criminality were not merely ineffective, but actually 
exacerbated violence and crime. Such letters portrayed social services as harmful, even 
jeopardizing the safety and security of law-abiding communities. Instead of expanding the 
groups within society that possessed full rights and autonomy, people felt that authorities’ 
attention to marginalized, racialized populations constricted the rights of average citizens. This 
zero-sum understanding of rights suggests that many people’s claims to full citizenship were 
predicated upon its denial to other groups. The sentiment that the state no longer served the right 
people was particularly resonant in an era marked by government interventions (however 
limited) on behalf of women, people of color, and other traditionally marginalized groups. A 
couple wrote to Senator Nejedly: “It is time we become less concerned with the rights of the 
criminal, and more concerned with the rights of the innocent victims…We all know it is an 
erosion of the rights of the people to be protected…Today wrong is right in the eyes of too many 
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of our government who make the laws.”561 A letter to the editor echoed this same theme: “It is 
high time to reexamine our criminal laws and legal procedures and put the emphasis where it 
belongs—on the rights of all law-abiding citizens of California who are the direct or indirect 
victims of crime.”562 In this language, people asserted rights to state resources and protections by 
virtue of their position as normative, tax-paying, law-abiding, productive workers. Positioning 
claims to full citizenship protection in this way negated the entitlement of other groups. It 
rhetorically excluded marginalized populations just at the moment when these boundaries were 
so heavily contested.  
 In another letter to Senator Nejedly, a man wrote that after eight armed robberies and 
eight burglaries, he was the “record holder in the City of Pittsburgh as a victim of crime.” He 
explained: 
I’m writing to you in a cry for help, not only for myself but for thousands of other 
citizens...I’m going to work armed, even at home…My question is What 
happened to our laws which is supposed to protect all citizens? Are our today’s 
leaders getting soft? Some of them seem more concerned about the welfare of our 
prisoners, (bums, radicals, etc, etc,) then us who are trying to make a honest 
living. We need men with guts in today’s society, to stand up and show us that we 
also have rights, also the right to work in peace without looking over our 
shoulders or keeping our fingers on the trigger...All I and others want is to live in 
peace without fear.563  
 
While it is not surprising that this person became enraged after 16 robberies, it is interesting to 
note his particular analysis of these events, which featured politicians’ cowardice, “soft”-ness, 
and lack of guts as the cause of crime, essentially charging elites with lacking manly prowess 
and resolve. This discourse framed efforts to address the root causes of crime and enhance the 
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rights of marginalized citizens—especially prisoners—as effete and wimpy. The writer deplored 
that fact that everyday citizens were forced to step into this void of masculine leadership and 
protect their families and property by arming themselves. When elites presented their policy 
recommendations in ways that aligned with or reinforced these increasingly prevalent themes, 
they captured much popular support and political momentum.  
  Despite the gathering strength of their political adversaries, the prisoners’ rights 
movement and the Prisoners’ Union remained adamant in their support of SB42 during the 
following legislative session. This support persisted even as the political process exacted new 
compromises with law enforcement. During the 1976 session, SB42 encountered virtually no 
opposition. After California courts struck down Directive 75/20, Governor Jerry Brown 
abandoned his efforts at administrative reform and supported the bill. He and his staff played a 
critical role mediating conflicts and building compromise legislation palatable to all the parties 
involved.  
 While many prisoners and their advocates were undoubtedly ecstatic about Governor 
Brown’s intervention and SB42’s resurgence, close observers saw his involvement with the bill 
as more complex. Brown was certainly not motivated by an affinity with those behind bars. 
Although the right reviled Brown as a typical liberal, his record on criminal justice was actually 
quite different. In an oral history, Alan Kline, Brown’s Legal Affairs Secretary between 1975 
and 1980, explained that the governor was not at all inclined to spend political capital on 
prisoners: “Jerry Brown was not a bleeding heart liberal. I know there were a lot of people who 
think that he must have been or were sure that he was, but let me assure you—and I was there—
when it came to sentencing issues, Jerry Brown was not a liberal.”564 Although he would not 
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drive punitive trends to the extent Rockefeller did in New York, Brown aligned staunchly with 
“law-and-order” positions on criminal policy.565    
There were others who anticipated that determinate sentencing could create problems for 
the left. Some political operatives warned against granting politicians sentencing authority, 
fearing that they would be subject to public pressure to increase punishment. In analysis of the 
bill, committee staff prophetically acknowledged the potential dangers. They wrote: “the 
Legislature has been a reactive body in the area of criminal sentences. Other than in the case of 
marijuana, there has been no significant legislation that attempts to reduce sentences.”566 The 
sentencing reforms also enhanced prosecutors’ power, since they chose whether or not to charge 
the enhancements that lengthened sentences for factors such as prior offenses or using a firearm. 
The legislative staff recognized that these proposed reforms did not remove discretion and 
arbitrariness from the sentencing process, as the bill’s proponents claimed. Instead, it changed 
the locus of decision making from parole boards to prosecutors: “The ultimate sentencer 
becomes the Prosecutor who decides the length of sentence by the enhancements he alleges.”567 
Others also saw risks associated with SB42. Michael Dufficy, the attorney who defended one of 
the San Quentin Six who were charged in the confrontation where George Jackson was killed, 
told a reporter, “I think there is no question that this bill is going to backfire for the liberals and 
the radicals.”568 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
to spend political capital, see page 22. 
565 Despite signing legislation that made punishment the principal function of incarceration, Brown did not totally 
abandon the notion that prisons could facilitate rehabilitation. Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag, p. 92. 
566 “Staff Concerns and Proposals over SB42,” April 7, 1976, Assembly Criminal Justice Committee, SB42, LP319: 
68, CSA.  
567
 Ibid. 
568
 Mary Leydecker, “Many Not Cheering New Sentencing Bill,” San Rafael Independent, September 2, 1976,  
Corrections Administration News Digests: 1976, F3717: 1638, CSA.   
 248 
“The Purpose of Imprisonment for Crime is Punishment:” California’s Legislature Enacts 
Determinate Sentencing 
 
In negotiations over the final version of SB42, there was little resistance to abolishing the 
indeterminate sentence, which was politically and legally unviable by 1976. The debate centered 
instead on the appropriate length of the fixed sentences, an ironic stumbling block considering 
that once lawmakers gained control over term lengths, there was no obstacle to constantly 
revising them. Kline explained this dynamic in his oral history interview:  
But once you took the power to set sentences away from the Adult Authority and 
placed it in the legislature, you were giving the legislature the ability to lengthen 
sentences. You also gave it the ability to shorten sentences, but it’s politically 
unrealistic to think they would ever do that, and to my knowledge they have 
not.569  
 
By keeping prison terms roughly consistent with California’s earlier averages, the final bill 
maintained the compromise between competing interests and resisted pressure to either lengthen 
or shorten prison terms.  
 On August 4, 1976, SB42 easily passed the committee that had stalled its passage the 
previous year. Pressure from the Prisoners’ Union and the governor’s involvement nullified any 
incentive for the Democratic members to scuttle the legislation. The Assembly’s Criminal Justice 
Committee voted four to one in favor of SB42. Alan Sieroty cast the only opposing vote, 
claiming that the law opened the door to a dangerous cycle in which lawmakers would 
perpetually extend sentences in response to public pressure or political motivations.570 After 
further compromises, the bill finally passed both houses. On September 20, 1976, Governor 
Brown signed the groundbreaking determinate sentencing law and three other anti-crime bills at 
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a press event surrounded by law enforcement officials.571 The prisoners and their allies, who had 
been so instrumental in the bills’ passage, were nowhere to be seen.  
 The new bill abolished the Adult Authority and the Women’s Board of Terms and Parole, 
and replaced the indeterminate sentence with a fixed, or determinate, sentencing system. The law 
aimed to standardize sentences and equalize the amount of time people served when they were 
convicted of similar crimes. Implicit in this endeavor was the discursive abandonment of the 
decades-long rehabilitative mission of prisons. The law spelled out this unprecedented 
conversion with its famous declaration: “the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.” 
Retribution was now the official motive for incarceration in California.572  
The final version of the law replaced the discretion of the parole board with a middle, 
lower, and upper term for each felony. Unless mitigating or aggravating factors existed, the 
judge was expected to sentence offenders to the middle term. Prison terms could be extended if 
prosecutors chose to charge any of the enhancements available for a variety of factors, such as 
previous convictions or the use of a firearm during the crime. The law instituted “good time,” a 
standard one-third reduction in sentence length for good behavior in prison. Most offenders faced 
a single year of parole upon release from prison. The Community Release Board replaced parole 
boards. The new board’s authority was limited to decisions about parole suspension, “good time” 
reductions in prison terms, and release dates for inmates serving life sentences (which remained 
indeterminate).573 
 Most inmates and prisoner advocates celebrated the passage of the SB42. Abolishing 
indeterminate sentencing and discrediting the therapeutic ideal were considered great victories, 
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unthinkable only a decade earlier. Yet, early on, some prisoners warned that the particulars of the 
bill were not as favorable as many imagined. An inmate journalist cautioned his readers against 
unrealistic expectations in the California Medical Facility’s newspaper:  
From talk on the yard there seems to be as many interpretations of SB42 as there 
are convicts. Unfortunately, many cons are extracting from the bill that part which 
is most favorable, blinding themselves to the various negative provisions. For 
instance, SB42 does not provide for a mandated mass exodus of overdue convicts 
on July 1, 1977…Beware your local jailhouse lawyer, as he may subject you to a 
bitter disappointment later on…Anyone who truly believes that SB42 is light stuff 
should re-read the bill. It may be great for first-timers, but don’t come back for 
seconds…certainly not thirds.”574 
In this and other pieces, inmates ruminated over the new statutes, searching hopefully for clues 
about how the new law would affect their fates. Although most prisoners welcomed the end of 
indeterminate sentencing, some also anticipated that the full import of the new legislation was 
not yet evident. 
 Before the bill was even signed by the governor, conservative and “law-and-order” 
interests began attacking SB42 for being overly lenient on prisoners. Motivated in part by the 
looming 1978 elections, politicians portrayed the bill’s prison terms as dangerously short and 
warned of disastrous consequence should officials issue fixed release dates for the thousands of 
inmates sentenced under the old indeterminate system. They rushed to call for repeal, revisions, 
and amendments that would make penal policy better protect the public. Republican State 
Senator H. L. Bill Richardson started the Law and Order Campaign Committee, a direct mail 
fundraising organization devoted to unseating “soft-on-crime” legislators.575 The first 
organization of its type nationally, Richardson’s new campaign committee hoped to channel 
public concern about rising crime to the political and financial advantage of conservative 
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legislators. This massive direct mail apparatus positioned conservative lawmakers as the manly 
protectors of public security, generated an influx of new funds, and discouraged lawmakers’ 
opposition to “law-and-order” bills at the state capitol. It would become an increasingly powerful 
and feared force in California politics in the coming years.  
 Senate Bill 42 also became a pawn in the upcoming gubernatorial election battles. Ed 
Davis, the tough-talking, controversial chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, retired from 
the force and made a bid to become the Republican nominee for governor. His likely rival, 
Evelle J. Younger, also had a law-enforcement background, having served as Los Angeles 
County District Attorney before becoming State Attorney General in 1971. Younger was 
certainly not aligned with prisoners’ rights groups; he supported mandatory life sentences and 
declared in 1975 that, “I’d rather run the risk of keeping the wrong man a little longer than let the 
wrong man out too soon.”576 But Younger had supported SB42, which became a political 
liability. In a series of public pronouncements and opinion editorials, Davis relentlessly attacked 
the provisions in SB42 that required corrections employees to assign release dates for inmates 
serving indeterminate sentences. Referring to those prisoners held far beyond the average term 
for their respective crimes, he claimed that this policy would release into the population a torrent 
of particularly violent felons who should instead be warehoused indefinitely by the state. In an 
influential and provocative Los Angeles Times opinion editorial, Davis wrote: “A new escape 
tunnel has been dug for San Quentin prisoners, but this one had the help of the Governor and the 
Legislature. Because of this tunnel, you can expect a sharp increase in violent crime. More than 
56% of the most violent and vicious criminals presently warehoused in state institutions will be 
released.” In case there was any doubt about whether Davis was trying to generate panic, he 
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continued: “Does that scare the hell out of you? Well, it should!” He portrayed this “prison 
break” as worse than mere bungling, charging the governor and courts with recklessly and 
deliberately endangering law-abiding citizens: 
On one side of that door are the predators of society: while on the other side, in 
the relative quiet of our communities, lie the potential victims—fearful of possible 
intrusion. Who is going to provide these potential victims with compassion?...At 
the center of this turnstile sit the executive and legislative branches of 
government. Will these representatives of the people continue to add grease to the 
doors of justice?577  
 
With this rhetoric, Davis played upon (and, in turn, escalated) fear of crime, while insinuating 
that he had the experience and resolve to protect the public from criminal predators and their 
unwitting accomplices: the executive and legislative branches of government.  
 Although Davis’s claims were hyperbolic, his attacks on SB42 effectively painted 
Attorney General Younger and Governor Brown into a corner as “soft on crime.”578 Both now 
called for changes to the law. Senator Nejedly accused the candidates of knuckling under to 
Chief Davis’s “vituperative” attacks. “These hysterics are all posturing to get some preeminence 
as the architect of law and order,” he told the San Francisco Chronicle. “The governor’s caught 
in the political maelstrom. Like the AG [Attorney General Younger], suddenly he’s got problems 
with the bill.”579 These political realities did not escape inmates, who continued to watch policy 
developments very closely. An analysis written for the prisoners’ newspaper at California 
Medical Facility explained the risks: “Considering that 1978 is an election year, and the political 
ambitions of the pervert from Los Angeles [Ed Davis], SB42 could become a political football 
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with Chief Davis playing quarterback.”580  
 With SB42 already passed, lawmakers scrambled to modify the law before it became 
effective on July 1, 1977. Much of the controversy zeroed in on the provisions concerning 
issuing release dates to inmates who still had open-ended sentences. Critics charged that the law 
triggered the release of criminals parole boards had deemed too dangerous to release after 
serving the average prison terms for their crimes. Governor Brown attempted to head off these 
attacks by forwarding his own revision, or “clean-up” legislation. Representative Daniel 
Boatwright introduced Assembly Bill 476 (AB476). Boatwright was a Democratic member of 
the Assembly and former deputy district attorney for Contra Costa County who championed 
“tough positions” on crime. Although the sponsors resisted pressure to increase SB42’s base 
prison terms, the law amended the cap on enhancements and limits on consecutive terms, thus 
enlarging the discretion of prosecutors to further lengthen sentences.581 It extended the routine 
parole supervision from one year to 18 months. It also altered the retroactive sentencing of those 
who were being held under the indeterminate sentences. The Boatwright Bill [AB476] 
empowered authorities to review, revise, and postpone the “tentative” release dates that 
Community Release Boards had begun issuing upon the passage of SB42.582  
Politicians’ rush to amend SB42 was clearly motivated by the new attacks characterizing 
the bill as overly lenient. One typical newspaper article read: “The proposed changes follow 
accusations by some law enforcement officials that sentences in the new law, scheduled to take 
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effect this July, are too soft.”583 As opposed to discussing the punishments merely in terms of 
length (i.e., too long or too short), reporters and officials more frequently cast the bill as “soft” 
and overly indulgent. Depicting state programs, officials, and policy in such gendered terms 
instantly linked with larger themes in public discourse that disparaged welfare-state programs by 
portraying them as weak, effeminate, and therefore, generally ineffective.  On a more concrete 
level, politicians, and Governor Brown in particular, wanted to avoid the political debacle that 
would undoubtedly ensue if any prisoners released under the new law were to commit any 
newsworthy crimes. Some critics suspected that lawmakers were planning to simply postpone 
release dates until after the 1978 elections.584  
 While the right attacked AB476 as insufficiently severe, the architects of SB42 were 
alarmed to see the policy they had championed and carefully crafted careen off course so 
suddenly. Raymond Parnas, one of the two principal drafters and negotiators of SB42, wrote a 
detailed analysis of these developments in the Sacramento Bee. He explained that SB42 was 
careful, rationally deliberated legislation resulting from two years of debate, public hearings, 
negotiations, and study, and eight different drafts. Boatwright’s legislation, on the other hand, 
was hurriedly assembled and informed by little more than political pressures. At his article’s 
conclusion, Parnas acknowledged that he and his allies had failed to anticipate the full 
consequences of transferring sentencing authority to politicians. He confessed that the liberal 
Senator Alan Sieroty, one of the SB42’s few opponents, had anticipated this dynamic: “I would, 
however, hate to admit that Senator Alan Sieroty was right in distrusting the collective ability of 
his legislative brethren to withstand the pressures of the multitude for perpetually higher 
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penalties.”585 Senator Nejedly also recognized that the shifting political landscape spelled serious 
problems for the delicate compromises in his determinate sentencing law. He wrote to one 
constituent that, “the whole subject of crime and lengths of incarceration has become a political 
football which threatens the very existence of SB42. I think it is clear that some measure 
‘toughening SB42’ will pass, or we will most certainly face a repeal or initiative measure 
drastically increasing sentences.”586 In another letter responding to a woman concerned about the 
cost and effectiveness of the longer sentences in AB476, Nejedly again warned of the gathering 
strength of “law-and-order” proponents:  
While harboring serious reservations about the contents of AB476, I have even 
greater reservations about attempts by law enforcement groups and individual 
legislators to “toughen” the bill still further…Given the political clout of judges, 
district attorneys, sheriffs, police and other law enforcement groups, and the 
existing political climate, perhaps a bill such as AB476 was inevitable.  
 
Emphasizing his conviction that longer sentences, while appearing “tough,” did nothing to 
reduce crime, Nejedly continued, “I can only hope that as our prisons become overcrowded and 
crime remains unabated we will discard the fallacious belief that longer prison terms will 
somehow make our streets and homes safer.”587 
 The changes heralded by AB476 were most alarming for prisoners themselves. Inmates 
reacted immediately to the proposed legislation, recognizing the implications for the material 
conditions of their captivity and for the larger cultural milieu. In a letter to Senator Way 
opposing AB476, the Prisoners’ Unions’ Willie Holder expressed a sense of betrayal by the 
legislative process.  
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SB42 evolved over a two year period of intense discussions with the author, 
liberal and conservative politicians, law enforcement, judicial associations, 
community groups, and the Governor. During these two years there were many 
compromises—all in good faith. Good faith like good will must withstand 
enormous pressure and requires strong convictions of a basic principle of equity. 
It is a highly unethical practice for the Governor to duck the leadership necessary 
to give what we and many others see as a compromise legislation, at best, a 
chance to work.588 
  
Holder’s comments suggest that the new bill violated the rules of fair play. Prisoners’ Union 
members felt double-crossed as the concessions they secured through hard compromises and 
relentless organizing were quickly swept away.  
One letter to Assemblyman Charles Maddy, the chair of Assembly Criminal Justice 
Committee, expressed a similar sense of betrayal by convicts’ sudden expulsion from the 
political dialogue concerning their fates. The author asked, “First, why were over 9,000 letters 
from prisoners, their families, and other concerned groups used to help SB42 through the 
legislative process, and now that the Boatwright Bill [AB476] proposes to completely rewrite 
SB42…no one is asking for our input or feelings?”589 The letter pointed to the wider trend where 
inmate voices had become less legitimate and less audible as policy recommendations became 
more punitive.  
The same writer spoke to the personal torment and disillusionment that resulted from 
extending the tentative release dates issued after SB42’s passage. The inmate requested that the 
governor and Representative Boatwright “tell my wife and children that I have to serve these 
added years of imprisonment because of the coming gubernatorial race and that it’s nothing 
personal toward me. I can’t explain it, all they know is that I received a ‘tentative date’ and that 
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Daddy is coming home.”590 Over and over again, inmates’ letters attempted to impress upon 
legislators the impact of suddenly revising release dates, especially for their families and friends 
on the outside. Another man wrote to Representative Maddy: 
Do you have any idea how much SB42 meant to people like myself? Or how we 
have counted the days since last August 31st, waiting for the time to creep by until 
the first of July this year and a chance to be free again?…Can you imagine the 
resentment this kind of disappointment will cause among the men in prison 
expecting to go home this summer?...We are people too, with the same feelings as 
everyone else, and we can differentiate between justice and injustice. I’ve never 
gotten mad about any of the years I’ve spent in prison yet, because I knew what I 
was doing when I broke the law, so I could not rightly complain about paying for 
my actions.591  
 
Their letters suggest that inmates thought they were in a reciprocal relationship with the 
state, where both sides had rights and responsibilities. Many seemed to accept prison terms as 
punishment for breaching this covenant, but were dismayed when they felt lawmakers violated 
this social contract by readily exchanging years of prisoners’ lives for political gain. Prisoners 
resisted being silenced and used as pawns in battles that sacrificed their interests for lawmakers’ 
gain. A public letter sent by more than 500 inmates at the California Medical Facility denounced 
AB476 as cynical maneuvering and all the more objectionable because it betrayed prisoners’ 
nascent faith in the system.  
California prisoners have waited many years for an alternate system that would 
remove the inhumane and debilitating cloud of indeterminancy from our lives. 
Time and time again we of the convicted classes and our families have been used 
and manipulated in this political and economic game of chess in which human 
beings are considered expendable by those forces in control of this society. After 
years of struggle, bloody riots, demonstrations, and the death of many of us, we 
finally ceded to those who asked up to stop using violence and to learn to work 
within the system. From that point many compromises were made in order that 
SB42 could become a reality…There are many reasons why the prisons of this 
state and this country remain full, but you know and we know that prisons are not 
full because of any soft or “PERMISSIVE” laws. We also know that the public 
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will not be any better protected by longer prison sentences nor will punishment 
ever act as a deterrent to crime or unwanted social behavior.592 
  
Just as prisoners entered the public sphere as legitimate voices on matters that concerned their 
own custody, they thought that disingenuous politicking dashed their incipient trust in the 
political process and expelled them from dialogue. Inmates objected to the wanton disregard of 
their time, interests, and loved ones. To counter the persistent rhetorical erasure of their ties to 
society, they continually highlighted their connections to their communities, especially to family. 
They repeatedly asserted their own humanity and notions of justice, both of which they felt were 
compromised by law-and-order politics. One man explained:  
People tend to talk about years out of a person’s life as if it were nothing, every 
day in prison is hard…and when you talk about 8, 10, and 12 years it’s an eternity 
of misery. I’ve neither killed nor hurt anyone yet to be told that 13 years isn’t a 
full pound of flesh, and that I have to give 3 or 4 more years to support a 
politicians’ platform and further his political career, is neither fair nor just and 
only breeds negative and resentment.593  
 
Frustration extended beyond disappointment with the policy changes proposed in AB476. 
Writers resented that their opinions and fates were so flagrantly, and deliberately, disregarded. 
They were alarmed by political elites’ rhetoric that renounced state accountability to prisoners 
and implied further exclusion from the polity.  
Many letters warned of the consequences of betraying prisoners’ trust and already 
strained faith in the justice of the legal system. Forty men imprisoned in Chino sent an open 
letter to Senator Nejedly, which opposed the proposed postponement of implementing SB42. 
They explained: “At Governor Brown’s words, we were told SB42 would come into effect on 
July 1, 1977. We told our families. Plans were made. Now we might have to tell them, all the 
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hopes were for nothing…Some people ask why there is no faith in the system. Need we say more 
to understand?”594 One inmate warned that, “The added years of punishment after we have 
received ‘tentative’ release dates under the provisions of a bill that was legally passed and signed 
into law—will, no doubt, cause an uproar and an injustice that will be remembered for years to 
come.”595 If politicians would not reconsider the punitive policies for benevolent motivations, 
this writer suggested that they might do so in the interest of maintaining peace within 
institutions. 
 In an effort to reason with policymakers, some inmates’ correspondence painstakingly 
explained the realities of how policies operated in their daily lives. In response to the provisions 
in AB476 that extended the period of parole supervision for ex-convicts, one man wrote at length 
about how parole actually functioned to prevent independence and reintegration into society as a 
law-abiding citizen. 
A lot of people will advise you that a longer parole term is necessary to control 
and guide the men released from prison. This is the opposite of the truth. The 
parole system does not exist to help the parolee remain out of prison. Its actual 
function, regardless of what anyone may say to the contrary is to perpetuate a 
high rate of recidivism and keep the prisons filled…I could go straight and work, 
and get along fine, even on escape or when I was a bailbond fugitive. But a parole 
is such a handicap that I could not make it. They always insisted that I had to tell 
my employer about my past. The only jobs I could get was when I lied, or did not 
reveal my past, and I was fired when my parole officer told my employer the 
truth. On each parole, I was unemployed for months, until I gave up and took off. 
Then I started robbing again.596  
 
Inmates were acutely aware of the political pressures motivating revisions to SB42. If lawmakers 
were going to ignore prisoners’ perspectives, inmates argued that they should at least consider 
the studies and academic knowledge produced by other elites. Their letters expressed indignation 
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at the chasm between specialists’ knowledge and the policy recommendations that grew out of 
the legislators’ inflammatory rhetoric. One wrote, “We all know that AB476 is politically 
motivated, it is not based on any recommendations from learned bodies or national commissions, 
nor have the proposed amendments resulted from study, analysis, of public hearings.”597 
Opponents of AB 476 repeatedly decried the pretense of claiming that harsher punishment 
improved public safety. A prisoner-rights activist echoed prisoners’ accusations: “The real 
reason why you legislators want to change SB42 is because of the scare tactics who have hit 
more newspapers. You do not hear organizations and people like myself who know—as you 
do—that long-term punishment is not and never has been a deterrent.”598   
 Despite this fervent opposition, AB476 easily passed both chambers of the legislature. 
With little debate, the Senate approved the law by 27 votes to six. In the Assembly, 59 approved 
passage and only one opposed the measure.599 Governor Brown signed AB476 into law as 
emergency legislation on June 29, 1977, just two days before SB42 went into effect. This bill, 
however, did little to alleviate the political pressures on the Brown administration, which was 
now attacked from the right for failing to increase penalties sufficiently, and from the left for 
succumbing to pressure from law enforcement. Again framing the debate in gendered terms of 
strength and weakness, Chief Davis attacked AB476 as a “sell out,” rejecting the claim that 
Boatwright’s law “toughened” SB42 as “absolute malarkey.”600  
Inmates resisted the new policy in every forum they could. In addition to writing 
lawmakers and coordinating advocacy with groups such as the Prisoners’ Union, they organized 
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fundraising drives within various California prisons in order to hire lawyers to challenge AB476 
in the courts. For example, a committee organized more than sixty men to solicit donations on 
their respective floors at California Men’s Colony, raising more than $3,000 to challenge the 
constitutionality of AB476.601 Prisoners found the courts no more sympathetic to their pleas than 
the legislative branch, and AB476 went into effect without significant hindrances. The policy 
effectively prevented the feared exodus of criminals and kept release rates low.602 
Confronted with these changes and the increasing calls for “law and order” in mainstream 
politics, some inmates began to reevaluate or nuance the fervent rejection of the rehabilitative 
ideal. One in-depth commentary ran in the institutional paper of California Men’s Colony and 
warrants being quoted at length. The article started by revisiting why rehabilitation had fallen 
from favor so suddenly:  
Across the country, the death knell is being sounded for rehabilitation programs in 
our prisons. Conservatives, who have always opposed the concept of 
rehabilitation, are watching in silent satisfaction as liberals and academics rush to 
recant their faith in the ability of psychiatrists and psychologists to alleviate 
prisoners’ antisocial tendencies. Once derided as barbaric and ineffectual, 
punishment is making a strong comeback as the radical-chic answer to the 
problem of crime in American…Meanwhile, prisoner-rights groups complain that 
existing rehabilitation programs are, more often than not, forced on them. Such 
programs, they also charge, have turned prisons into an Orwellian nightmare 
where inmates, denied firm date for getting out, are reduced to playing endless 
games to prove that they have achieved “insight” into the psychic causes of their 
crimes. 
 
After acknowledging why rehabilitation lost support, the author warned of the dangers of 
discrediting therapeutic rationales for incarceration.  
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True, the time is long overdue to limit this power of psychiatrists and 
psychologists in deciding, almost single handedly, who goes to prison and how 
long they stay there. These “experts” should also be deterred from forcing their 
wares on a-quite literally—captive audience…However, it should be clearly 
understood that treatment has always been the exception rather than the rule. Most 
of the time “rehabilitation” has just been a convenient excuse for placing 
enormous discretion in the hands of prison officials...Yet the hasty retreat from 
the excesses and overpromises of the “rehabilitative ideal” poses a serious danger 
not only for prisoners after their release but also for the larger society. The danger 
is that legislators at both federal and state levels will seek to cut expenditures and 
balance budgets by seizing on the current climate of pessimism about 
rehabilitation to justify eliminating even the woefully inadequate amount of 
treatment now being provided.603 
 
These warnings proved prophetic. While inmates appreciated being liberated from the arbitrary 
power of parole boards, they faced a climate that was increasingly hostile to providing them 
basic educational, recreational, and social services. Discrediting the rehabilitative ideal also 
coincided with the growing opposition to convicts’ civic participation and inclusion in the polity.  
Prison Guards Revolt at Susanville 
AB476 did little to mollify “law-and-order” advocates. It was an abortive attempt to stave off 
even more punitive policy, and a harbinger of things to come. And these trends were not 
confined to the legislature. As law-enforcement interests gathered strength in Sacramento, 
corrections employees struggled to assert more total control of prisons by wresting away 
authority from prisoners and upper-level bureaucratic management.  
Events at the rural prison in Susanville in 1977 sent a powerful message throughout 
California’s prison system. The confrontations there illustrated the ongoing struggles to 
recalibrate the balance of power within prisons in the aftermath of social mobilizations around 
carceral issues. Previously a lower-security conservation camp, Susanville became a medium-
security prison after local citizens fiercely opposed CDC plans to close the institution in 1973. 
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The atmosphere at the prison was particularly tense, especially as the overwhelmingly black and 
Latino inmates clashed with the predominantly white workforce. On February 9, 1977, inmates 
organized a peaceful work stoppage to protest prison conditions and policy. Guards reacted 
violently, breaking the strike with riot sticks and almost 120 rounds of rifle ammunition. The 
attack injured ten inmates, three from gunfire. Scandal erupted when the Department of 
Corrections’ investigation into the incident blamed racism, terrible conditions, and failure to 
implement affirmative action programs for the confrontation. “Law-and-order” advocates and 
corrections employees were horrified by this public rebuke, especially the CDC’s move to 
discipline twelve guards involved in the clash.604 Enraged officers retaliated by organizing their 
own work action, and more than 160 guards staged a sickout to protest the investigation 
specifically and affirmative action programs and expanded inmate rights more generally.605 In 
public comments, the California Correctional Officers Association (CCOA) charged that CDC 
administrators were in “cahoots” with the Prisoners’ Union and had “shifted the staff’s authority 
to the inmates.”606 By presenting the guards’ union as a check on the excesses of prisoners and 
CDC management, the CCOA enhanced its authority within institutions and its influence on 
public debates over the new directions in penal practice. The fact that guards were struggling to 
assert control over prisons was not secret. Assistant Director of Corrections Phil Guthrie 
explained to the Sacramento Bee, “There’s a feeling, although sometimes it’s vague, that 
changes in society and how prisons are run have caused a loss of control and reduced their 
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[guards’] authority.”607 As the new determinate sentencing policy diminished therapists and 
parole boards’ authority, guards struggled for dominance in the new balance of power emerging 
within prisons. Through aggressive organizing and rhetorically positioning themselves as 
protecting “the public’s” interest in safety and order, law enforcement (and the CCOA in 
particular) became increasingly influential in criminal-justice debates.608 
 Prisoners’ efforts to remain viable civic participants suffered other blows as the decade 
wound to a close. For years, courts heard arguments about inmates’ right to unionize, and in 
1977, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned two lower-level decisions issued in North Carolina, 
and ruled that prisoners had no guaranteed right to form a union. In their dissent, Justices 
Marshall and Brennan called the court’s move “a giant step backwards” to “a time not so very 
long ago when prisoners were regarded as slaves of the state.”609 In choosing this language, the 
justices, perhaps unwittingly, echoed prisoners’ and activists’ analyses that asserted a continuum 
between race slavery and a legal system that disproportionately incarcerated people of color. 
This court decision dashed the already-waning hopes for inmates’ collective representation and 
an organized, independent voice within prisons. On a symbolic level, it was another public 
declaration of prisoners’ status as outsiders without the rights and protections of other citizens.  
  As law enforcement made new gains in courts and within prisons, it also continued to 
push for criminal sentencing reforms at the California legislature. Only months after SB42 and 
AB476 went into effect, lawmakers moved again to increase prison terms. State Senator Robert 
Presley, another Democratic politician with a law-enforcement background, led the charge. He 
had campaigned as the “Undersheriff of Riverside County” and credited his electoral victories—
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particularly the ability to attract Republican support within his swing district—to his stance on 
crime issues and his professional background.610 Disturbed by the allegedly short sentences 
proscribed by the new fixed sentencing scheme, Senator Presley introduced legislation to extend 
the terms. His bill, Senate Bill 709 [SB709], added two to four years to middle and upper terms 
for violent crimes and some property crimes. For example, the indeterminate sentence for a 
convicted rapist had been three years to life in prison. Under SB42, rape was punished by a 
lower (or mitigated) term of three years, a middle term of four years, and an aggravated sentence 
of five years. SB709 increased the terms for rape to three years, six years, and eight years, 
respectively. The sentence for assault with the intent to kill, which had been two, three, or four 
years, depending on severity, was increased to three, five, and seven years by SB709.611 A 
companion bill, Senate Bill 1057, extended the average length of parole supervision from 18 
months to three years. For those sentenced to indeterminate life sentences and released at the 
discretion of the new Community Release Board, SB1057 increased parole from three to five 
years.  
  Law-enforcement interests and their political allies used the proposed fixed sentencing 
laws as a vehicle to assert a muscular vision of state power. Prosecutors and police groups, 
principally the District Attorney’s Association, justified SB709 by presenting the punishments in 
SB42 as weak. In public pronouncements and media coverage, SB709 was characterized as an 
attempt to “strengthen,” “toughen,” or “stiffen” criminal penalties. Editorialists spoke of SB709 
as “putting teeth” in determinate sentencing, and described it as a “Bill with Backbone.”612 
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Officers also couched their calls for expanded parole supervision in gendered terms. A letter to 
Senator Presley from a unit supervisor of the Parole and Community Services Division, 
explained that, “It appears to us that some legislators and outside groups wish to emasculate and 
eventually eliminate paroles, for whatever their reason.” SB1057 was needed to “toughen” or 
“strengthen” parole workers, and—the logic followed—in turn enhance public safety. The key to 
protecting the public was fortifying the power of law-enforcement agencies.  
While this reasoning is so naturalized today it may seem bizarre to reflect on it, this logic is 
neither inevitable nor self-evident. Little research suggested that increased parole or prison time 
enhanced public safety. When factoring in the significant costs of added monitoring and 
incarceration, there was not significant evidence to suggest any net positive social value to 
punitive policy shifts. In the debate surrounding SB709 and SB1057, some opponents disputed 
whether the bills would provide enough social benefit to justify an additional $370 million 
dollars in corrections spending between 1981 and 1986 alone. Governor Brown “raised questions 
about cost” but chose not to oppose the law in an election year.613 Most politicians joined him in 
endorsing the revisions, and SB709 passed the Senate 27 to two. The only opposing votes were 
Senator Nejedly, who originally shepherded SB42 to passage, and Alan Sieroty, who had 
opposed determinate sentencing from the beginning for fear of lawmakers’ inclination to 
perpetually increase sentences.614  
Legislators were right to worry about the political costs of opposing these “tough-on-
crime” bills. When SB709 moved to the Assembly, H. L. Bill Richardson’s advocacy 
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organization, the Law and Order Campaign Committee, coordinated a media and grassroots 
campaign with the District Attorney Association and other law-enforcement groups. It unleashed 
intense pressure, especially on the members of the Criminal Justice Committee, who had 
historically thwarted efforts to increase punishments. In one mailing, the Law and Order 
Campaign Committee alerted 10,520 constituents of Criminal Justice Committee members that 
their representatives had not yet committed to supporting SB709.615  
After clearing the Criminal Justice Committee, the Assembly easily passed SB709 and 
SB1057. On September 5, 1978 Governor Brown signed these bills and three other anti-crime 
measures into law. He held a press conference at the Los Angeles Sheriff’s office, again 
surrounded by law-enforcement personnel.616 
 
“The Walls Are Getting Higher, and the Steel Bars Are Getting Closer Together”: The 
Aftermath of SB42 and Determinate Sentencing 
 
Senator Presley believed his law “fixed” the major problems in California’s new sentencing 
system and that legislators would resist “emotionalism” and not pursue further, more punitive 
changes.617 However, like AB476, SB709 did not end the clamor for more punitive laws. In the 
following decades, statutes that increased punishment, enhanced “victims’ rights,” or otherwise 
“toughened” policy became staples of California’s politics. And the reward for championing 
such legislation was increasingly apparent. In 1978, H. L. Richardson introduced Senate Bill 
1840, a law that in effect doubled the penalty for rape, making it higher than punishment for 
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first-degree murder in some cases. When the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee blocked the 
legislation because it believed it created a warped, disproportionate penalty structure, Senators 
used a rarely successful parliamentary maneuver that forced the entire Assembly to vote on 
whether to bypass the committee and bring the bill directly to the floor. Although the effort to 
bypass the Criminal Justice Committee failed by five votes, Richardson’s Law and Order 
Campaign Committee used legislators’ opposition on the procedural question to attack them as 
“soft on crime” and “soft on rape” in the upcoming election campaigns. Voters sent almost a 
dozen new Republican legislators to the Assembly who had made “tough” stands on crime 
central to their campaigns. Many of them were supported by funds from Richardson’s 
campaign.618 Legislators attributed some of their colleagues’ subsequent defeat in the 1978 
elections to these attacks and, not surprisingly, were even more reluctant to oppose the next 
round of anti-crime legislation.  
Seizing the momentum, Senator Richardson repeated the same play in 1979, and 
introduced essentially the same rape bill, titled Senate Bill 13. When the Criminal Justice 
Committee again obstructed the legislation, opponents seemed on the verge of assembling a 
bipartisan coalition with enough votes to pry the law from committee and move it before the full 
body. Democrats, fearful of handing “law-and-order” proponents another vote to hammer them 
with in the 1980 elections, relented and the Criminal Justice Committee negotiated another 
hearing for Senate Bill 13. Soon afterwards, the law passed the legislature. It mandated severe 
enhancements for repeat violent sex offenders and eliminated caps on consecutive sentences. In 
practical terms, it roughly doubled the sentences for serial rape, making California’s penalties the 
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most severe in the country.619 
Soon Richardson would look beyond state lawmakers and focus his organizations’ political 
energy on members of the judiciary. When California Supreme Court Justice Rose Bird authored 
a decision that undermined the 1975 “Use a Gun, Go to Prison” law, the Law and Order 
Campaign Committee invested almost a quarter of a million dollars into an effort to defeat her. 
Confronting an unprecedented public attack in what were usually routine reconfirmations, Bird 
barely retained her seat in the 1978 election.  
 The ascendancy of these punitive politics joined with mandatory sentencing to balloon 
California’s prison population. While the growth started before the passage of SB42, with prison 
commitment rates climbing steadily from 1972, the rate of increase accelerated considerably 
after sentencing reform.620 And although there is some scholarly debate over what caused the 
explosion in incarceration, contemporary observers drew a direct correlation between punitive 
new laws and the increasingly crowded prisons. With mandated sentences, authorities lost the 
ability— employed so successfully by Ronald Reagan when he was governor—to use parole 
releases to alleviate population pressure within institutions. In addition to the more mechanical 
policy effects, some population growth was attributable to the cultural reverberations of these 
debates. Some judges felt more willing to hand down prison time, knowing that the offender 
faced a set punishment and would not be held indefinitely.621 Others defensively erred on the 
side of longer sentences and higher commitment rates, fearing that their decisions were being 
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carefully scrutinized for signs of “softness.”622  
These factors conspired to cause unprecedented growth in the number of people housed by 
California’s prisons. Those convicted were sentenced to prison more frequently, as opposed to 
other options, such as probation, jail, or some combination of the two. In 1971, only 10 percent 
of convicted felons were sent to prison, versus 33 percent in 1978. Judges in Los Angeles County 
issued 34 percent more prison sentences in 1978 than 1977. And California’s prisons quickly 
filled to capacity, raising the politically dicey issue of whether to fund new prison construction or 
institute reforms to reduce the population that left lawmakers open to “soft-on-crime” attacks. In 
January of 1979, institutions housed 20,000 inmates in facilities designed to accommodate 
19,000.623 By 1981, the population reached 24,000, with 10 percent of inmates sharing cells built 
to house one person.624 (By 2010, California’s 33 prisons house 165,000 people, more than 
double the 84,000 inmates the institutions were designed to hold.)625  
Because diverting precious state resources to prison construction was less popular than 
demanding “stiff” sentences, it was here where liberal state politicians made another stand 
against punitive trends. For a period in the late 1970s, the issue of prison costs reopened debates 
about punitive mandatory sentencing. When overcrowding prompted demands for construction 
funds, Assembly members blocked the proposals, arguing that other approaches would be a more 
productive use of resources. In article after article, journalists deliberated whether the public’s 
taste for longer prison terms would translate into a willingness to fund, build, and sustain a 
massive carceral apparatus. One editorial predicted that the price tag of punitive policy would 
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inspire new reforms. “Despite the current tough mood of citizens toward criminals, it may be 
tempered somewhat when the high cost of this attitude really sets in. These incarceration costs 
may help renew interest in devising effective rehabilitative programs.”626 The issue was often 
presented as a duel between the public’s two most pressing concerns: crime and taxes. One Los 
Angels Times article began: “As much as Californians want government spending held down, 
they also want criminals locked up.”627 Members of the Assembly continued to block major 
prison construction funding until the law-enforcement community took the issue directly to the 
voters through ballot initiatives. Californians approved bonds for prison construction every few 
years throughout the 1980s.628 Senator Presley, who carried many of the stymied prison 
construction bills, remembered that the bond initiatives passed easily when put directly to the 
people, especially in Southern California. “It seemed to be a self-starter. We didn’t put much of a 
campaign to get them passed I think in the public. A lot more than in the Legislature, there 
seemed to be a law-and-order sentiment out there.”629  
Most often, punitive shifts in criminal policy were characterized as the inevitable response 
to the populace’s growing concern about crime and the state’s inability to manage it. Newspaper 
reports often took for granted that the public demand for security resulted in longer prison terms. 
A typical story from the San Diego Evening Tribune read: “The mood of the California public is 
reflected in recent actions by the legislature mandating stiffer penalties for crimes involving a 
gun and getting specific sentences for certain violent crimes.”630 Other articles reiterated the 
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assumption that bottom-up pressure drove legislators’ actions: “Over the last few years, in 
response to the public outcry over rising crime, the Legislature has enacted measures which set 
fixed prison terms, increased the length of sentences and limited judges’ discretion in granting 
probation.”631 Legislators also pointed to public pressure to explain their support for increasingly 
draconian punishments. There is little doubt that they felt trapped by insurmountable pressure 
from the public not only to address rising crime rates, but to do so in a “tough” and punitive 
manner. Howard Way, a moderate Republican who cosponsored SB42 with Senator Nejedly, 
explained his dismay when colleagues voted for extreme anti-crime bills that he knew they found 
objectionable.  
[N]o one wants anybody to be soft on crime. That’s the kiss of death. That’s why so 
many of my liberal colleagues, when I approach them on whey were casting some 
of those votes for harsh penalties, they would reply, “Just not to be labeled soft on 
crime.” And they can just take one vote, you know, on one obscure bill, and say, 
“Look, he’s soft on crime.”632 
In the same oral history interview, Way reiterated how this fear, coupled with legislators’ newly 
acquired sentencing authority, affected the fate of SB42:  
[W]hat happened after the bill became law on July 1, 1976, almost immediately the 
legislature began tampering with it. Assembly Bill 476 increased terms and 
mandated sentences for certain crimes. And they continued to do that every year, 
which was very distressing to those of us who had pushed for determinate 
sentencing. And I think it would be fair to say that neither Senator Nejedly nor I 
anticipated that this would happen. As long as sentences and the punishment of 
crime is left in the hands of publicly elected officials, I think you’re going to see 
this. I would go over and talk to my liberal former colleagues—Senator Petris, for 
example, would be one—“Why did you vote for this bill?” Well, there was just one 
simple answer: “I want to stay in office, and this is what my constituents want.” 
And this is a very, very dangerous precedent...What’s happened here in California 
is that—and I have said this many times—we’ve just gone berserk in terms of 
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punishment.633  
 
The assumption that public opinion drove punitive trends naturalizes these changes and 
portrays them as an inevitable result of rising crime. Yet, these transformations in penal practice 
were actually a highly contingent and historically specific outcome. It is therefore critical to 
examine how these issues were presented in public discourse, as well as who controlled and 
advanced the issue. It should not be taken for granted that reports of skyrocketing crime would 
enhance the political and cultural prestige of police and law enforcement. Also, claims that the 
public uniformly demanded the empowerment of law enforcement through “tougher” state 
responses to crime equate the public with primarily white communities where “law and order” 
polled the best. This can further marginalize urban communities of color, who had much more 
conflicted relationships with state power, especially the police. It is therefore vital to excavate 
the role of individuals and groups, such as the Law and Order Campaign Committee, which 
deployed these issues in savvy, resonant ways that both accommodated and shaped the political 
beliefs of various constituencies.  
Not everyone accepted that the public pressured lawmakers to enact longer sentences. 
There were alternative explanatory schemas. Although infrequently framed in these terms, 
commentators occasionally noted how attention to one explanation for disorder distracted from 
alternate theories. For example, when discussing the attacks on the judiciary in the late 1970s, an 
ACLU lobbyist explained, “It sounds great—you blame it [crime] on judges so people don’t 
think law enforcement is responsible for not doing a good job.”634 The public could logically 
hold police and prosecutors responsible for rising crime rates, instead of blaming liberal 
politicians and judges. Law enforcement was, after all, directly tasked with maintaining order, 
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and failed to apprehend or convict anyone for the majority of crimes reported.  
Two factors were integral to successfully positioning law enforcement and punitive policy 
as the common-sense solution to the era’s perceived crisis in law and order. First was the ability 
of groups—usually associated with law enforcement—and legislators, typically assumed to be 
Republican, to connect themselves with muscular, macho assertions of state power. These people 
projected a vision for government that was fresh, resolute, and unsullied by the historical 
baggage of liberalism. These visions were uniquely attractive at a moment when critics besieged 
traditional authority and expertise from every angle. Punitive policy’s second key contribution 
was symbolically (and often technically) expelling highly marginalized, radicalized groups from 
society. Debates about escalating criminal penalties were platforms from which people could 
resist demands to dismantle racist institutions and increase the representation and autonomy of 
people of color. As opposed to balancing the diverse, conflicted interests in society, these laws 
portrayed the state’s primary responsibility as serving and protecting the allegedly uniform 
interests of taxpaying, law-abiding, “productive” citizens. The rhetoric and policy reaffirmed 
traditional notions of “the public” that failed to accommodate the fraught, incremental movement 
toward a more democratic multi-racial society.  
Staking out a “tough” position was a political and rhetorical maneuver that was most often 
associated with the Republican Party. Although in the final analysis these politics were most 
beneficial for the GOP, it is a mistake to assume Republicans monopolized the issue or were 
singularly responsible for moving it into the core of political culture. In fact, as California’s 
history illustrates, Democrats were the architects and sponsors of many punitive sentencing 
reforms, and often attempted to preempt Republicans from passing laws that could be used to 
paint them as “soft on crime.” In his analysis of what went wrong with determinate sentencing, 
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Jan Marinissen of the AFSC argued that it was Democrats who undermined the promise of SB42. 
“[T]he two people who did the greatest damage to the determinate sentence were Mr. Boatwright 
and Jerry Brown, of course. They were the two greatest perpetrators of screwing over what was 
initially a very good bill.”635 Efforts to head off conservatives by co-opting “law and order” 
politics— usually undertaken by more conservative Democrats associated with law 
enforcement— frequently divided the party. And while Democrats could never successfully 
wrest the mantle of “toughness” away from Republicans, bipartisan participation in “law-and-
order” politics legitimized the core messages and assumptions about the appropriate responses to 
crime. In fact, as opposed to seeing punitive politics as the fruit of Republican enterprise, many 
contemporary observers faulted Democrats for their own political vulnerability on “law-and-
order” issues generally, and determinate sentencing in particular. A columnist for the 
Sacramento Bee suggested Democrats had created the beast that now threatened them: “It has 
taken them a while to catch on, but Democratic lawmakers have awakened to the fact that, in 
helping to end the system of indeterminate prison sentences in California, they have created a 
Frankenstein monster which is threatening their political careers.” The article continued by 
reminding readers that some had predicted this outcome, and quoted Democratic Assembly 
member Alister McAlister’s earlier warning that “I fear SB42 will return to haunt us.”636  
 In most cases, Democrats were trapped by their participation in anti-crime discourse that 
presented “toughness,” punishment, and retribution as the common sense solution to crime. 
Despite their embrace of more punitive policy, they could rarely outflank Republicans. An 
Assembly staffer explained that “[n]o matter how much we [Democrats] adapt, the Republicans 
can always take one more step to the right than we can. I expect them to try and to continue to 
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make that an issue.”637 While Democrats could neutralize the political viability of these issues by 
adopting their adversaries’ punitive positions, they were unable to undermine Republicans’ claim 
to muscular, tough governance. The developing consensus favoring macho penal strategies 
helped discredit any program or person that could be characterized as its opposite: “weak,” 
“soft,” or otherwise effete. Raymond Procunier, known for his blunt talk, explained that 
Republicans’ monopoly of this macho politics allowed them political latitude unavailable to 
Democrats:  
You’ve got a lot more freedom to be decent under the conservatives than you ever 
have under a liberal administration. Look what [Jerry] Brown did, appropriated all 
kinds of money, got tough on law and order, hollered “Kill ‘em” and Old [Pat] 
Brown put some board members that should have never been on there, just to 
make it look like he was tough. Reagan did not have to look like he’s tough, just 
like I don’t, the way I talk and raise hell and bark and stuff. I don’t ever have to 
do anything tough to make sure I’m tough.638 
 
By successfully painting Democrats and liberals as “soft,” their conservative opponents 
ensured that politicians advocating for therapeutic, systemic reforms to handle crime 
operated in uncomfortably cramped rhetorical space.  
 Prisoners were quite aware that lawmakers were using their lives to illustrate and perform 
their macho resolve. After the incredible disappointments following Boatwright’s AB476, they 
were cynical about future political developments and the repeated escalation of punishments. 
One inmate sarcastically described this dynamic in a prison newspaper article about Senator 
Richardson’s efforts to enhance rape penalties:  
With the legislative sessions coming to a close last week, our lawmakers held to 
their usual pattern of passing penal legislation that increases the terms of 
imprisonment for some crimes. This year they concentrated on rape penalties. 
Last year it was something about “use a gun, go to prison.” Next year it will be: 
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“Commit a crime, get the gas chamber.”639  
 
With the rise of increasingly punitive policy, space for inmates in civil society and in public 
debates narrowed. Fewer and fewer inmates testified before committees. Fewer bothered to write 
their legislators. Legislative staff stopped listing the Prisoners’ Union as opposing punitive 
legislation or supporting alternative measures. These trends converged to further expel prisoners 
from the polity.  
Prisoners’ civic participation, which was never widely celebrated, became increasingly 
unwelcome and controversial. And inmates clearly grasped the implications of these trends. One 
man depicted the situation in an article for the California Medical Facility:  
You don’t have to be a weatherman to know that things are getting hot for 
convicts. If you’re semi-conscious, mildly literate and occasionally capable of 
adding two and two, then you know that, in a manner of speaking, the walls are 
getting higher, and the steel bars are getting closer together. Is seems like every 
time we turn around some new bill is being introduced, to give convicts more time 
for a given offense, or to expand the number of offenses for which a prison term is 
mandatory. Moves are being put on our visiting rights and our rights under the 1st, 
6th, and 14th Amendments to the US Constitution. Lifers sentenced under the 
indeterminate Sentence Law are having their terms fixed under the Determinate 
Sentence law, without fair compensation in the areas of good time and work 
credits…In terms of attitude towards prisoners, the people in the free world are 
definitely regressing. Believe it.640  
 
The only hope to counter these trends and be heard, the author argued, was for prisoners 
to unite:  
We need a union to stand up for the continuously diminishing rights of convicts, 
so that there will be no return to Dark Ages of penology. We need a union to act 
as a liaison between convicts, the public, and the powers that be. We need a union 
to promote a greater awareness of the problems of prisoners and how those 
problems relate to the free world. We need a union to identify the true causes of 
criminality, and when possible, to alleviate those causes. We need a union for 
access to the media, so that our position on matters that affect prisoners can be 
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voiced… 
 
The author went on to explain that these new dynamics foreclosed the possibility that outside 
allies will make prisoners’ case:  
“Who should we depend on for our survival? The police? Politicians? Professors? 
No there is only ourselves. Ourselves and those precious few people in the free 
world who realize that that there is a lot more to criminality than the commission 
of crimes; and who believe that no matter how badly some of us may stumble, the 
human spirit is always capable of redeeming itself.641  
 
With fewer organized advocates and diminishing rights, inmates saw their already constricted 
agency further stifled. The platforms for prisoners to be heard, even by each other, shrunk as 
criminal policy became more punitive. For example, the California Department of Corrections 
shut down all prison-based newspapers in 1982, responding to inmates’ legal challenges to press 
censorship. Following pressure from the ACLU and allied lawmakers, the papers were reopened 
under strict control, serving essentially as administrators’ organs.642  
 Simultaneously, law enforcement and “law-and-order” politicians expanded their power 
and prestige. Their enhanced authority was predicated upon the perceived need to surveil, 
discipline, and punish prisoners. New policies, which were opposed to facilitating convicts’ 
reintegration into society, charged state agents with guarding the boundary between criminal and 
law-abiding citizens. Prisoners were presented as the antithesis of citizens and positioned 
emphatically and dramatically (if not always permanently) outside of the polity. The rejection of 
their rights and belonging worked to secure the rights and security of normative, law-abiding 
citizens. In fact, the authority of law enforcement, its “law-and-order” political allies, and the 
reformulated legitimacy of the state itself were all predicated upon the discursive, physical, and 
legal exclusion of prisoners from society. This dramatic expulsion of convicts from the polity not 
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only made people feel safer, but also provided social cohesion at a time when society seemed to 
disaggregate and traditional visions of the national character seemed to disintegrate. 
 
 280 
CONCLUSION: ASSEMBLING AN UNDERCLASS THROUGH THE 
SPECTACLE OF PUNISHMENT 
 
The punishing policies enacted during the 1970s were both creative and destructive. They helped 
tear down old state bureaucracies and undermine the reigning assumptions about the appropriate 
response to crime, poverty, and drug abuse. Simultaneously, they advanced a new macho vision 
of state power that built and expanded the state’s punitive apparatus. This political process—the 
spectacle of debating, passing, and implementing punishing policy—forged new notions of 
citizenship and state authority. These studies chronicle how punishing politics recast the 
professed mission of government and entrenched a cleavage in society between normative, 
rights-bearing, taxpaying Americans and racialized, stigmatized “anti-citizens.”  
These policies emerged during an especially volatile, explosive time in U.S. history, 
marked by momentous economic and cultural transformations and profound social 
desegregation. During the 1970s, traditional authority experienced a profound crisis of 
legitimacy.643 The state, in particular, was undermined from within by its own corrupt and 
dubious practices, and from without by an onslaught of criticism from social movements on the 
left and right. Freedom movements, particularly African Americans’ bitter confrontations with 
racist institutions across the country, contested traditional notions of citizenship. At the same 
time, economic opportunities diminished as the capital reorganizations that began after World 
War II triggered a steady decline in the percentage of blue-collar jobs in northern urban centers. 
Women entered the workforce in unprecedented numbers, profoundly unsettling family 
dynamics and established gender roles. As these factors conspired to spotlight the limitations of 
                                                
643 It is a persistent trope about the 1970s that the nation witnessed a crisis of leadership and faith in government. 
President Carter’s declared in a renowned 1979 speech that “a crisis of confidence” was plaguing the United States. 
See, for example, Peter Carroll, It Seemed Like Nothing Happened, Part Two: Crisis of Leadership, p. 139-235. 
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the U.S. welfare state, groups of elites long hostile to the New Deal seized on the opportunity to 
defund and dismantle its legacy.644  
These interlocking factors exerted intense destabilizing pressure, rendering old social 
assumptions and economic arrangements vulnerable and opening space for the rise of a new 
order. The welfare and criminal policy debates examined in this dissertation were a principal site 
for forging that settlement. On this unstable stage and with varying degrees of agency, groups 
met and struggled over how the state should serve and protect its citizens. Empowered by social 
movements, welfare recipients and criminal offenders claimed new authority and made new 
claims on the state. Their political engagement reshaped policy debates, unsettled societal 
hierarchies, and undermined liberalism by laying bare the quiet brutality behind many of its 
rehabilitative claims and therapeutic regimes.  
Simultaneously, hostile groups, such as law enforcement interests and conservative 
politicians, used the heightened visibility of marginalized populations as a foil to circumscribe 
normative citizenship. These groups forwarded punitive legislation embedded in a distinct 
narrative about the causes of poverty, crime, and drug addiction. The political process of 
enacting these laws etched this powerful social logic into public consciousness. This logic held 
malicious individuals and pathologized groups responsible for the era’s formidable social 
problems, effectively absolving other influences such as state fiscal policy or structural economic 
reorganization. Framed in this manner, punishment, social expulsion, and surveillance became 
the commonsense response to these social problems.  
Punitive policy transformed programs ostensibly designed to reintegrate marginalized 
populations into programs responsible for protecting normative, tax-paying citizens from these 
                                                
644 See, for example, Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: the Making of the Conservative Movement from the New 
Deal to Reagan (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009).  
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groups. Welfare reforms reoriented the AFDC’s mission from serving its beneficiaries to 
protecting taxpayers from recipients’ abuses. Rejecting the earlier mandate to rehabilitate 
offenders, new sentencing policies claimed to serve and protect the public by quarantining felons 
from society.  
Although earlier welfarist and rehabilitative programs had rarely lived up to their 
purported mission, they left welfare recipients and criminal offenders with some rhetorical claim 
on the state. The punitive policies, on the other hand, positioned them as outsiders to whom the 
government was not accountable. These politics, therefore, helped to constrict the circle of 
people with full claims on the state at the precise moment that social movements were prying it 
open. They were instrumental in constructing and guarding the barrier between these anti-
citizens and taxpaying public. 
Although punitive policy negated the state’s accountability to poor drug sellers, welfare 
recipients, and criminals, it did not relieve the state of responsibility for managing social 
marginality. Nor did these changes diminish the role of government, despite the anti-statist 
rhetoric of many of the policies’ proponents. Juxtaposing debates about welfare and crime 
highlights the dominance of personal responsibility and racialized group pathology rhetoric in 
the response to these social problems. Without recognizing the growth of spending on 
incarceration, welfare state retrenchments may appear as a callous means to save money or 
shrink government. However, interpreting attacks on welfare as simply anti-government fails to 
explain elites’ enthusiastic support for expensive programs that disciplined, monitored, and 
punished. Welfare state retrenchment represented a change in tactics and a redirection of 
resources, not an abdication of government authority or responsibility.  
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Examining social policy since 1970 without incorporating punitive trends and the 
expansion in incarceration is like studying international relations without examining the military. 
If studied in isolation from the armed forces, the State Department’s expenditures and emphasis 
on diplomacy would be a misleading indicator of the nation’s engagement overseas. Just as the 
scale of military spending reveals critical aspects of the nation’s cultural, political, and economic 
orientation, the colossal penal apparatus constructed during the final decades of the twentieth 
century reflects core attributes of the political economy and cultural landscape of the United 
States.  
Contrary to many politicians’ professed aim to diminish the size and role of government, 
these trends actually enlarged the prestige, resources, and power of punitive state agencies. 
Opposed to merely denigrating the social work bureaucracy or therapeutic specialists, these 
changes enhanced the authority and social respect of law enforcement, fiscal managers, and the 
lawmakers espousing these strategies. They were instrumental in relegitimizing and restructuring 
the state during an era that had seen profound challenges to government authority and 
bureaucratic expertise. 
 The three main problems examined in this dissertation—crime, welfare, and drug use—
were all propelled into the limelight by distinct economies and exigencies. Throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s, their politics merged and intersected, resonating together to create something larger 
than the sum of its parts. In 1977, the front page of Time magazine announced the discovery of 
the “underclass,” an entire new social system divorced from the cultural norms and prosperity of 
the rest of the nation. The article described this population in menacing terms: “Behind its 
crumbling walls lives a large group of people who are more intractable, more socially alien and 
more hostile than almost anyone had imagined. They are the unreachables: the American 
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underclass.”645 Depicted as a minority within racial minorities, the underclass was considered to 
be the source of social turmoil. The article explained, “Thus the underclass minority produces a 
highly disproportionate number of the nation's juvenile delinquents, school dropouts, drug 
addicts and welfare mothers, and much of the adult crime, family disruption, urban decay and 
demand for social expenditures.”646  
Building upon the centuries-old binary between the deserving and undeserving poor, the 
emergence in the 1970s of the “underclass” was nonetheless new and significant.647  It explicitly 
united the various racialized anti-citizens into a distinct, self-perpetuating ecosystem. In this 
formulation, “criminals,” “drug pushers” and “welfare queens” were not only gendered 
representations of poor, hyper-stigmatized Blacks and Latino/as, but they were also the stages in 
a cycle by which the “underclass” reproduced itself. In this “culture of poverty,” the sexually 
deviant, single mother transmitted her pathology to her children, destining them for delinquency, 
criminality, and welfare.    
Isolated and alien from society, the “underclass” was nonetheless a constant moral and 
physical threat to the mainstream. This threat, in turn, rationalized other punitive policies that 
further reinforced the symbolic and legal barricade between the “underclass” and normative 
mainstream society. In the final decades of the 20th century, a dynamic interaction between the 
penal and social welfare system consistently fortified the border. The welfare system used the 
criminal justice system to prosecute, monitor, and surveil recipients, and therefore perpetuate the 
stigmatizing link to criminality. Many states followed California’s lead and enlisted the 
                                                
645 “American Underclass,” Time Magazine, August 29, 1977, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,915331-1,00.html#ixzz0vSUjPldP.  
646 Ibid.  
647 Herbert J. Gans, The War Against the Poor: The Underclass and Antipoverty Policy (New York: Basic Books, 
1995); Michael Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1989); and Michael Katz, The Underclass Debate. 
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quintessential law enforcement technology —fingerprinting— to monitor the caseload, prevent 
fraud, and signal recipients’ marginalized social position.648  
Simultaneously, punishing policies have entrenched felons’ position outside of civil 
society by withdrawing access to social services and civil rights. A few of the many examples 
illustrate the trend. In 1994, prisoners lost the right to receive Pell Grants, effectively barring 
their ability to receive higher education while incarcerated.649 The Prison Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995 constricted inmates’ right to press civil suits against the state, making it almost 
impossible to resist the conditions of their imprisonment through the court system.650 The 1996 
welfare reform law not only abolished the federal entitlement to welfare but also enacted a little-
debated provision that permanently barred drug offenders from eligibility for food stamps and 
cash assistance.651 In many states, convicted felons cannot be licensed in certain occupations, 
including careers with few criminal temptations such as hairdressing.652  Together, this tangled 
net of regulations effectively severed many legitimate paths to economic self-sufficiency and full 
citizenship, while simultaneously reinforcing the image of a distinct population—a criminal 
underclass with few claims upon the state.  
These politics helped construct a political landscape where welfare recipients, criminals, 
and drug offenders were positioned as enemy outsiders responsible not only for their own 
conditions but for the nation’s most pressing social problems. Therefore, although a majority of 
U.S. citizens do not encounter the penal system and other punishing institutions on a regular 
                                                
648 Shoshana Magnet, "Bio-Benefits: Technologies of Criminalization, Biometrics, and the Welfare System" in 
Surveillance: Power, Problems, and Politics, ed. Sean Hier and Joshua Greenberg (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 
169-84; and Murphy, “Deniable Degradation: The Finger Imaging of Welfare Recipients.” 
649 Marc Mauer, Race to Incarcerate (New York: New Press, 2006), 200.   
650 Anthony Lewis, “The Despised and Rejected; Targets of the G.O.P.,” New York Times, May 20, 1996, p. A15. 
651 Patricia Allard, “Life Sentences: Denying Welfare Benefits to Women Convicted of Drug Offenses” Sentencing 
Project, February 2002, http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/women_lifesentences.pdf , p. 1-2. 
Recently, many states have exercised their option to opt out of this ban.  
652 Gottschalk, Prison and the Gallows, 22. 
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basis, their symbolic operations saturate society and have been instrumental in forging national 
identity, preserving state legitimacy, and perpetuating interlocking gender, racial, and class 
hierarchies. With this logic governing popular understandings, it is not surprising that vast 
swathes of the public are not only indifferent to these groups’ fates, but antagonistic toward any 
effort to increase their access to economic or educational opportunity, enhance their agency, or 
reintegrate them into the polity. Nor should it be surprising that there has been little political will 
to grapple with the structural features of U.S. society that help produce and perpetuate gross 
economic, social, and racial inequality. This history suggests that as long as social problems are 
interpreted as the product of hostile, menacing outsiders, the United States will continue to 
display an insatiable appetite for containment, surveillance, punishment, and retribution. 
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